A disguised kingdom: Ó hEoghusa’s Odyssey, and what it says about being unrecognised
Understanding Sligo Series -1
Around the turn of the seventeenth century, so roughly 1600, a poet from Fermanagh looked at Sligo and wrote this:
Fuigheall formuid fonn Sligidhbés do díochra a ainigintar chrích n-úir mbinnealuigh mBredhcinnemhuin tnúith ‘na tímcheal.
Sligo is the leavings of envy.Hardship has become its custom.Beyond the fresh-soiled land of Bréifne,a fate of malice encircles it.
It is because people are envious of Sligo that she suffers destruction – some very particular forms of destruction we shall see.
That is the first quatrain of a forty-three-quatrain poem called Fuigheall formaid fonn Sligigh, preserved in a manuscript now in the Royal Irish Academy (23 L 17, folios 53a to 54b). The poet is Eochaidh Ó hEoghusa — Anglicised O’Hussey — chief poet to the Maguires of Fermanagh, born c. 1568, died 9 June 1612. His patron’s court was on an island in Lough Erne; his working life was spent inside the Gaelic lordship system in the last decades before it ended.
The poem is not well known. It has not been the subject of a modern critical edition. Its detail about the physical landscape of Sligo has never been extracted; its argument about the region has never been put alongside what archaeology, hydrology, and the town’s own street plan can be made to say. This essay is the first attempt to do that. It is a working document, not a finished one — corrections and collations are welcomed, and the manuscript readings are marked by confidence tier throughout.
The poem begins with a description of what Sligo has become, moves through what has been done to it, presents the man to whom the poet is speaking — Domhnall mac Cathail meic Taidhg, an O’Conor of Sligo — spends twelve quatrains retelling the story of Odysseus’s return to Ithaca, and closes with a warning. That is the skeleton. The flesh is a set of observations about Sligo which turn out to be remarkably precise.
Let us take them as they come.
The first thing the poem knows: Sligos value is what causes destruction
Four quatrains in, Ó hEoghusa says something that reads at first like an outburst of grief and turns out on inspection to be an economic proposition of some clarity:
Mairg dhi nach díthreabh ndocranó cairge chuas bhfaolchonta
Woe to her that she is not a harsh wilderness,or wolf-haunted hollows of rock.
She would be better off, the poet says, if her banks were rough, her plains covered in heather, her fields worthless. Because then nobody would come for her.
This is not the standard bardic move. Bardic praise of a territory ordinarily piles up its wealth as an argument for its glory. Ó hEoghusa inverts the formula: her wealth is the cause of her destruction. She is being taken because she has something to take. Her fertility is her wound.
Two quatrains later he says it again, from a different angle — that the covetous gaze itself, the very look of the enemy, is a kind of assault:
Sáithid Gaoidhil is Goill Bhredhrenna a rosg, rún a gcroidhe
Gaels and Foreigners of Bréifne drive in the spear-points of their gazeand the desire of their hearts.
The look and the spear-point are the same word — renna. Being seen is being attacked. What is coveted is what is taken.
That is a proposition about extraction, not a metaphor.
The second thing: where the wound is
Ó hEoghusa gives Sligo’s wound a location. It is not diffuse. One quatrain names it precisely:
Quatrain 16: eang as goimhemhla um ghort Bhréifne — the tract that smarts most at Bréifne’s tilled field.
That is a specific, secure claim: the most painful zone is the arable margin adjoining Bréifne, to the east. It is not, on its own, a claim about who is causing the harm — only about where it lands.
The poem opens by placing Sligo tar chrích Bhréifne, “beyond the land of Bréifne” (q. 1) — but this is best read as simple positioning, the kind of landmark-reference common in bardic geography, rather than an accusation. Ó hEoghusa was a Fermanagh poet, writing for a Fermanagh audience; Bréifne is the territory an audience at Maguire’s court would already know, lying between them and Sligo. Naming it locates Sligo. It does not, by itself, indict it.
One further quatrain may name Bréifne as the direction from which a mixed force strikes — Sáithid Gaoidhil is Goill Bhréifne, “Gaels together with Foreigners drive at Bréifne” (q. 8) — but this line’s reading is still unsettled; the word could equally be bréid, a border-strip, describing the object of the attack rather than its origin. Until the manuscript is checked, this cannot be used to build a case.
What can be said with more confidence is that the danger, wherever exactly it originates, is routine:
Quatrain 17: do ghuasacht do ghnáthaimsibh — danger in ordinary seasons.
Not the noise of one campaign. An endemic condition.
And the poem is unambiguous, three times over, that the sea stands outside this danger entirely. The wave (q. 2) endures gan tnúth, without envy. The land (q. 17) is ar nach tóir tonn, a place no wave assails. The territory (q. 42) is tonn-mhaoineach, wave-wealthy. Whatever harms Sligo, it does not come from the water. It comes from the land.
That much is secure: Sligo’s wealth is maritime and safe; her wound is landward and to the east, centred on the Bréifne march. Beyond that, the poem is more restrained than I first credited it with being. It does not name O’Donnell, the Burkes, or the Crown, and it should not be made to.
There is a plausible reason for that restraint, a hypothesis rather than a finding. The principal overland route from Dublin and the midlands into Sligo runs along the southern edge of Bréifne, through the country around Carrick-on-Shannon, before crossing into the Sligo lordship. Anyone campaigning against Sligo from the east or from the centre of English administration — Crown forces most of all — would in practice arrive by way of Bréifne, whatever their actual origin or allegiance. If that is right, “Bréifne” in the poem may function less as an accusation against O’Rourke’s territory and more as a direction — a way of naming the corridor a threat travels through, which lets the poet locate the danger precisely without having to name, or risk naming, whichever power is actually sending it. Bardic poets had good reason to avoid naming the Crown outright in a poem of this kind; naming the road it travels solves the same problem.
That reading is attractive and it would explain why Ó hEoghusa — writing in a period when O’Donnell, the Burkes, and Crown forces under Bingham were all live threats to Sligo — settles on a single place-name rather than an enumeration of enemies. But it is an inference about the poem’s method, not something the text states, and it should be held as such until the addressee is dated and the actual campaigns active against Sligo in that year are checked against it.
The passes themselves — the bearna of qq. 22 and 23 — are real and are worth mapping against a digital elevation model of the Sligo–Leitrim border regardless of who used them. But they should be presented as the border’s physical chokepoints, not assumed in advance to be Bréifne’s chokepoints specifically. What the terrain shows may settle the question the poem leaves open.
The third thing: the landscape itself
Here is where the poem becomes something different from what modern readers expect a bardic poem to be ( the few that get this far !). Ó hEoghusa is describing a real place, in vocabulary that turns out to be observationally precise.
The hills are limestone. The slopes are aol-chorcra, lime-purple: white stone and heather in the same phrase (q. 6). The cliffs are all gruaidh-fhliuch, “wet-cheeked” — streaming with water down their faces (q. 22). The summits are maoilinn, bald and rounded (q. 10). There are hollow caves in the rock (cuas, qq. 4, 6). Anyone who has stood at the base of Ben Bulben in wet weather knows exactly what he means. This is Dartry limestone, described from life.
The woods are hazel on that limestone.Call (q. 7), craobh (q. 7), fedh (q. 6), fiodhbhaidhe (q. 9), grian-fhiodh — a “sunlit wood” (q. 22) literally “sun-wood”. The ecology is coherent: hazel-dominated scrub with open, lighter stands, growing on thin soil over limestone. It is the same vegetation still recorded in the Sligo lowlands.
The hydrology is karst. The poem gives Sligo an epithet, tirm-shreabh, “dry stream,” and uses it three separate times (qq. 3, 5, 39). At the same time it describes her uplands as braontana, dripping wet (q. 25). Rain-drenched hills, streams that run dry: those two things are only paradoxical to a reader who does not know limestone country. On karst, rainfall is heavy, infiltration is rapid through fissured rock, and surface streams sink and reappear. The poem is describing sinking streams, and it does not know that it is. It is simply reporting what the poet or his informants saw.
The harbour is articulated in detail, in three tiers.Rian bairc, the ship-lane (q. 22). Ethar-ród, the boat-road — the navigable channel (q. 6). Rian caol-eathair, the small-boat lane (q. 12). These are three distinct water routes for three distinct hull types. A poet does not distinguish three vessel-classes by route unless the depths actually differ. The estuary at Sligo will bring ships of about three metres draft; the outer bays and side channels are shallower. Ó hEoghusa’s vocabulary maps that gradient. And ethar-ród is a personal coinage of his — the only attestations known are in this manuscript, both by him, nine folios apart. The standard dictionary of Old and Middle Irish tentatively gives it as “of swift boats”; on the evidence of the two attestations and their contexts, that is almost certainly wrong. It means boat-road: a channel navigable by working vessels.
The uplands carry flocks.Benn n-eltach, flock-bearing peaks (q. 5); gorm-eltach, green-flocked (q. 24). Summer grazing on the summits. Booleying is not being invented in the eighteenth century; it is in the poem.
And the settlements have towers, walls, ditches, and grain stores.Tuir corra, tapering towers, thrown down (q. 10). Tuir shoillse, bright towers, empty (q. 11). Múr, walls (q. 2). Cladh, an earthen bank (q. 11). And most concretely of all, iothlonna, corn-yards or haggards, set on fire (q. 10). The iothlann is the bulk grain store. To burn it is to convert a raid into a famine, and the poet knows this and lists it in the same breath as the towers.
None of this is stock. Or rather: some of it is drawn from the standard bardic lexicon, but the combination is not, and the accuracy of the combination against the actual landscape is not. This is a poet describing a place he has looked at.
The fourth thing: how the harm is done
The scorched-earth quatrain, q. 10, does its work in four escalating lines:
Do tresgradh a tuir chorrado hadhnadh a hiothlonnado bhán glaise a griamhadh slimdo siabhradh maise a maoilinn.
Her tapering towers were thrown down.Her corn-yards were set alight.The green of her sunlit slopes was blanched. *The beauty of her bare summits was bewitched.
The first two lines are what a raiding party literally does. The third line escalates to the wider landscape — pasture, streamlets, ground colour. And the fourth line does something odd: the summits, which cannot be burned or thrown down, are siabhradh — glamoured, enchanted, made spectral, made uncanny.
Siabhradh is a strong word. It is not decay. It is not decline. It is the transformation of a thing’s aspect into something not-itself, something eerie. And the poet uses it here because the hills, being indestructible, could not be attacked in the ordinary way — so what was done to them was done to their appearance.
Note that word. It is going to be useful.
The fifth thing: what recognition is, and how it fails
The poem then does something no other bardic praise-poem does, that I know of (admittedly i dont know them all). Two-thirds of the way through, Ó hEoghusa takes twelve full quatrains — nearly a third of the whole work — and retells the story of Penelope and Odysseus.
It is not decoration. It is the argument.
Odysseus returns to Ithaca after twenty years, disguised by Athena as a beggar. Nobody in the palace recognises him. Even Penelope, his wife, does not know him. She had reckoned him dead. She was reasonable to have reckoned him dead; twenty years is good evidence. Her error is not stupidity — it is conclusion.
Ó hEoghusa writes:
nír aithin é acht go hionmhallfedh a ré re ces cumhadhdo mheas gan é d’aontughadh.
She did not know him, and then only slowly.Through her whole life, under grief’s affliction,she had reckoned there would be no reunion.
Meas — she had assessed, judged, concluded. And having concluded, she could not see him standing in front of her. The problem is not that Odysseus has been destroyed. He has not. The problem is that he has been rendered unrecognisable — and the person who most needs to recognise him has already, on good evidence, concluded that he is gone.
The poem is quite explicit that recognition, when it eventually happens, has three parts, in order. First fiosrú: someone has to ask. Second éisteacht: someone has to listen to the thing itself, not to reports of it. Third aithne, slowly (go hionmhall): recognition is laborious and gradual, not a flash. And only then does anything follow.
The corresponding failure is stated flatly at q. 35:
nír fhiosruigh, ‘s nír aithinthey did not enquire, and they did not recognise.
The failure to recognise is preceded, in the syntax, by the failure to enquire. Nobody asked. They walked past him because they had already reached their conclusion, and having reached it, they never posed the question that would have overturned it.
And now the thing that ties the whole poem together
The word Ó hEoghusa uses of the disguised Odysseus, when he arrives back at his own house in a stranger’s shape, is éagcruth ilrechtach — “shape-shifting deformity” (q. 34).
He has used the same phrase, and words in the same family, of Sligo. The land is ilrechtach — protean, many-formed (q. 5). Its beauty has been traded into éagcruth — deformity (q. 13). Every riocht, every guise, has come upon her (q. 7). And her summits have been siabhradh — glamoured or bewitched (q. 10).
Sligo has been made unrecognisable, exactly as Odysseus was made unrecognisable.
That is the poem’s central argument. What Domhnall mac Cathail is being asked to do is not, in the first instance, to fight. He is being asked to recognise. Q. 14, the hinge of the whole poem, says outright that Sligo’s problem is not that she has no champion. Her problem is that she has no fer a hégcaoine d’éisteacht — no man to hear her lament. The requital, when it comes (qq. 37–38), follows recognition automatically: Penelope speaks only after Odysseus is known; Odysseus strikes immediately after Penelope has spoken. The whole crisis is epistemic. Force is downstream of aithne.
That is a sophisticated piece of thinking about how a place is lost. It says: a territory can be so disfigured — physically, politically, semantically — that even those who ought to know it do not; and the recovery of the territory begins not with an army but with someone asking what it is.
Why write about this now
Ó hEoghusa’s poem is a document about Sligo composed by someone who watched it being taken apart in specific ways: the raiding pattern, the burning of the grain stores, the collapse of the road network and the sea-lane, the siabhradh performed on what could not be destroyed. It also happens to contain the most linguistically precise description we possess of the physical Sligo of the late sixteenth century — its karst landscapes, its limestone escarpments, its hazel scrub, its three-tier harbour, its flock-bearing summits, its walled and towered settlements with their bulk grain storage.
Neither of those things has been used. The philology has not been done in a form the wider public can read. The landscape signal has not been extracted at all. And the argument the poem itself is making — that Sligo’s central problem is a failure of recognition, sustained by a prior reckoning that nobody has bothered to question — is one that turns out, when you look, to be uncomfortably specific about a set of things that are happening in the county now.
The failure modes are many — value causing extraction like the stream at Glencar, a preconception foreclosing enquiry, like the cairn on Knocknarea, present day evidence recoded as absence because the framework has no slot for it — recurs. It is recurring right now, in identifiable instruments, on identifiable sites, and it is destroying evidence at a rate that archaeology even has not registered because it lacks the vocabulary to see it.
The rest of the essays in this series will document that. This one is the foundation: the poem itself, on its own terms, as a working document. The full working edition, with the manuscript readings tiered by confidence and the corrupt lines flagged, is provided at
[link to the working edition PDF]. !
What follows here is the essay-length reading. If you disagree with a line, tell me. It will be better for the correction.
But first, one more thing, and then we can begin.
Nír fhiosruigh, ‘s nír aithin.
They did not enquire, and they did not recognise.
That is the diagnosis, in five words of Early Modern Irish, from a manuscript that has sat in Dublin, mostly unread, for four hundred years.
Article modified to correct errors on mass and scale in the first version. This research is ongoing!
Four hundred and thirty-eight years ago, three ships of the Levant squadron drove ashore at Streedagh — in the same autumn that opened what a contemporary would call the Fifteen Years’ War— the most formidable Gaelic resistance to the English conquest. That conquest was administered from a single node: Dublin, the seat of the crown’s government in Ireland, the centre from which armies were raised, supplied, and sent against the north and west...
On the last day of June a Spanish galleon comes into the bay. The Galeón Andalucía — the largest sailing replica of her kind afloat — will pause off Streedagh before she enters the harbour, and her crew will drop a wreath on the water for the roughly eleven hundred men who drowned there in September 1588. Then, for a fortnight, anyone can walk her decks.
It is worth going. A reconstruction like this does something no document can: it lets you stand on a deck and feel a size that records only assert. But the most useful thing the Andalucía can do is send you a few miles up the coast in your mind, to the three ships lying in the sand off Streedagh Strand — because she is not quite the same kind of ship.
The yardstick
TThe Andalucía is rated at a little under 600 tons. The three ships wrecked at Streedagh — La Juliana, La Lavia and the Santa María de Visón — carried ratings of roughly 860, 728 and 566 toneladas respectively. It is tempting to line those figures up and conclude the Streedagh ships were simply bigger. That is the first trap,, because a tonelada is not a weight. It is an administrative capacity rating from a different system entirely, and you cannot convert it into modern tonnes and set it beside a replica’s stated tonnage as if they were the same measurement.
The accurate comparison is not about mass — it is about shape. The Andalucía is a galleon: long, relatively narrow, built to sail and to fight, with a length-to-beam ratio around four to one. The Streedagh ships were not galleons. They were large Mediterranean merchant naos — broad, deep, full-bodied carriers with a ratio closer to three to one, requisitioned for the Armada and pressed into one of the biggest seaborne invasions in European history. They were built to hold things, not to race.
Armada vessels at anchor, not the high built up fore and aft castles, it sthese that arethe most likely explanation gotr several features of the wrecks.
When you reconstruct La Juliana‘s hull carefully — stated assumptions — her measured body comes out at something like thirty metres in the rated length, around eleven in the beam, six or so deep. In other words, the actual hull of the largest Streedagh ship is not obviously longer than the replica you’re standing on at Sligo quays. What made these ships capacious military transports was not a bigger galleon-shaped hull. It was a broad, deep carrying body plus towering fore-and-aft castles stacked several levels high to take hundreds of soldiers and their gear.
So the replica is genuinely useful — walk her deck and you feel the real weight and scale of a period ship in a way no drawing conveys. But she is a yardstick of the wrong shape. The ships up the coast were a different animal: broader in the body and taller at each end.
The Andalusia, Sllgo bay 2026, she has a lower profile than many of the Armada vessels, particularly the fore and aft castles are not built up. her hull size is very similar though to the ships at Streedagh.
Armada merchantman, Peter Breughel
The guns we have raised — and what they are not
Twelve bronze cannon have been brought up from La Juliana, three in the 1980s and nine in the great storm-driven recovery of 2015. They are beautiful objects: cast in Genoa in 1570 — the very year the ship was built — each carrying a saint in relief, among them St. Matrona, patron of Barcelona, where La Juliana was launched. The National Museum is conserving them still.
Those twelve guns are her own armament — the sakers, falcons and stone-throwing pedreros that made up the thirty-two-gun complement a merchantman of this size carried to fight off corsairs. They are the deck guns and the swivel guns: the self-defence kit. The whole recovered battery weighs about six tonnes, and the heaviest single piece is around a tonne.
For scale, compare to the famous siege gun raised from the Trinidad Valencera, the other big Levant nao wrecked off Donegal: a single bronze battering piece of two and a half tonnes, made in Brussels, firing a forty-one-pound ball. That is what an Armada siege train looks like — and nothing of that weight is among the twelve guns lifted at Streedagh.
Which tells you something important. What we have raised is what the ship needed to defend herself. Her anti Corsair armament. It has almost nothing to do with what she was carrying. What she was carrying is still down there.
A floating warehouse for an invasion
These ships were heavy-lift transports. The plan in 1588 was to land an army in England and march on London, and that required a siege train — heavy guns, gun carriages, entrenching tools, munitions, the engineering gear to batter and dig. We know La Juliana was carrying it, because the first thing found on her site was a spoked carriage wheel a metre and a half across, and four more like it: the dismantled remains of siege carriages, exactly as found on the Valencera. The guns those carriages were built for are far heavier than her defensive battery, and they would have been stowed deep as cargo, well below it. None of that weight is among the twelve guns raised.
La Juliana‘s thirty-two documented guns, twelve have been recovered. The other twenty are unresolved. “Not recovered” is not the same as “still on the seabed” — burial, dispersal, or salvage we have no record of are all possible — and the siege train’s survival is a hypothesis to be tested, not a fact to be asserted. But the carriage wheels are hard evidence that the heavy gear was aboard, and nothing in the record says it was ever taken off.
There is more than ordnance. The Santa María de Visón took on a share of the whole fleet’s medical supplies after the dedicated hospital ship was condemned as unseaworthy on the way north. One of the three Streedagh wrecks is, in effect, carrying an Armada field hospital. And La Juliana was built for exactly this kind of work: the amphibious conquest of Terceira in the Azores in 1583 gives us the doctrine — the same class of hull, the same kind of cargo, the same task, rehearsed in the years before the main event. One of her guns is even of Turkish manufacture, very likely captured at Lepanto in 1571: a barrel that travelled from the Ottoman fleet to a Catalan merchantman to an Irish beach.
Why Streedagh is different — and of world importance
The Valencera comparison is instructive, because the two sites are nothing alike as deposits. The Valencera came to rest on a hard seabed. The lighter material washed away; what remained were the heaviest objects, left exposed on the bottom. Streedagh is the opposite. The hulls filled with sand, and the excavators who have worked there report something remarkable: articulated ship timbers — the structure of the ships themselves — surviving in place beneath the overburden.
There is a mechanism behind that. A contemporary watching from the shore saw the ships destroyed — and in a sense he was right, because the tall castles and upper works, driven onto a bar and hammered by surf, would have failed fast and violently. But the heavy lower hull, constrained on the sand and loaded with ballast and cargo, need not have broken up with them. It could sit, coherent, and be buried. That is how you reconcile an eyewitness account of total wreck with articulated timber surviving on the seabed four centuries later: the ship you see destroyed is the upper ship; the ship that survives is the buried floor of it.
If the lower hulls are partly intact and sand-sealed, then the holds may be partly intact too, and the heavy gear — the siege guns, the bulk munitions, the stores, the medical assemblage — may still be where it was stowed, sealed in by the same sand that hid the sites. That is a prediction, not a promise; the sea is dynamic and even large timbers can move once uncovered. But it is a prediction the deposit type supports.
And the reason any of it survived to be predicted is that nobody could rob it. Bronze guns are normally the first thing stripped from any wreck; gunmetal was worth more than the ship. They survived at Streedagh because the wrecking, in September 1588, opened what a contemporary historian called the Fifteen Years’ War. The north-west of Ireland was a contested war zone from that autumn until 1603, with no settled authority and no secure access for the divers and time that organised salvage needs — and by the time the fighting ended, the sand had done its work. The archaeological survey found no evidence of any historic salvage at all. What lies at Streedagh is something genuinely rare in the world: an unsalvaged, sand-sealed 16th century invasion cargo.
Putting numbers on it
For the past while I have been trying to assemble the actual figures for this site as part of an archaeological assessment — not impressions, but a reconstruction with stated assumptions and honest error bars, in which every value is marked as observed, derived, inferred or hypothesis.
It bounds La Juliana‘s measured hull body. It reads her recorded complement — something like 355 to 395 people aboard — as a constraint on her architecture: fit that many soldiers and mariners, with their artillery and stores, and you are forced into the broad-bodied hull and the stacked castles, because a single flat deck cannot hold them.
:thirty-two guns documented, twelve recovered, up to twenty unresolved, their status left open rather than assumed. The siege train sits on top of that, evidenced by the carriage wheels and not yet found.
I will be setting out the full reconstruction separately — the hull-form envelope, the personnel and architecture argument, the calibrated ordnance, and the wreck-process model — because I think it amounts to something we are oddly missing: a proper assessment of what this site actually contains.
The sea will not wait
There is one reason for a sense of some urgency. The sea at Streedagh is very active. The same dynamic sand that buried and preserved these ships also, periodically, un-buries them — and an exposed timber or gun in a high-energy surf zone is a timber or gun being destroyed. The 2015 recovery happened because storms tore the sand off the Juliana and left her material exposed and, in the divers’ word, vulnerable; the ship’s own rudder shifted after long burial, a reminder that “preserved in place” is a dynamic condition, not a permanent one.
That is not a situation a reactive scramble can manage. Every storm that exposes the site starts a clock, and answering it from a standing start, with expertise and equipment brought in from elsewhere each time, is no way to look after a wreck complex of this importance. What a world-class site needs is a standing plan — and, just as much, the capacity to act on it: the physical infrastructure and the local expertise, based here in Sligo, to survey, recover, conserve and interpret what the sea keeps offering up and then threatening to take back. Building that capacity where the site is, rather than depending on it arriving from away, is the difference between stewarding this place and merely reacting to it.
The wreath
When the Galeón Andalucía drops her wreath off Streedagh this week, it falls above a grave. More than a thousand men died there in the space of an hour, and the sand that may yet hold an intact field hospital and a buried siege train also holds them. The numbers and the reconstructions matter — they are how we understand the scale of what is there —
A replica is coming to the harbour. The real ships are in the sand a few miles up the coast, in a place that both preserves them and, slowly, takes them apart. They are worth the plan, the infrastructure, and the people to do it properly. We have, lying off one Sligo beach, one of the most important Armada sites in the world.
The reconstruction figures referred to above are part of ongoing work to assemble a full archaeological assessment of the Streedagh site. I will publish the technical detail — the hull reconstructions, the cargo mass-budget, and the calibrated ordnance — separately.
There is a particular conversation you only have while leaning on a shovel. In the rain. Up to your ankles in water and mud. Mine happened years ago, while digging some endless ancient ditch, on minimum wage, the rain finding the gap between collar and neck. We worked out — between us, idly, the way you do to keep warm — that it seemed half the films showing in the cinema that month were built on archaeology. Lost tombs. Cursed idols. Buried cities. Maps to vanished civilisations. The public clearly could not get enough of it, and was paying handsomely for the privilege. And here we were, the people who actually do the thing those films are about, being paid roughly what a teenager earns stacking shelves, to recover the real past with our hands.
That mismatch is not an accident, and it is not ironic. It is structural. Once you see the structure, you also see that it is fixable — and that almost all the campaigning energy archaeologists spend is aimed at the wrong target.
The Pincer
Working archaeologists are told two incompatible things.
On one side, we are told our output is a minority interest that produces no wealth. The past is a luxury; knowledge of it is nice-to-have; be grateful for whatever subvention the state can spare, and don’t expect much, because none of this pays.
On the other side — the moment a road or a housing scheme hits the ground — we are told the opposite: that archaeology is a service that ought to be commercially viable, that consultancies should compete for the developer’s money, and that the discipline should behave like any other line item to be priced down.
Held separately, each claim sounds reasonable. Held together, they are a trap. The first justifies starving the public side; the second justifies squeezing the commercial side. Both conclusions are “fund it less,” reached from opposite premises. The way out is to stop arguing on the terms we’ve been handed and look at how value actually moves through the discipline.
Crude Knowledge
Lets borrow a frame from the industry that understands extracted, finite resources better than any other: petroleum. Oil people talk about upstream, midstream, and downstream. Upstream is extraction — expensive, risky, capital-hungry, and where the raw substance comes out of the ground. Midstream is processing and transport. Downstream is refining and the thousand branded products where the actual margin lives.
Nobody looks at a barrel of crude and declares the extraction worthless because crude, as it comes up, is useless. Nobody demands that drilling turn a profit on its own, in isolation, without the refinery and the forecourt downstream to justify it. The whole chain is understood as one system, and the enormous downstream value is exactly what justifies subsidising, protecting, and carefully marshalling the upstream end.
Archaeology has precisely this shape.
Upstream is the dig: survey, geophysics, remote sensing, excavation — the recovery of information from a finite, irreplaceable, non-renewable resource. Midstream is the refining: post-excavation analysis, scientific dating, conservation, archives, peer-reviewed publication, the museum. Raw stratigraphy is as useless to the public as raw crude until it has been refined into knowledge. Downstream is where the value is realised and where the money is: film and documentary, computer games, narrative books and comics, tourism, heritage, education, even the music and the merchandise.
So far this is just description. Here is the mechanism
Why the money never flows back
The reason the value concentrates downstream — and stays there — is excludability.
Knowledge of the past is a commons. Once it is published, no one can be charged at the gate for knowing it; it cannot be fenced, and what cannot be fenced cannot be sold. The upstream and midstream, by their nature, produce a public good. The romance, on the other hand, is perfectly excludable: a cinema seat, a game licence, a branded heritage experience, an intellectual-property right. Value pools wherever a fence can be built.
The result is a value chain with the return pipe missing. The surplus that the public’s genuine, deep fascination with the past generates is captured downstream, behind fences, and almost none of it routes back to refund the commons that produced the raw material in the first place. The diggers in the ditch generate the substance the whole edifice rests on, and see none of the wealth it creates, because the part they produce is structurally unsellable.
This is where the wrong conclusion gets drawn. Because the upstream “makes no money,” it is funded as an afterthought. But by the logic of every other extractive industry, that is exactly backwards: the colossal downstream value is the justification for increasing the upstream subvention, not the excuse for withholding it. And archaeology has an advantage oil does not — there is no pollution at the wellhead, no externality to clean up. It is a finite resource that, once refined, pays society back in identity, tourism, knowledge and stories, and harms nothing on the way out. The case for public subvention is not weaker than oil’s. It is cleaner.
I do not, for the record, begrudge the downstream its fences. The studio that puts a ticket price on a story about the past is doing nothing wrong; it is putting money into telling the public a tale they want to hear. The fault is not the fence. The fault is that we never built the pipe that sends a fair share back up the chain.
The conflict of interest we should simply abolish
Development-led archaeology — the model that exploded across Ireland and Britain during the building booms — rests on an absurdity. The developer pays for the excavation. The more is found, the more it costs the developer, and the longer they are delayed. So every incentive in the arrangement points in one direction: toward finding and recording less. Consultancies compete for the developer’s contract, and the competition rewards whoever can promise to find less, faster, cheaper. The people doing the recovery are paid by the one party in the whole transaction with a direct interest in minimising what is recovered.
We have built a system in which developers pay archaeologists to destroy archaeology efficiently, and then we wonder why morale, wages and standards are where they are.
The fix is a single cut, moved to the right place: split the cost at the point of encounter.
Let the developer pay for the looking part— survey, geophysics, evaluation, monitoring, watching briefs. That cost is bounded and predictable, an almost normal line item any project can price in advance. The search and monitoring phase is certainly the most predictable part of archaeological costs. But the moment significant material is actually encountered, finding — the excavation itself, done properly, to the best standard we can manage — becomes a public charge.
This does two things at once. First, it caps the developer’s open-ended risk. The terror of the bottomless archaeological bill is precisely what drives the panic, the corner-cutting, and the quiet midnight destruction. Remove the unbounded cost and you remove that panic. Second, and more importantly, it severs the corrupting coupling. The excavator stops answering to the party who profits from finding less, and starts answering to the public, whose interest is in finding the most.
And here is the part that turns this from a subsidy into a transfer of power. Control follows payment. Under the current model the developer pays, so the developer effectively owns the decision; the archaeology serves their timeline and their convenience. Move the payment to the public, and the ownership moves too. Because the developer is no longer paying for the important site, they no longer hold a veto over it. The site can be ordered preserved in place, incorporated into the new structure, opened to public access, the plan modified — and in the rare extreme, the development altered or abandoned — precisely because the public, not the developer, is now carrying it. What developers lose is not money. It is the purchased leverage to destroy or ignore.
“But then they’ll just build anywhere”
The obvious objection is that if developers no longer pay for what they find, they lose the incentive to avoid sensitive ground in the first place.
In practice this is far smaller than it sounds, because it is the wrong tool for the job anyway. Avoidance does not belong in the excavation bill; it belongs in planning. We already know where the high-risk, high-value ground is — the cores of ancient towns, monastic enclosures, known archaeological landscapes. The right place to handle a Viking waterfront or an early church is at the planning stage: by refusing unsuitable developments before they start, and by attaching conditions in advance — preserve in situ, design around it, incorporate it, provide access. Developers in such zones should know going in that an important discovery may mean modifying their plan, and in extreme cases losing it.
So the sequence is: known risks are controlled by planning; everything is done to avoid and mitigate what we can predict; and it is only when, despite all that, an unexpected site emerges that the public authority steps in to pay for its proper recovery. Developers still have every reason to avoid trouble — the cost of investigation, the delay, the planning friction — they simply no longer pay to suppress archaeology. One can even imagine a graduated arrangement: a developer contribution that steps down as a find’s significance and value step up, so that the more important the site, the more fully the public carries it, and the less say the developer has over its fate.
The emphasis falls on planning that controls development with appropriate clauses, rather than on a perverse market that pays people to find as little as possible.
The missing pipe
Both halves of this point to the same reconnection. The reform needs a funding source, and the funding source is sitting in plain sight at the downstream end. A modest, ring-fenced levy on the profitable, excludable products that already monetise the public’s appetite for the past — the very industries this argument began with — is nothing more than the return pipe the chain has been missing. The arrow runs back from the fenced downstream to refund the open commons upstream.
The outcome is one almost everyone should accept. The public pays to recover and preserve the sites that genuinely matter. Developers are no longer bankrupted excavating a field of muddy, undatable postholes that nobody needed dug at a cost of a million euro. Resources are marshalled toward significance rather than wasted on incident. And the people in the ditch, who produce the raw material the whole shining downstream is built on, are finally paid out of the wealth their work makes possible.
We already extract the past. We refine it, and we sell it, and we make fortunes at the far end. We simply built the chain with the return pipe left off. Reconnect it.
“The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. Therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.”
Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Q11-12
I. “What is wrong with Sligo people?” “Why do they resist progress so much?”
The question was asked of me directly, more than once, by a person who had moved to Sligo from elsewhere (Galway i think) and had spent years working in the local authority. They had never come to terms with what they perceived as the town’s opposition to progress, its resistance to development schemes, its tendency to frustrate the well-intentioned efforts of those trying to improve it. They asked the question with genuine puzzlement, not malice. They could not understand the place. Why were these people, in this town, so determinedly difficult? Why were they against progress?
The question deserves an answer. The answer is not the one the questioner expected, and it is not flattering to the official narrative of the country in which the question is being asked. But it is the answer that the historical evidence forces upon anyone who actually examines it, and the purpose of this article is to lay out that evidence and follow it where it leads.
In 2013, the Fine Gael and Labour government abolished Sligo Borough Council. The council had accumulated a debt of approximately €94 million, much of it incurred through land purchases at top-of-market prices during the Celtic Tiger years. Phil Hogan, then Minister for the Environment, observed that “Sligo is certainly one of the reasons we are reforming local authorities.” It was a striking statement. It was also a misleading one: the debt had been accumulated by the County Council, not by the Borough. What the reform actually achieved was the abolition of a different democratic institution — one that had existed in various forms since 1613, that had survived four hundred years of political upheaval, and that had nothing to do with the financial mismanagement being cited as justification for its removal. The wrong body was abolished. Democratic representation was reduced rather than restored. The reformers proceeded anyway.
This was a small administrative event, easily overlooked, easily justified in the language of necessary modernisation. But it was also an indicator of something larger. It was the latest in a long series of decisions, stretching over decades, in which the Irish state had responded to Sligo’s difficulties by removing capacity rather than adding it. Services rationalised; routes closed; institutions consolidated elsewhere; investment directed to other regions; democratic structures abolished. The pattern was so consistent that it could not reasonably be attributed to unfortunate coincidence. It was, evidently, something else.
The European Union, in its periodic regional assessments, classifies the Northern and Western region of Ireland as a “lagging region.” This is technical language: it indicates an area whose economic performance falls significantly below both the national and EU averages, attributable to long-term underinvestment in regional infrastructure. The classification is not contested by the Irish state. The data behind it — GDP per capita, infrastructure density, transport connectivity, broadband penetration, healthcare access, third-level education attainment, demographic stability — are consistent across all measures. By every objective indicator, the region of which Sligo is a central town is one of the most chronically underdeveloped parts of Western Europe.
What is contested, or rather what is not addressed at all, is the explanation. Official descriptions, when they exist, are in the passive voice. There has been underinvestment. Services have been rationalised. Demographic factors have produced unfavourable outcomes. The phrasing treats the situation as the cumulative product of impersonal forces operating on a region that simply, somehow, mysteriously ended up disadvantaged. The active subjects who made the relevant decisions — the ministers, the civil servants, the agencies, the bodies that allocated the funding and routed the rail lines and located the hospitals and designated the universities — disappear from the account. So does the question of why they made the decisions they did.
This passive-voice account is not, in fact, satisfactory. The region in question is not an isolated, resource-poor periphery in the way that some European peripheries are. It contains more land area than the east coast, albeit a lot of it not great agricultural land admittedly. It has three international airports — Shannon, with the only US customs pre-clearance facility in Europe; Knock, one of the fastest-growing airports in Ireland; and Derry, providing exactly the kind of cross-border connectivity that EU policy actively prioritises. It contains the largest natural harbour in the British Isles, at Cork. It has a distributed regional university, Atlantic Technological University, with campuses stretching from Letterkenny to Galway. It has nineteenth-century intermodal port infrastructure at Sligo that aligns precisely with EU coastal shipping policy. It has substantial agricultural, fisheries, tourism, and renewable energy and water resources. By any objective measure, this is a region that could be thriving.
It is not thriving. It is, instead, the region that has been emptying out for over a century, generation after generation, as its young people leave to find in Dublin, in Britain, in North America, in Australia the opportunities that are not provided at home. The Greater Dublin Area now contains over forty per cent of the national population and continues to grow at a rate that has produced one of the most acute housing crises in Europe. The northwest continues to lose people. The infrastructure that might allow it to develop independently is not built. The Western Rail Corridor, the proposed restoration of the existing Atlantic seaboard rail line connecting Cork through Limerick, Galway, and Sligo to Derry, has been blocked for over fifteen years through a documented sequence of administrative obstructions, despite available EU funding and a strong economic case. The museum that Sligo town has been trying to establish since the 1950s remains unrealised, more than seventy years after the project was first proposed. The Borough Council, as we have seen, was abolished in 2013.
A pattern of this consistency, repeated across this many dimensions of state activity, over this length of time, requires an explanation. The pattern itself is the data; the explanation has not been provided. A substantial body of writing — investigative journalism, policy analysis, community advocacy — now documents the symptoms in considerable detail. What none of this writing does, with any rigour, is provide the underlying cause. The implicit theory has been that the symptoms are a series of independent failures, each individually explicable in technical terms, that have cumulatively produced an outcome no one explicitly intended. This article will argue that the implicit theory is wrong. The symptoms are not independent. They follow a pattern. The pattern has a structural source. The source can be identified, and once identified, it explains not only the specific case of Sligo but the broader phenomenon of which Sligo is the most acute and most visible instance.
The source is historical. It is not, however, the history that most readers will expect. The conventional history of post-independence regional inequality in Ireland is told in terms of geographical disadvantage, economic adjustment after the rupture of partition, the slow modernisation of an underdeveloped agrarian economy, and the comparatively recent shift toward concentrated urban service economies. This conventional account is not wrong about the symptoms it describes, but it is wrong about their causes. The actual causes lie much deeper, in cultural and institutional patterns that were established in medieval Ireland, consolidated through the centuries of English colonial rule, and — most consequentially — were not dissolved but were preserved and given new institutional form at independence in 1922. The post-independence Irish state is not, structurally, what its official narrative claims it to be. Once one sees what it actually is, the pattern of regional inequality becomes immediately and completely explicable.
Seeing what the state actually is requires, first, seeing what its constituent populations actually are. It requires accepting that there are not, and never have been, “the Irish” as a single cultural formation, but rather several Irelands with distinct historical trajectories whose relationships with each other have shaped the political development of the country since the thirteenth century. It requires recognising that the religious vocabulary in which Irish history is conventionally narrated — Catholic Ireland against Protestant Ireland, native against settler, Irish against English — obscures more than it reveals about the actual cultural fault lines, which are not religious in origin and are not adequately described in religious terms. It requires reading the period 1916–1923 not as the culmination of the Irish revolutionary tradition but as something quite different and considerably less straightforward.
And, finally, it requires looking at Sligo itself with new eyes. Sligo is not a peripheral town that has somehow failed to keep up with national development. Sligo is the most acute case of a structural pattern that operates wherever the post-independence state encounters a place or population that does not fit its cultural template. Once that pattern is understood, the apparent puzzle of Sligo’s chronic underdevelopment dissolves. The town’s condition is not anomalous. It is the predictable and necessary outcome of a framework that was constructed precisely to render places like Sligo — and the cultural traditions they represent — invisible to the state that nominally serves them.
To see this clearly, we must go back to the beginning. Not to 2013, or 1922, or even 1798. We must begin, where the relevant story actually begins, in 1245.
Norman wooden castle – reconstruction in Anjou, France. These were the most common types of castles nuilt by the Normans, Motte nad Bailey, the bailey being the small fortified enclosure below the motte mound with the Keep like above on it — Ballymote has the two Norman words in the name the Baile and the Motte.
In that year, the Anglo-Norman magnate Maurice Fitzgerald — at the time one of the most powerful men in Ireland — and Feidlim Ó Conchobhair, King of Connacht, together founded a town on the south bank of the river Sligech, at the point where it spills out of Lough Gill toward the Atlantic. The location was deliberate. The river offered a natural defensive line. The lough behind it controlled the inland routes. The harbour ahead opened onto the western sea routes that linked Atlantic Ireland to Scotland, the Hebrides, and through them to Norway, and to the south towards Galway, France, and Spain. Whoever held this point held the gateway between the interior of Connacht and the wider Atlantic world.
Sligo was the northern tip of a two point prong extending into Connacht from the bridgehead at Lough Ree. Here the Normans had finally organised the invasion of Connacht, 80 years after invading the east of the country. To make good these speculative grants of the English kings and especially the Pope, they had to enforce on the ground what was written in the documents. At a promontory on the west side of Lough Ree the Normans set up the bridhead and supply depot, walling off the base of the peninsula to pretect it. From there one line adbanced southwest towards Galway, founding Athenry and Galway that were to remain in Engliush hands. The second line ran northwest, a chain of castles including Ballymote, hitting the coast at Sligo. From the two seaports at each end of Connacht the Normans could resupply by ship without trying to conquer the vast mountainous districts of western Connacht. All they had to do was hold them.
The large city wall at the “lost city” of Rindoon, Co. Roscommon. Here a city wall cuts of the base of a large peninsula, but behind it there is no city. Abandoned within less than a century of its founding, it stands as a unique reminder of the 13th century expansion during Europes medieval warm period.
The town that rose on the river bank at Sligo followed the standard continental medieval template: a Dominican friary, a market cross, a castle, a hospital, and a port. This was urbanism in the European sense — the kind of integrated commercial-religious-military settlement that the Normans had built across England, France Wales, Sicily, the Levant, and the Atlantic seaboard wherever they went. By the standards of thirteenth-century Connacht, where the indigenous settlement pattern remained dispersed and clan-based, it was a remarkable imposition.
What is too often forgotten is that it was a joint imposition. Maurice Fitzgerald and Feidlim Ó Conchobhair did not found Sligo as conqueror and conquered. They founded it (ostensibly)as allies. The same king of Connacht had welcomed Norman builders into his territory because Norman engineering, Norman fortifications, and Norman commercial reach offered things the Gaelic political economy could not yet provide. Sligo, from the moment of its foundation, was a hybrid: a continental town built on a Gaelic invitation. This hybrid character would shape everything that followed. Although as the annals mention, Fitxgerald slyly gathered stone for the agreed upon hospital, only to arrive and switch the building materials to a castle at the last minute, catching the Irish king by surprise.
Areas of Norman political control at their hieght in the 13th century. After Kieran O’Conor.
The Collapse of Norman Control
The Norman lordship over Sligo was brief. Within twelve years of the founding, in 1257, Maurice Fitzgerald was dead after the Battle of Credran-Cille, (near modern Rosses point) killed in a Gaelic counter-attack at the northern fringe of his own lordship. The Fitzgeralds held on for another generation under his nephew Maurice fitz Maurice — known to the annalists as Muiris Maol, “Maurice the Bald” — but by the death of Muiris Maol in 1286 the position was already untenable. Three powers were converging on north Connacht: the Fitzgeralds themselves, increasingly absentee; the de Burghs, the rising Anglo-Norman earls of Ulster and lords of Connacht; and the various branches of the Uí Chonchobhair, the royal family of Connacht, now fragmented into competing dynastic lines. The Normans had more luck along the coast in Tireragh and towards modern Mayo, ousting the O’Dowds for a time, but by the 1350s at the latest they had either intermarried and become absorbed or were driven out of the area and Gaelic chiefs re-estanlished control of the coastline.
The years between 1286 and 1310 were chaotic. As Katharine Simms has reconstructed from the annals, the lordship of Sligo became a contested borderland in a four-cornered conflict involving the Fitzgeralds, the de Burghs, the O’Donnells of Tír Conaill pressing down from the north, and the Clan Murtagh O’Conors pressing up from the south. Kings were made and unmade in months. Cathal Ruadh O’Conor took the kingship of Connacht in 1293 and was assassinated within three months. Aodh son of Eoghan O’Conor was deposed by his own Gaelic vassals in 1294 and reinstated by the English justiciar within months. The whole region, in the half-century after Maurice Fitzgerald’s foundation, was in a state of permanent succession crisis. The one effect the Normans did have in Connacht was to destabilise it – the Kings of Connacht never really reestablished proper authority, instead fracturing into rival dynasties.
This was the wider context for what happened in 1310, the date that fixes Sligo’s medieval fate. Richard de Burgh, the Red Earl of Ulster — by then the dominant Anglo-Norman magnate of the entire north and west of Ireland — undertook a serious effort to consolidate his control over Sligo. He rebuilt the castle, which had been allowed to decay, and attempted to bring the surrounding territory back under his lordship. It was the last serious Anglo-Norman attempt to hold the place.
It failed. Within a generation the de Burgh interest in Connacht itself was disintegrating, undone by the assassination of William, the Brown Earl, in 1333 and the civil war between the Mayo and Galway branches of the family that followed. Sligo passed into the hands of the Ó Conchobhair Sligigh — a Gaelic branch descended from the royal line of Connacht — and remained there.
The Wider Recession
What happened at Sligo between 1267 and 1333 was not an isolated regional setback. It was part of a much larger pattern. The Norman colonisation of Ireland had reached its high-water mark in the second half of the thirteenth century, and from about 1300 onwards it began to retreat. Town after town, lordship after lordship, was lost to Gaelic recovery. The Bruce invasion of 1315–1318 accelerated the process; the Black Death of 1348–49 finished it off in many places. By the early sixteenth century, English officials were complaining that the walled towns of the Pale could only communicate with each other by sea, because the Gaelic Irish had retaken almost all the land between them.
One reason for this retreat of the Normans was the arrival into the west of heavy infantry – the armoured Galloglas – Gaelic-Norse warriors with an origin of a fightlig style in Western Scotland, but who proved effective in countering the Norman heavy armoured horsemen who wrought such devastation on the battlefileds of Europe. Here, combined with the terrain, and the traditional Irish light infrantry known as Ceatharna or Kern, the Normans were stopped in their tracks and gradually retreated or were absorbed into the Gaelic world.
MacSuibhne Galloglaigh –Goghe’s 1567 map showing MacSweeney soldiers with the chainmail, classic long handled sparth axes and various styles of padded head armour. Right, MacSweeney grave slab at Killybegs, circa 1550, note the plumes on the headdress or helmet. — taken from www.wildeirish.com
Sligo was part of this recession. But Sligo was unusual in two respects, and these two anomalies are the foundation of everything that follows.
The first anomaly is geographical. Most Norman towns lost in the recession either vanished or were absorbed into the surrounding Gaelic countryside, reverting to dispersed patterns of settlement. Rindoon is the textbook case — the walled town on a peninsula jutting into Lough Ree, founded as a bridgehead during the invasion of Connacht, by the fifteenth century a ruin. Athenry survived as a Norman town but only by remaining tightly Norman, walled, English-speaking, isolated. The general rule was that when Norman control collapsed, urbanism collapsed with it.
Sligo did not follow this rule. The town survived. The friary continued to function and continued to attract burial endowments from the surrounding Gaelic nobility — a sign of ongoing wealth and institutional continuity. The port continued to operate, exporting hides and fish, importing wine and salt. The castle was repaired and held, changing hands frequently but never abandoned. The market continued. The street pattern, identifiable on the earliest surviving maps, preserves the medieval layout to this day.
Why did Sligo survive where Rindoon did not? The most likely answer is geographical and political. Sligo sat at the southwestern edge of the Gaelic zone that included Tír Conaill (Donegal), Tír Eoghain (Tyrone), and the wider Ulster lordships. This zone was never effectively conquered by the Normans in the first place. After 1300 it became the great unconquered redoubt of Gaelic Ireland. Sligo’s proximity to this redoubt — its position as the southern gateway into and out of it — gave it a strategic value that could be defended. The Ó Conchobhair Sligigh, the O’Donnells, and the O’Neills all had reasons to keep the port functioning and the town viable. Rindoon, perhaps just wasnt situated on a traditional route, and stands now as one of the very strangest and most unique sites in Europe, a full town laid out for occupation but abandoned shortly after.
The abbey mattered too. The Dominican friary at Sligo was not just a religious institution; it was an administrative, economic, and educational hub. Friaries of this kind, in this period, functioned as something like medieval universities, hospitals, and archives all at once. They were international institutions, plugged into networks that ran from Spain to Poland. The Sligo Dominicans were patronised by Gaelic chiefs who endowed the friary, were buried in its grounds, and used it as a meeting place. The friary gave the town a continuity that did not depend on whoever was sitting in the castle in any given year.
The Anomaly Within the Anomaly
The second anomaly is what makes Sligo not just exceptional among Norman foundations but exceptional within the Gaelic world itself. After the Norman recession, most of what is now western and northern Ireland reverted to a non-urban, pastoral, political economy. Cattle were the medium of wealth. Movement was seasonal. The dominant settlement form was the ringfort or the unfortified clachan, not the town. Cities and large towns were, by the fifteenth century, a feature of Old English Ireland — Dublin, Drogheda, Kilkenny, Waterford, Cork, Limerick, Galway, Athenry — not of Gaelic Ireland.
Sligo violated this pattern. It remained a town under Gaelic governance. The Ó Conchobhair Sligigh ruled it as a Gaelic dynasty but operated it as a continental city. This combination was rare to the point of being almost unique. It is the central historical fact about medieval Sligo, and it explains everything that comes after.
The evidence for the town’s continued urban functioning is not abundant, because the Gaelic world did not produce the same density of administrative records that the English colonial system did. The annals — the great Gaelic chronicles compiled by hereditary historians attached to noble households — record what they considered worth recording: battles, dynastic successions, deaths of nobles, occasional natural disasters. They are not municipal records. But what they do record about Sligo, together with the surviving archaeological evidence, is enough to establish that Sligo was something other Gaelic regions did not have: a small, but working medieval city.
An idea of its culture can be gleaned from an incident recorded in the early 16th century of a Dublin merchant travelling to Sligo overland, presumably with pack-horses to sell his wares, who then before he left purchased the rights to poem from local poets – which turned out to have already been sold to someone else. We know of this because the merchant complained and was brought before Oconnor Sligo who restored the merchants 10 pounds he had paid and gave him ten more for his trouble. Presumably the sellers were tracked down by O’ Connor afterwards!. This shows us though what the place was known for – and interestingly that such poems could command prices and value even within the Pale.
However, perhaps the most telling evidence is the books.
The Manuscript Wealth
Making a manuscript in fifteenth-century Ireland was an enormous undertaking. Vellum had to be prepared from calf skins — perhaps two hundred animals for a substantial codex. Pigments had to be sourced, some of them imported from continental suppliers and worth their weight in silver. A trained scribe might take a year to copy a major text; an illuminator longer. The work required a secure space, sustained patronage, access to source texts that themselves had to be copied or borrowed from other patrons’ libraries, and the kind of long-term political stability that would allow such an investment to be safely completed.
Most of Gaelic Ireland after 1400 could not afford this. The pastoral economy generated enough wealth to support warrior aristocracies, hereditary professional families, and modest courts, but not enough surplus, and not enough security, to sustain large-scale manuscript production. Where the great manuscript collections were assembled, they were assembled in a handful of places where unusual concentrations of wealth and stability allowed it.
Sligo and its hinterland was one of these places. The Ó Conchobhair Sligigh, the MacDonnchadha, the O’hEadhra and O’Dubhda, drawing revenues from the port and from the agricultural surplus of north Connacht, were among the most consistent manuscript patrons of late medieval Gaelic Ireland. The clearest single piece of evidence for this is the history of the Lebor na hUidre, the “Book of the Dun Cow” — the oldest surviving manuscript in the Irish language, written at Clonmacnoise around 1100. In 1359, after a defeat in battle, Seaán O’Donnell of Tír Conaill was compelled to hand over the Lebor na hUidre to Cathal Óg O’Conor of Carbury as part of the ransom for two hostages. The fact that the book could function as ransom — and that the O’Conors of Carbury immediately commissioned the scribe Siograidh Ó Cuirnín in 1380 to restore its faded script — tells us something about the cultural priorities and the disposable wealth of Gaelic Sligo. A century later, in 1470, Aodh Ruadh O’Donnell took Sligo castle and recovered the manuscript, an event so important to him that it was inscribed into the manuscript itself. Books, in this region, in this period, were treated as objects of dynastic value comparable to land.
The wider regional pattern bears this out. The Book of Ballymote and the Book of Lecan, two of the great compendia of Gaelic learning, were both produced in the Sligo region in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the work of the hereditary historian families — the MacFhirbhisigh, the Ó Cuirnín, the Ó Maolchonaire — who served the local Gaelic nobility. The scribal tradition was so deeply rooted in Sligo that it continued long after the medieval Gaelic order had been destroyed: as late as the eighteenth century, a scribe was still working in High Street in Sligo town, compiling the Leabhar na nGenealach. The town’s manuscript culture outlived the political order that had created it by more than a century.
This matters because it tells us something about what kind of place Gaelic Sligo actually was. It was not a backward outpost of pastoral subsistence. It was a regional capital with the wealth, the institutions, and the political stability to sustain one of the most demanding forms of intellectual production known to its world. Other Gaelic areas of comparable population could not do this. Sligo could.
The Three Hundred Years
The Gaelic city lasted, by any reasonable accounting, from the failure of de Burgh’s reconquest around 1310 until the Tudor conquest in the 1590s. Almost three centuries. Twelve generations.
That is a long time. It is a century longer than the United States has existed as a country. During those three centuries, Sligo was a working town, governed by Gaelic dynasties, operating in the Gaelic political and legal order, but maintaining continental urban forms — port, friary, market, castle — and supporting a culture of learning that produced some of the most important manuscripts in the Irish tradition. The Ó Conchobhair Sligigh were not provincial chiefs imitating something they did not understand. They were running a city. They had been running it for generations. By the time the Tudor armies arrived at the end of the sixteenth century, Sligo had been a Gaelic city for longer than it had been anything else. When Henry Sidney arrived in SLigo in 1567 he reported that
“the castle is fair and the greatest of any that we have seen in an Irishmans posession. It standeth upon a good haven and hath been full of merchants houses, all of which are now disinhabited and in ruins. Therein is a large monastery of Whitefriars and a bishops palace. “
The end came, as all such endings came in sixteenth-century Ireland, in violence. The Nine Years War, which began as a confederation of Gaelic lordships under Hugh O’Neill in 1594 and ended with the surrender at Mellifont in 1603, devastated the entire Gaelic north and west. English commanders under Lord Mountjoy pioneered what would now be called total war: burning crops, slaughtering cattle, deliberately starving civilian populations. The pastoral economy that had sustained Gaelic Ireland for a thousand years was systematically destroyed. By the end, contemporary accounts describe Irish populations reduced to eating grass and carrion. The Flight of the Earls in 1607 — when the great Ulster lords abandoned their territories for continental exile — completed the political defeat.
Sligo was caught in this destruction. The town was burned and rebuilt more than once during the war. The Ó Conchobhair Sligigh were broken as a ruling dynasty. By the time James I issued the borough charter to a reconstituted Sligo in 1613, the three-hundred-year-old Gaelic city had been effectively annihilated. The borough that replaced it was a colonial creation, a node in the new English administrative system, no longer connected to the dynastic and ecclesiastical networks that had sustained the older town. The continuity of place was preserved — the same river, the same harbour, the same friary site, even some of the same street lines — but the continuity of political and cultural life had been broken.
The three hundred years were over.
But their consequences were not. Three hundred years of Gaelic urban life had created something that did not exist anywhere else in Ireland: a population, a regional culture, a sense of what was possible, that had developed outside the framework of Old English colonial urbanism and outside the framework of pastoral Gaelic ruralism. When the colonial system arrived in seventeenth-century Sligo, it arrived in a place that already had three centuries of its own urban memory. That memory shaped everything that followed.
It is to those consequences that we now turn.
But in another sense, the destruction was only the beginning. What had happened to the Gaelic city in the 1590s would, over the following three hundred years, be done to Gaelic Ireland as a whole — first by the British colonial system, and then, in a different way, by the population that succeeded the British. And this second process — the slow, structural, often invisible reconfiguration of Irish cultural identity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries — is the one that explains how the cultural fault lines O’Sullivan Beare had described in 1618 came to be obscured rather than acknowledged in the modern Irish state. It is also what explains why a town like Sligo, with its unusual configuration of surviving and inherited identities, would end up structurally illegible to the state that emerged after 1922.
To see how this happened, we have to follow the long arc from the destruction of Gaelic Sligo through the famine, the Catholic emancipation, the romanticisation of the dying west, and the construction — in the second half of the nineteenth century — of a wholly new Irish identity that bore little real relationship to the actual cultural traditions it claimed to represent.
The Plantation Aftermath in Sligo
The Sligo that received the borough charter in 1613 was not a planted town in the Ulster sense. The Ulster Plantation, organised after the Flight of the Earls, involved the systematic settlement of Lowland Scots and English colonists onto confiscated lands across the northern six counties. Sligo received no comparable programme. The seventeenth-century arrivals — soldiers granted land after the Cromwellian campaigns of the 1650s, Williamite veterans after 1690, and the steady drift of merchant and professional settlers who came in their wake — were less systematic, less concentrated, and less ideologically driven than the Ulster planters. They came as opportunists into a region that had been broken open by conquest, and they settled where the opportunities were.
What they encountered in Sligo was a town that had lost its old elite but retained its physical and commercial infrastructure. The port still worked. The friary site still drew local devotion. The street pattern, the harbour, the agricultural hinterland — all remained productive. What was missing was the indigenous urban middle class that, in other Irish towns, would have absorbed the new settlers into existing social structures over generations. Sligo had had no Old English Catholic middle class to begin with, and the Tudor conquest had eliminated whatever indigenous mercantile elite the Gaelic city had supported. The new Protestant settlers, by default, became Sligo’s middle class. There was no other.
This was the structural inheritance that would shape everything that followed. Across most of the Old English towns — Dublin, Drogheda, Kilkenny, Cork, Limerick, Galway, and the rest — the seventeenth-century Protestant settlers arrived into towns where a Catholic mercantile elite already existed and where, despite the penal laws, that elite would survive as a parallel commercial class. The two communities would coexist and eventually merge in commercial life, with the Old English Catholic merchants gradually re-emerging as the dominant local force after Emancipation. In Ulster, the rural plantation produced a different pattern: a smallholding Protestant population alongside dispossessed Gaelic tenants, with no significant Catholic middle class until the late nineteenth century. Sligo combined features of both patterns and was identical to neither. It had an urban Protestant middle class — small relative to the urban populations of the planted Ulster towns, large relative to the tiny Protestant minorities of the Old English towns — and almost no Catholic middle class at all. A situation that will become very important later.
This unusual configuration would persist, with modifications, into the twentieth century. It is the foundation of everything that follows.
The Penal Era and the Cultural Inheritance That Survived
The eighteenth century in Ireland is usually described as the Penal Era — the period during which a series of laws systematically restricted Catholics from owning land above a certain value, holding public office, practising law, serving in the army, voting in parliamentary elections, or educating their children abroad. The penal laws were enforced with varying intensity in different periods and different places, and the modern historiography has generally moved away from the older nationalist account that treated them as a uniform programme of religious oppression. But what is undisputed is that throughout the eighteenth century, the Catholic Irish — both Old English Catholic and Gaelic Catholic — were excluded from formal political and economic power, while the Protestant Ascendancy consolidated its ownership of the land and its control of the institutions of state.
What this concealed, however, was the survival of distinct cultural formations within the Catholic population. The Old English Catholics, concentrated in the towns of the old Pale and the southern walled towns, maintained their distinctive features through the penal era: English language as their first language, urban commercial orientation, continental Catholic religious practice, networks that connected them to Catholic merchants across Europe. They sent their sons to be educated in France, Spain, and the Low Countries. They maintained marriage networks within their own community. They preserved, as the central marker of their identity through this period of exclusion, their Catholic faith — but it was a specific kind of Catholicism: continental, post-Tridentine, hierarchical, sacramentally focused, organised around the parish and the clergy in the model that had been consolidated by the Council of Trent.
This was not the only Catholicism in Ireland. The Catholicism of the Gaelic-speaking countryside, which had survived the Tudor and Cromwellian destructions in the form of an underground hedge-school clerical culture and a network of patrons of native saints, was quite different. It was less hierarchically organised, more locally embedded, more integrated with pre-Christian elements that had never been fully suppressed by the medieval Gaelic Church. Holy wells, pattern days, pilgrimages to ancient sites, devotion to local saints who were often barely distinguishable from earlier pagan figures — these were the substance of the Catholicism that the Gaelic countryside had maintained through centuries of formal repression.
It was a Christianity that bears comparison, in its locality, its fusion with the pre-existing religious landscape, and its lack of strong central institutional control, with Japanese Shinto. The comparison is unusual and requires defence. Most of the cultures conventionally used to illuminate Ireland — Anglican England, the Catholic continent, post-Reformation Scotland, Norman France — are cultures shaped by strong central religious authority operating through systematised doctrine. They are useful for measuring Ireland by what Ireland was not. The Catholicism of Gaelic Ireland, like the Shinto of Japan, was something else: a religion held in the practice of the people, in landscape and season and kinship and local saint, rather than in the writ of an episcopate or the consensus of a curia. The bishops, when they were present in Gaelic Ireland at all, often had only nominal authority over the actual religious life of the people. Whatever doctrinal communion existed with Rome existed at a great institutional distance, mediated by hereditary church families and local custom rather than by parish priests answering to a chancery.
The Irish-born Japanologist Lafcadio Hearn — who arrived in Japan in 1890 with a sensibility shaped, as it turns out, by his Connacht nanny rather than by his Protestant Anglo-Irish family — saw the structural parallel directly and drew on Irish material throughout his Japanese writings: Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan (1894), In Ghostly Japan (1899), and his late synthesis Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation (1904). The biographical detail is worth pausing on, because it pins Hearn’s comparative insight to the actual cultural region this article is concerned with. Hearn’s early imagination was formed by Catherine Costello, a native Irish-speaking woman from Cong, Co. Mayo, who introduced the child to folk Catholicism, fairy lore, and the pishogues and ghost stories of the western Gaelic world. Costello’s transmission was the channel through which Hearn — by background a member of precisely the cultural formation that would have marginalised her — encountered the actual living religious imagination of Gaelic Ireland. His central observation about Japan, that Shinto “lived not in books but in Japanese people’s hearts,” applies equally to the world Costello had given him. Both were religions of place, ancestor, season, and local saint; both were syncretic to a degree that scandalised the missionaries of more systematised traditions; both had survived institutional weakness because they did not depend on institutions in the first place.
It is worth noting, while we are with Hearn, that the body of work he produced from Costello’s gift became foundational to modern Japanese self-understanding and is honoured annually at the Lafcadio Hearn Memorial Museum at Matsue. Kwaidan, his most influential collection, was not translated into Irish until 2018. The Connacht woman whose folklore reached Tokyo through Hearn’s hand had no easy route to reach the Gaeltacht through her own. The pattern by which Gaelic Irish material is recognised abroad while remaining marginal at home is not specific to Hearn; it runs through the entire post-1922 cultural history of the country, and it is one of the structural consequences of the cultural framework this article is attempting to describe.
The parallel between the two religious cultures is not identity, but the differences are themselves illuminating. Japan, too, received an imported elite religion: Buddhism arrived from Korea in the sixth century, brought there from China and originally from India, and it was thoroughly foreign in its texts (classical Chinese), its concepts, its clergy, and its aesthetics. The Japanese imperial court adopted it. Prince Shōtoku in the seventh century, and the great state Buddhism of the eighth-century imperial capitals at Nara and Kyoto, were the products of elite conversion to a foreign creed.
But Buddhism in Japan did not displace Shinto. Instead the two entered into a syncretic relationship that defined Japanese religious life for over a thousand years — Shinbutsu-shūgō, the syncretism of kami and buddhas. Kami were understood as local manifestations of buddhas, or buddhas as universal forms whose Japanese local manifestations were the kami. Shrines and temples shared sites and personnel. Priests moved between traditions. Rural folk religion combined elements of both with much older devotional practices. The formal separation of Shinto from Buddhism, shinbutsu bunri, was a Meiji-era state project of the 1860s, not an organic religious development. For most of recorded Japanese history, “religion” was an integrated Buddhist-Shinto-folk complex with no sharp internal boundary.
The Irish case followed a similar trajectory until much earlier, and was broken by different means. Christianity arrived in Ireland in the fifth century. It encountered an existing devotional landscape — holy wells, sacred groves, calendar festivals, cults of place and ancestor — that it did not displace but absorbed. The medieval Gaelic Church, like medieval Japanese religion, operated as a syncretic settlement in which the imported elite religion and the indigenous folk substrate merged rather than competed. Local saints often inherited the attributes of pre-Christian deities. Holy wells continued to be venerated under new dedications. The brehon legal order persisted alongside canon law. The hereditary clerical families that ran the major monasteries were as much a feature of the older Gaelic social order as of Roman Christianity.
What is striking, then, is not that the two cultures had comparable religious forms — many traditional societies did — but that both maintained their syncretic settlements for over a millennium, and that the breaking of each was the work of a specific reformist project rather than the natural evolution of religious life.
Japan’s syncretism was broken by the Meiji state in the 1860s and 1870s, as part of the construction of modern Japanese nationalism. The new state needed a religion of national identity, distinct from Buddhism (which was tainted by association with the previous shogunal regime) and capable of supporting imperial ideology. State Shinto was the result: a deliberate, top-down disentangling of the syncretic complex, with Buddhism pushed back into a recognisably “religious” sphere and Shinto reconstituted as a national-cultural identity. It was an internal political project, carried out by the Japanese state itself.
Ireland’s syncretism was broken earlier and by an external project: the post-Tridentine Counter-Reformation Catholicism that arrived from the continent in the seventeenth century and consolidated itself through the eighteenth and nineteenth. The Counter-Reformation in Ireland sought, with substantial success, to discipline the holy wells, regulate the pattern days, control the local saints, suppress the hereditary clerical families, and replace them with seminary-trained priests answering to bishops who answered to Rome. The model was continental and centralising. Its institutional vehicle, after Maynooth was founded in 1795 and after Catholic Emancipation in 1829, was the rising Old English Catholic middle class — the population for whom this post-Tridentine, hierarchical, parish-centred Catholicism was the cultural marker of identity. The Gaelic syncretic Christianity was, to them, superstition. The reform of it was a civilising project — carried out by Irish Catholics against other Irish Catholics, but operating with cultural assumptions imported from the continent and aligned politically with the British administrative state that was simultaneously rationalising the country’s political-legal structures along similar centralising lines.
The interesting question is not “did Ireland have an indigenous religion?” but “what kind of religious culture was Gaelic Christianity, and what broke it?” The answer is that it was a syncretic settlement of the same general type as Japanese pre-Meiji religion, and it was broken by a reformist Catholic project that was, in religious terms, doing the same kind of work that the British administrative state was doing in political-legal terms: replacing localised, decentralised, customary structures with centralised, standardised, institutionally controlled ones. The post-Tridentine reformist Catholicism and the British centralising state were not the same thing, but they operated on the same kinds of objects and through similar logics. They worked, in their effects, in coordination.
Lafcadio Hearn’s Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan repeatedly notices the survivals of the older syncretic settlement in the rural Japan of the 1890s — the holy mountains, the village shrines, the festival processions, the easy commerce between Buddhist and Shinto elements in the religious imagination of the people. His descriptions read, almost interchangeably, as descriptions of the rural Gaelic religious culture his Connacht nanny had given him as a child. The point is not that the two cultures were the same. The point is that they had the same structural form — syncretic, localised, decentralised, surviving institutional weakness because they did not depend on institutions — and that the standard European comparators do not describe this form. To see what Gaelic Ireland actually was, we need comparators that match its structural type. Japan is one. There are others indeed, the work of identifying them, and of seeing Gaelic Ireland clearly through them, is largely undone, and it is part of what an honest historiography of Ireland will need to take up.
These two Catholicisms — the post-Tridentine continental Catholicism of the Old English towns and the localised, syncretic, decentralised Catholicism of the Gaelic countryside — would later be conflated as “Irish Catholicism” in the official narrative. They were not the same thing. They were the religious expressions of two of O’Sullivan Beare’s three Irelands, and the relationship between them, through the eighteenth century, was one of mutual suspicion. The continental Catholic clergy regarded the rural devotional culture as superstitious and corrupt, badly in need of reform. The rural population regarded the educated continental clergy as foreigners who did not understand local religious life.
The Trigger: Catholic Emancipation
The political settlement of 1829, which removed the major civil disabilities on Catholics and allowed them to sit in parliament, hold office, and enter the professions, transformed the situation. It is conventionally read as the moment when “the Catholics” of Ireland began their rise to political and economic power. This reading misses the crucial fact that the population most positioned to benefit from Emancipation was specifically the Old English Catholic middle class. They were the ones who already had the English language, the urban commercial networks, the capital, the education, and the cultural orientation to step immediately into the spaces that opened up. The Gaelic Catholic population — rural, Irish-speaking, often impoverished, with no commercial or professional infrastructure — was not in a position to compete for these spaces. What Emancipation produced, in practice, was the rapid expansion of the Old English Catholic middle class across the country.
The decades after 1829 saw this class (and those able to make their way into this class, whatever their background) take over local government as it was successively reformed, dominate the Catholic professional and commercial life of every town, build the parliamentary Catholic political movement under O’Connell and his successors, and increasingly come to be identified, in both their own self-understanding and in the wider public discourse, as the Catholic Irish.
Their position would be changed by an event none of them had foreseen.
The Famine and the Collapse of the Gaelic West
The Great Famine of 1845–52 killed approximately one million people and drove another million into emigration, with both mortality and emigration concentrated overwhelmingly in the western and southwestern counties — that is, in the surviving Gaelic-speaking heartland. The famine did not affect Ireland uniformly. The Old English towns and the eastern counties suffered, but the catastrophe was disproportionately a catastrophe of the Gaelic west. Mayo, Sligo, Leitrim, Donegal, Galway, Clare, Kerry, west Cork and along the south Ulster belt— these were the counties where the population collapse was most severe and most permanent. By 1900, parts of the western Gaeltacht had less than half the population they had supported in 1841.
What this destroyed was not just demographic. It was cultural. The Gaelic language collapse, which had begun in the eighteenth century and accelerated through the early nineteenth, became precipitous after the famine. The hereditary professional families — the bards, the historians, the legal specialists — that had survived in attenuated form into the early nineteenth century lost their patrons and their audiences as the Gaelic-speaking population was destroyed. The devotional culture of the holy wells and pattern days continued, but it lost the demographic base that had given it institutional weight. The actual living tradition of Gaelic Ireland, which had been wounded by the Tudor conquest but had survived in modified forms for two and a half centuries afterwards, was largely finished by 1880.
It is important to be clear about what this means. The land of the Gaelic west was not depopulated. People still lived there. But the population that survived was a fragment, traumatised by mass death and emigration, increasingly English-speaking, increasingly disconnected from the older cultural forms. The Gaelic Ireland that had been a substantial cultural presence in 1840 had become, by 1900, a remnant — confined to scattered districts on the western fringe, watched by anthropologists and folklorists, materially impoverished, with no political weight and no institutional infrastructure of its own.
The land thus emptied was opened up to commercial exploitation in a way it had not been before. The post-famine decades saw the consolidation of large grazing farms across the west, the conversion of small subsistence holdings into pasture for the British market, the systematic clearance of the remaining Irish-speaking smallholders into emigration. Ireland became, in this period, one of the great cattle-export economies of the world. The economic transformation was as profound as the demographic one, and it benefited two groups in particular: those in the Protestant landlord class who consolidated their holdings, and the Old English Catholic merchant class who built the export trade. It did not benefit the surviving Gaelic-speaking population, whose role in the new economy was largely to provide cheap labour or to emigrate.
The Romanticisation
What happened next was unexpected. Once the Gaelic west had been thoroughly broken — once its population was collapsing, its language dying, its economic base destroyed, its political weight reduced to nothing — it became, for the first time in centuries, culturally fashionable. The same Old English Catholic middle class that had spent the previous two hundred years regarding Gaelic culture as backward, superstitious, and embarrassing began, in the late nineteenth century, to embrace it as picturesque, ancient, and authentically Irish. Albeit in some casesa vision of a pure peasant idyll, populated by devout Roman Catholics. A projection of their own beliefs rather than anyhthing grounded in reality.
The parallel with the American West is exact. As long as the indigenous populations of the American plains had been a military and political threat, they had been regarded by the settler population as savages to be eliminated. Once they had been broken — herded into reservations, their economic base destroyed, their numbers collapsed — they became the romanticised inhabitants of an idealised landscape, suitable subjects for sentimental literature and tourist promotion. The same logic, in the same period, governed the new Irish attitude toward the Gaelic west. Yeats’s Sligo, Synge’s Aran Islands, the antiquarian interest in holy wells and dolmens and round towers — all of this depended on the prior destruction of the actual culture being celebrated. The Gaelic west became picturesque at the exact moment it stopped being a threat.
It also became the subject of aniquarian and archaeological interest. This interest was to lay the foundations for the professional construction of a history that tended to ignore the problematic elements that might survive of the old culture – and focus on Gaelic Ireland like it was some ancient mystery akin to Sumer – ie long gone and mysterious, and not something that the state had up until recently been systematically destroying.
This romanticisation was not, in itself, a bad thing. Some of it produced real cultural achievement, as we saw in the previous section; some of it served the fusion project that the Gaelic Revival attempted; some of it preserved knowledge that would otherwise have been lost entirely. But it also performed a quite different function, which is the function that concerns us here. It allowed the Old English Catholic middle class to begin appropriating Gaelic identity for itself — to claim, as the dispossessed and impoverished population of the actual Gaelic west could no longer effectively contest, that they were the Irish, that their culture was the authentic native tradition, that the country belonged to them by historical right.
This was the switch.
The Switch
What the Old English Catholic middle class culture did, in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, was carry out one of the most successful identity substitutions in modern European history. They adopted the symbols, the rhetoric, and the historical claims of Gaelic Ireland — language revival movements, mythological literature, native sports, antiquarian preservationism — and built on top of these adopted symbols an Irish national identity whose substance was, in fact, the cultural inheritance they had been preserving for centuries: English language as primary, urban and commercial orientation, English common law, English administrative structures, and most importantly, post-Tridentine continental Catholicism as the central marker of national belonging.
The Catholicism that became the official religion of the new Irish identity was not the Catholicism of the Gaelic Irish. It was specifically the Catholicism of the Pale and the Old English towns: hierarchical, sacramentally focused, parish-organised, clerically dominated, morally policing. It was the Catholicism that had been imported into Ireland by the Counter-Reformation in the seventeenth century, consolidated by Maynooth College after 1795, and brought to full institutional flower under Cardinal Cullen and his successors in the second half of the nineteenth century in what historians have called the “devotional revolution.” It looked nothing like the Catholicism of medieval Gaelic Ireland, which had been decentralised, locally embedded, fused with pre-Christian devotional practices, and characterised by weak episcopal authority. It looked, instead, like a continental Catholic-state model imported into Ireland by the population that had been most exposed to continental Catholic influence through their commercial and educational networks.
The Roman Catholic Church, properly speaking, had never been a dominant political institution in Ireland before the nineteenth century. The medieval Gaelic Church had operated under its own rules; the Tudor and Cromwellian conquests had broken the institutional Catholic Church in Ireland; the penal era had pushed it underground; the Catholic hierarchy as we now know it — the bishops with their palaces, the seminary system, the network of parish priests with effective social control — was a creation of the nineteenth century. It was, in important respects, given its institutional position by the British state, which after 1795 funded Maynooth, after 1829 conceded political emancipation, and through the rest of the century used the Catholic Church as an instrument of social order — a counter-weight to nationalist and revolutionary movements, a guarantor of stability and “respectability” in the rural and urban populations alike. The British were handing the institutional keys to a Catholic hierarchy that was, for most of its history, a recent and partial presence in Irish life.
An example of this was the stamping out by the Roman church of the Gaelic psalm singing of the Gaelic masses. Something that ironically was to suvive only in the western isles of Scotland because here, the Catholic church lost control as the locals adopted Protestantism in the 16th and 17th century.
This hierarchy, when it received those keys, behaved exactly as one would expect. It enforced English-language education and discouraged Irish in the schools it controlled. It supported the new commercial and professional classes against the surviving rural and traditional cultures. It denounced the radical labour movements and the cross-confessional republican traditions. It actively shamed the surviving Gaelic devotional practices as superstition. It became, in short, a central part of the Anglicising project — not in service of Britain, but in service of the Catholic continental model and of the Old English Catholic middle class that had brought that model to dominance.
Individual priests, particularly in the Gaelic-speaking areas, often resisted this institutional logic. Many parish priests in the west were themselves of Gaelic background and maintained respect for the local culture. But the institution as a whole, and the bishops and the Catholic press and the religious orders, operated in alignment with the cultural project of the Old English Catholic middle class. When the new Irish identity was being constructed in the late nineteenth century, the Catholic Church was its principal institutional vehicle, and the version of Catholicism being installed was the version that had been preserved by the population that was now installing itself as the authentic Irish.
The genius of this construction was that it absorbed the symbols of Gaelic Ireland without requiring any change in the substance of the identity being constructed. You could sing rebel songs in English about Gaelic chieftains, organise GAA matches in counties whose Gaelic-speaking populations had been destroyed in the famine, learn enough Irish to recite the national anthem at sporting events, and still operate within an entirely Old English commercial, legal, administrative, and religious framework. The cultural fault lines O’Sullivan Beare had described in 1618 were not abolished by this construction. They were buried under a layer of symbolic Gaelic identity that allowed the dominant culture to claim continuity with what it had, in fact, replaced.
The Collapse of the Protestant Aristocracy
The same period that saw the construction of the new Catholic Irish identity also saw the destruction of the population that had been, since the seventeenth century, the dominant cultural and economic force in Ireland: the Protestant Ascendancy. Their wealth had depended on rents from a substantial tenant population, much of which was Gaelic-speaking. The famine destroyed that population. The Land Acts of the late nineteenth century, beginning with Gladstone’s in 1870 and culminating in the Wyndham Act of 1903, transferred ownership of agricultural land from the landlords to the tenants. The political reforms of the same period — the extension of the franchise, the reform of local government in 1898 — destroyed the political power of the gentry. By 1900, the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy was a class in terminal decline.
What did the surviving members of this class do? Some emigrated; some withdrew into reduced gentility; some, as we saw in the previous section, joined the fusion project of the Gaelic Revival, taking the family’s identification with Ireland to its democratic and sometimes revolutionary conclusion. But the class as a whole was, by the early twentieth century, no longer in a position to influence the construction of the new Irish identity. They had been historically capable of contesting the Old English Catholic middle class’s claim to define Irish nationality. By 1900 they were not.
The same period also saw the slow erosion of the urban Protestant middle classes in the small towns of the south and west — including Sligo. Some of this was direct emigration. Some was the long demographic effect of mixed marriages under the Ne Temere decree of 1908, which required the children of Protestant-Catholic marriages to be raised Catholic. Some was simply the cumulative result of being a small minority in towns where commercial and political life was increasingly dominated by the rising Catholic middle class. Sligo’s Protestant middle class survived longer than most because it was unusually substantial to begin with, but it was already on the long downward trajectory that would, by the end of the twentieth century, reduce it to a small remnant.
The Unusual Configuration of Sligo by 1900
By the turn of the twentieth century, Sligo had developed into a configuration that was unusual in Ireland and that had no exact parallel anywhere on the island. It had a devastated but still present Gaelic-speaking rural population in its hinterland, particularly in the southern parts of the county and along the Leitrim and Roscommon borders. It had an impoverished but culturally significant Anglo-Irish gentry, of which the Gore-Booths of Lissadell were the most prominent but by no means the only example. It had a substantial Protestant middle class, rooted in the town and increasingly identifying with the place rather than with the colonial power. It had an active working class with cross-confessional union organisation. And it had almost no Old English Catholic middle class to play the dominant role that this population was playing in nearly every other Irish town of comparable size.
This configuration was the structural precondition for the fusion politics we examined in the previous section. It explains why Sligo and its hinterland produced figures like the Gore-Booths and the Pollexfens and the Yeatses and the Hyde family in such concentrations. It explains why the dock strikes took the cross-confessional form they did. It explains why the town’s politics, through the revolutionary period, were unusually open to socialist, republican, and Gaelic Revivalist alignments simultaneously.
It also explains why what happened next was so catastrophic for the place. The new manufactured Catholic Irish identity that had been constructed over the previous half-century was about to become the official identity of the new state. The state would be administered by that class, would speak in its cultural voice, would enforce its religious institutions, and would treat the configurations that did not fit its model as problems to be solved rather than diversity to be respected. Sligo’s configuration did not fit. The town’s unusual demographic and cultural mixture — a substantial Protestant middle class, a radical labour movement, an Anglo-Irish gentry that had joined the revolution, a Gaelic hinterland that had no place in the official Catholic-nationalist narrative — was structurally incompatible with the state that was about to be built.
The starkest evidence of how this incompatibility would be handled, in the decades after independence, was provided by the population that represented, more clearly than any other, the actual living continuity with pre-modern Gaelic Ireland: those known as ” Travellers”. Their fate under the new state will give us, more vividly than any other case, the answer to the question of what the manufactured Catholic Irish identity required to be buried in order to maintain itself. To that question, and to the broader pattern of which the Travellers’ case is the most acute instance, we now turn.
What makes the Free State a counter-revolution rather than simply a conservative settlement is that there had been a real revolution to counter. The decades immediately before 1916 saw the emergence in Ireland of something genuinely new, and genuinely fragile: the first serious attempt since the United Irishmen of the 1790s to build a politics that would bridge the cultural fault lines O’Sullivan Beare had described in 1618.
This attempt is conventionally called the Gaelic Revival, but the name is misleading. The Revival was not simply a cultural movement to recover Irish language, music, sport, and literature, though it was that. It was something more dangerous, and more interesting. It was an effort by figures from each of the three Irelands — Gaelic, mixed, and Old English — to construct a shared Irish identity that would belong to all of them and exclude none of them. It was, in effect, an attempt to make the cultural fault lines politically irrelevant by creating a common ground on top of them.
That attempt nearly succeeded. Its near-success is what made the counter-revolution necessary.
The Strange Window
The conditions that made the Revival possible were peculiar to the late nineteenth century and would not last. By the 1880s, two of the three Irelands were collapsing.
The Protestant Ascendancy — the Anglo-Irish gentry who had dominated the country since the seventeenth-century plantations — was being dispossessed. Within a single generation, the economic basis of the Ascendancy was being destroyed. The great country houses began their long decline. The political power of the landed Protestant class was being curtailed by every reform act and every extension of the franchise. By the 1900s, a significant portion of the Anglo-Irish gentry had lost most of what had made them a ruling class.
At the same time, the Gaelic-speaking population was completing its long collapse. The decades of post-Famine emigration — sustained at extraordinary rates for the rest of the century — continued to drain the Gaelic-speaking populations specifically. By 1900 the proportion of the population speaking Irish daily had fallen to under fifteen per cent, concentrated in scattered western and southwestern districts. The death of Gaelic Ireland as a living mass culture was visibly underway, and many of those who cared about it believed they were watching the last generation.
These two collapses — the Ascendancy and the Gaeltacht — were happening simultaneously. Ironically enough they were of course dependent on the population paying the rents. And as the Irish speaking districts emptied out with emigration – the rents collapsed. And they created, for the first time in two centuries, the conditions for a different kind of Irish politics.
The Protestant gentry whose world was ending began, in significant numbers, to look around for what would replace it. Many emigrated. But a substantial minority did something more interesting: they began to identify themselves as Irish in a way they had not done in earlier generations, and to seek out the surviving elements of native Irish culture as the foundation for that identity. Especially those who had spent time in the west – WB Yeats great grandfather had been sent to Drumcliff at the turn of the 18th to 19th century. Here these Protestant clergy found themselves immersed in Gaelic districts, often preaching to tiny populations and seeing foirst hand the effects of the Imperial colony on the people. The piper Canon James Goodman in Kerry is a good example – who learned his craft from a blind piper on the Dingle pininsula, while preaching in Irish as a Protestant minister. This man went on to teach Douglas Hyde and Synge in Trinity college. These people laid the foundation for the next generations of Protestant zIreland that turned to the Gaelic culture as a wy to create a better Ireland.
The Gaelic-speaking population, on the other hand — or rather the educated Catholic descendants of that population, often now English-speaking themselves — began to look for allies in preserving what was being lost. The alliance was unlikely on paper. In practice, it became one of the most productive cultural movements in Irish history.
The Inheritance
The intellectual resources for this alliance were already in place. Three traditions, all of them suppressed or marginalised after independence, were available in the 1890s as living political and cultural inheritances.
The first was the tradition of Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen — the late-eighteenth-century republicanism that had explicitly sought to
“unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past dissensions, and to substitute the common name of Irishman in place of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic, and Dissenter.”
Tone’s writings were widely available and were treated, in the late nineteenth century, as foundational documents for any serious republican politics. The fact that Tone had been a Protestant who built an alliance with Catholic and Presbyterian radicals around a non-sectarian republican programme made his tradition a usable resource for anyone trying to do something similar a century later.
The second was the cultural pluralism of Thomas Davis and the Young Irelanders of the 1840s. Davis was Protestant, wrote in English, and understood that authentic Irish identity could not be reduced to romantic Celticism. His project was a cultural nationalism that celebrated Irish distinctiveness while explicitly accommodating Protestant and Catholic, urban and rural, Gaelic-speaker and English-speaker. He argued passionately for a non sectarian education system that would educate all faiths and none equally, but here he clashed with Daniel O’Connell – a Catholic landlord from Kerry who embodied the bourgeois principles we have described- who though an Irish speaker, ennvouraged the discarding of the language, and who vehemntly blocked the idea of secular and open education. This caused Davis and the Young Irelnaders much distress, and he foresaw and predicted that bloodshed wouyld ensue in the future from the insistence on separation of the population along religious lines. He was right. But O’Connell and the forces of Roman Catholic Ireland won the day, and Irish education from primary to university became divided on religious lines. Those progressives who believed in open education were driven to the fringes in the Republican and revolutionary moveemnets such as the IRB, which were to plah a pivotal role in the Rising to come. The Famine (and his untimely death from Scarlet Fever) cut short Davis’s movement, but his idea — that diversity within Ireland strengthened rather than weakened national identity — survived as a usable resource.
The third was the social republicanism of James Connolly, then in active development. Connolly understood that political independence without economic restructuring would reproduce colonial patterns under new management — that an Irish state run on colonial economic logic would be hollow regardless of who was nominally in charge. His socialism explicitly demanded land reform, labour rights, women’s equality, and protection of the poor as integral to independence rather than as separate questions. By 1910 Connolly was developing this position in active engagement with both Irish nationalism, but perhaps more importantly he absorbed some knowledge of the Gaelic past and its importance in being fused to his socialist principles, and his synthesis offered a way of thinking about Irish independence that put the economic conditions of the working class at the centre.
Behind these three traditions stood a fourth, less developed but quietly influential: the anarcho-nationalism of Bulmer Hobson, the Belfast Quaker who organised the IRB in the 1910s, founded the Dungannon Clubs, edited Irish Freedom, and helped plan the 1916 Rising. Hobson argued for a federal Ireland that would devolve real authority to regions and cultural communities — that would accommodate Ulster Protestants, Gaeltacht districts, urban workers, and rural smallholders within structures designed for plurality rather than uniformity. Hobson’s federal vision was the explicit alternative to the centralised state model that eventually triumphed, and it was widely known and discussed in revolutionary circles before 1916.
These four traditions — Tone’s non-sectarian republicanism, Davis’s cultural pluralism, Connolly’s social republicanism, Hobson’s federalism — together formed the intellectual scaffolding of a possible Ireland that was very different from the one that emerged. They were not fringe positions. They were the mainstream of advanced republican thought before the Rising. The figures most centrally associated with them — Tone, Davis, Connolly, Hobson — were figures the post-independence state could not entirely repudiate without losing its own legitimacy, and so it commemorated them as heroes while ignoring or burying their actual programmes. What they had in common and what is often not remarked upon – is that in each case the features of the Gaelic past were to figure prominenly in what led them to the particular barand of federal decentralised and secular republic they envisaged. They were led there because this history was what still animated the people, and it was the fusing of modern political concepts like equality, anarchism, socialism to the knowledge of the old Gaelic world that underlay the culture of the country that gave these movements their power.
The Revival as Fusion
Against this intellectual background, the Gaelic Revival proper — the cultural and linguistic movement of the 1890s and after — takes on a different significance than it is usually given. The conventional reading treats the Revival as essentially nationalist, with figures like Douglas Hyde, Patrick Pearse, and the Gaelic League providing the cultural infrastructure for what eventually became the independence movement. This reading is not wrong. It is incomplete.
What it misses is the structural character of the Revival as a fusion project. The Gaelic League, founded in 1893, was deliberately non-sectarian and non-political. Its founding president was Douglas Hyde, a Protestant clergyman’s son from Roscommon, born into the Church of Ireland gentry of the western marches. Its early leadership included Protestants, Catholics, urban professionals, rural priests, socialists, conservatives, and ascendancy figures. The shared project — recovery of Irish as a living language, preservation of Irish music and oral traditions, building of a literary culture that drew on native sources — was deliberately framed as belonging to all Irish people regardless of religious or political affiliation.
Hyde himself was not just nominally a regional figure. Though born at Castlerea in Roscommon, he spent significant portions of his youth at Kilmactranny in Co. Sligo, in the same townland that contains the mythological battlefield of the second battle of Moytura, where the Tuatha Dé Danann fought the Fomorians for control of Ireland. The geographical specificity matters. The fusion project Hyde would later articulate intellectually he had already lived geographically: his formation was simultaneously his family’s Protestant clerical-rectory Ireland and the deepest layer of pre-Christian Gaelic mythology, both present in the same Sligo landscape. He delivered the lecture that would define the Revival’s intellectual programme — “The Necessity for De-Anglicising Ireland” — at the inaugural meeting of the National Literary Society in November 1892, at W. B. Yeats’s invitation. The fusion thesis was thus placed, from the founding moment, at the institutional centre of the Revival’s literary wing.
Hyde and his collaborators understood exactly what they were doing. The “De-Anglicising” lecture. It was an argument that Irish people of every background had been culturally damaged by the abandonment of their own traditions in favour of imported English ones, and that recovery of those traditions would benefit all of them equally. The recovery Hyde had in mind was the recovery of distinctive Irish cultural forms; it was not the imposition of any particular religious or political programme. He was attempting to create a shared cultural ground on which Protestant and Catholic, English-speaker and Irish-speaker, gentry and tenant could meet as equal participants in a common project.
W. B. Yeats’s literary nationalism worked along parallel lines. Yeats was emphatically not interested in producing a Catholic-nationalist literature. He wanted a national literature that drew on Gaelic mythological and folk sources but was produced in English and Irish (he tried but failed to learn Irish), by writers of all backgrounds, and was capable of representing the country as a whole. The Abbey Theatre, founded in 1904 with Yeats and Lady Gregory as central figures, was a Protestant Ascendancy project deliberately framed as a national institution. Its founders saw no contradiction in this — and there would have been no contradiction if the fusion project had succeeded.
The Gaelic Athletic Association, founded in 1884, was a more complicated case. It was more deeply marked from the start by Catholic and sectarian elements than the Gaelic League or the Abbey, and it would eventually become one of the institutional vehicles of the Old English Catholic culture’s dominance after independence. But even the GAA, in its earliest decades, drew Protestant participants in significant numbers, and its founding rhetoric was framed in inclusive terms. It was only in the post-independence consolidation that it became unambiguously aligned with one of the three Irelands.
The cumulative effect of these institutions, in the two decades before 1916, was the creation of a substantial cultural space in which the cultural fault lines O’Sullivan Beare had described were being deliberately and successfully bridged. People who could not have collaborated on any other ground were collaborating on the recovery of Irish language and culture. The collaboration was producing real cultural achievements — a literary movement that would win two Nobel Prizes, a theatre tradition that influenced world drama, a linguistic recovery that, however incomplete, prevented the total disappearance of Irish as a living language. And it was producing, more importantly, a shared cultural identity that crossed the older fault lines.
Sligo at the Centre
This fusion was not evenly distributed across Ireland. in the late 18th and early 19th century the first wave of Church of Ireland preachers were posted to the remote parishes in Gaelic speaking areas. Many of them learned the lkanguage and they became the first generation from the colony that began to see a possibility that lay beyond the sectarian and colonial divisions. Some places had the conditions for it more strongly than others, and Sligo had them as strongly as anywhere on the island.
The town’s Protestant middle class — descendants of the seventeenth-century settlers, by 1900 a substantial community of merchants, professionals, and skilled workers integrated into the economic and civic life of the town — was unusual in its scale and its rootedness. Sligo had a higher Protestant population than any other town in Connacht, upt around 15-20%. These were not absentee landlords or visiting officials. They were locally embedded, and increasingly identified themselves as people of the place rather than as outposts of a colonial power. They had every reason to seek arrangements that would secure their position in a changing Ireland, and many of them did so by participating actively in the cultural and political life of the region.
The Anglo-Irish gentry of the Sligo hinterland included some of the most significant fusion figures in the country. The Gore-Booths of Lissadell are the textbook case. Sir Robert Gore-Booth, in the 1840s, had been the rare landlord whose treatment of his tenants during the Famine was remembered with respect rather than bitterness. His granddaughters Constance and Eva, born into the Ascendancy at its declining moment, took the family’s identification with Ireland to its logical conclusion. Eva became a socialist, suffragist, and labour organiser in Manchester, working with women textile workers; Constance became — improbably for a Polish-married countess raised at Lissadell — a revolutionary socialist, an officer in the Irish Citizen Army, a participant in the 1916 Rising, the first woman elected to the Westminster parliament in 1918, and the Minister for Labour in the first Dáil Éireann. Her trajectory is conventionally treated as exceptional. It was not. It was an extreme expression of a pattern visible across the Anglo-Irish gentry of the late nineteenth century, in which the children of the dispossessed Protestant ruling class chose Irish identity and democratic equality over the colonial loyalties of their parents and grandparents. The estate they inhabited would itself, a century later, become the most acute single test of the state’s relationship to its own founding narrative.”
W. B. Yeats’s roots in Sligo are too well-known to need rehearsal. His maternal family, the Pollexfens, were Sligo merchants — substantial Protestant business owners in the town, ship-owners and millers, the kind of locally rooted commercial family that defined Sligo’s distinctive middle class. He spent much of his childhood in Sligo; his lifelong identification with the region shaped the bulk of his poetry. What is worth noticing is the specific quality of that identification. Yeats was not a Sligo Protestant looking nostalgically at a Gaelic peasantry. He was a Sligo Protestant trying to construct, through literature, a national identity that would include him and his community as Irish rather than English, but without suppressing the other identities on the island. His Sligo was deliberately a Gaelic Sligo as well as a Protestant Sligo; the conscious project of his work was to refuse the choice between those identities.
The poet’s father, the painter John Butler Yeats, described his own political position with the phrase “socialist anarchist Home Ruler.” It was a self-description that captured the political stance of an entire generation of Anglo-Irish intellectuals who saw the cultural fusion of Gaelic and Protestant Ireland as the necessary basis for a successful and non-sectarian country. The line from John Butler Yeats’s politics to Constance Markievicz’s revolutionary socialism is not a long one. He was not an isolated eccentric. He was the type case of the Anglo-Irish father whose children would carry the fusion project into active revolutionary politics.
Douglas Hyde, though born in Castlerea in Roscommon and shaped (as we have seen) by his Sligo years at Kilmactranny, belonged to the same regional cultural world. The Protestant clergyman’s son who founded the Gaelic League and would later become the first President of Ireland was a product of the same Connacht Anglo-Irish formation that produced the Gore-Booths and the Yeatses. His fusion project — Gaelic culture as common ground for all Irish people regardless of religion — was a project that made specific sense in this region, where the cultural fault lines were closer together than they were elsewhere and where the historical possibility of bridging them was more visible. Sir William Wilde, father of Oscar, was also born and grew up in Connacht – in Roscommon. Wildes collection of artefacts and stories were to form the basis of the national museum collections in the future.
These figures — Markievicz, Yeats, Hyde, the Wildes— are conventionally read as exceptional individuals. They were more usefully read as representative of a regional cultural formation that had produced the conditions for fusion politics. Sligo and its hinterland was not just incidental to their emergence.
The Labour Dimension
The cultural fusion attempted by the Gaelic League and the literary movement was paralleled, and reinforced, by an industrial fusion attempted by the labour movement. The Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union, founded in 1909 under James Larkin and James Connolly, organised across confessional lines from its founding. Its industrial actions — the Belfast dock strike of 1907, the Cork City strike of 1909, the Wexford foundry strike of 1911, the Sligo dock strike of 1913, the Dublin Lockout of the same year — repeatedly demonstrated that Catholic and Protestant workers could and did make common cause against employers when given the institutional vehicle for it.
The Sligo Dock Strike of 1913 deserves particular attention because it is the case that contradicts the conventional narrative most clearly, and that has, for that reason, been most thoroughly forgotten. The dispute began on 8 March 1913, six months before the Dublin Lockout would erupt in August. Its origins were in a confrontation initiated by Arthur Jackson, the dominant port employer, who — having been forced to concede union recognition in a shorter dispute in 1912 — was determined to break the ITGWU’s grip on Sligo labour. His tactics anticipated, in remarkable detail, those that William Martin Murphy would deploy in Dublin six months later. He liaised with the Royal Irish Constabulary, contacted the international Shipping Federation, arranged for scab labour to be imported from Liverpool, and prepared for a confrontation he expected to win.
The strike lasted fifty-six days. It was violent: there were repeated clashes on the docks, riots in the town, baton charges by the RIC, and one death — a union member named Dunbar, struck on the head with a shovel by an imported strike-breaker named Garvey. The property of leading firms was attacked, including that of Pollexfen and Company — the Yeats family business — and of the Connacht Manufacturing Company, of which Sir Josslyn Gore-Booth, Constance Markievicz’s brother, was a director. The cultural fault lines of the town were visible on both sides of the dispute: the Yeats family’s commercial interests and one of the Gore-Booth siblings were on the employer side, while Constance Markievicz herself, in Dublin, was supporting the union side from the platforms of the Irish Citizen Army. Sligo County Council formally denounced Larkin’s “foul, anti-Christian doctrines” — the explicitly religious framing of the denunciation is itself significant. But the Mayor of Sligo took the opposite position, hosting mass meetings of the strikers in the Town Hall and backing their cause publicly.
The strike was settled at the beginning of May. The settlement preserved union recognition and improved working conditions. The workers had won. James Larkin would later regard the Sligo victory as one of the ITGWU’s major achievements of the period.
This outcome is the key piece of evidence the conventional narrative cannot accommodate. The Dublin Lockout, beginning in August of the same year, was fought to total defeat. The Dublin employers, under Murphy’s leadership, refused all negotiation and broke the union completely; the Dublin workers suffered famine-level deprivation through the winter; by January 1914 the ITGWU had been forced to concede defeat. The conventional story of 1913 — taught for generations in Irish schools as the doomed heroic moment of the labour movement — is the story of that Dublin defeat in isolation. The Sligo precursor, in which the same union pursued the same tactics against employers using the same anti-union strategies and won, is not in the standard story. It is so absent from the standard story that even people raised in Sligo town can complete a full Irish education without ever encountering it.
The contrast between the two outcomes deserves examination. The Sligo and Dublin disputes had the same union, the same tactical playbook on the employer side, the same period, the same political context. They were different in one major respect: the cultural composition of the employer class. Murphy was the leader of the Dublin employer alliance, a Catholic businessman whose political networks ran deep into the Old English Catholic establishment that dominated Dublin commerce. His coalition was reinforced by sustained pressure from the Catholic Church, which denounced Larkin from pulpits across the city and organised the campaign to remove starving Dublin children from their families when sympathisers in England offered to feed them. The Sligo employer class was differently composed. Jackson himself was Protestant; the most prominent affected firms — Pollexfen, Gore-Booth’s Connacht Manufacturing — were Protestant-owned; the local Catholic church and the County Council denounced the strike, but the institutional weight of clerical opposition was substantially less than what was deployed in Dublin a few months later. A settlement that was unthinkable in Dublin was reachable in Sligo. The hypothesis is not that Protestant employers are intrinsically more amenable to union recognition than Catholic ones. The hypothesis is that the combination of Catholic employer leadership, Catholic Church institutional weight, and the wider Old English Catholic political-commercial network in Dublin produced a unified ideological opposition to labour rights that did not have its equivalent in Sligo’s more culturally plural commercial environment. The fusion politics that the Revival was attempting culturally were, in Sligo, also possible economically.
This is precisely the kind of evidence the post-independence narrative could not afford to preserve. The Sligo victory of 1913 — cross-confessional workers achieving union recognition through municipal support, against the wishes of the Catholic Church — was a model of what the alternative Ireland might have looked like. The state that emerged after 1922 had no use for such models. The Dublin defeat could be commemorated as tragic heroism; the Sligo victory had to be forgotten, because remembering it would have raised the question of why the same union with the same tactics had succeeded in one place and failed in another. The answer to that question pointed directly at the cultural and ideological character of the new state itself.
The pattern would repeat. The alliances of which the Sligo Dock Strike was a model would continue, briefly, into the revolutionary period. Their persistence into the early 1920s — particularly in figures like the Sligo Protestant republican and newspaper editor Robert George Bradshaw, whose biography we will examine in the next section — would constitute one of the principal threats to the cultural framework of the new state, and would be suppressed accordingly.
The Window Closes
The fusion attempt had a narrow window. The conditions that made it possible — the simultaneous collapse of the Ascendancy and the Gaeltacht, the availability of the Tone-Davis-Connolly-Hobson intellectual inheritance, the institutional emergence of the Gaelic League and the Abbey and the ITGWU, the active leadership of figures like Hyde and Markievicz and Yeats and Connolly and Hobson — were specific to the period from roughly the 1890s to 1916. The Rising itself was, in part, an attempt to capitalise on this window before it closed.
It closed faster than anyone expected. The execution of Connolly in May 1916 removed the most powerful synthesising figure on the labour-republican side. The increasing dominance of military rather than cultural and social arguments through the War of Independence narrowed the political space. The split over the Treaty in 1922 forced every individual and institution to choose sides on a question that had nothing to do with the fusion project and everything to do with the conservative reconsolidation of state power. The Civil War of 1922–23 destroyed the personal and political networks that had carried the fusion through the previous two decades.
By 1923 the window was closed. The Free State that emerged was governed by the cultural formation that had always been least committed to fusion — the Old English Catholic middle class — and that had every reason to ensure that the alternative possibilities never reopened. Markievicz lived until 1927, increasingly marginalised. Hobson lived until 1969, writing memoirs nobody read. Hyde was given the ceremonial role of first President under the 1937 Constitution, a symbolic recognition that excluded him from any actual power. Yeats wrote, in his late poetry, the bitter recognition of what had been lost.
The fusion attempt was real. It had achieved real things. It had produced, in Sligo and elsewhere, the conditions for an Ireland that would have been federal, plural, socially radical, and culturally inclusive. It lost. The question to which we now turn is how, exactly, it lost — and what the structural consequences of its loss have been for the places that had positioned themselves to lead it.
The conventional account of Irish independence runs as follows. After centuries of colonial occupation, a generation of revolutionaries — cultural, political, and military — built a movement that achieved, through the Rising of 1916, the War of Independence, and the Treaty of 1921, the partial liberation of the island from British rule. The Free State that emerged was imperfect — partition, the oath, dominion status — but it was nonetheless Irish self-government, the recovery of native sovereignty, and the natural culmination of everything from Wolfe Tone forward.
This account has the virtue of being simple. It also has the disadvantage of being substantially wrong.
What actually emerged from the period 1916–1923 was not the culmination of the revolutionary tradition but its defeat. The state that consolidated itself under Cumann na nGaedheal in the 1920s, and then more durably under Fianna Fáil from 1932, was the political vehicle of one specific Irish cultural formation: the descendants of O’Sullivan Beare’s “Englished” — the urban, English-speaking, Catholic, commercial middle class of the Pale and the Old English towns. The revolution they completed was not the revolution Tone or Davis or Connolly or Hobson had envisaged. In key respects it was the opposite of that revolution.
For places like Sligo — which had everything the new state was structurally hostile to — independence in this form was not liberation. It was a second colonisation.
The Opposition Came From Within
To see what happened, we have to start by correcting a basic confusion. The Gaelic Revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not opposed primarily by the British. The British were already withdrawing. By 1900 the colonial administration was contemplating Home Rule; by 1912 the third Home Rule Bill had passed; by 1918 the British had effectively conceded that some form of Irish self-government was inevitable. The British state, in the decades when the Revival was reshaping Irish culture, was not its main antagonist.
The main antagonist was inside Ireland. It was the population or perhaps more accurately by this stage – those culturally identified with what O’Sullivan Beare had described three hundred years earlier — the “Englished” — now no longer English in their own self-understanding but Catholic and “Irish” in a particular sense of that word. This was the population that had inherited the commercial and administrative skills of the medieval Pale, had maintained Catholic faith through the Reformation and the Penal Laws, had accumulated capital through urban trade, and had, after Catholic Emancipation in 1829, moved rapidly into the professional, commercial, and increasingly political life of the country. By 1900 they constituted the dominant English-speaking middle class of Catholic Ireland: shopkeepers and merchants in every market town, lawyers and doctors and clergy, civil servants and Land League organisers, the bedrock of the Irish Parliamentary Party.
For this class, the Gaelic Revival was a problem. Not because they were hostile to Gaelic culture as such — many of them sponsored it, learned the language, joined the Gaelic League — but because the Revival’s deeper logic threatened their position. The Revival, in the hands of figures like Douglas Hyde, Constance Markievicz, W. B. Yeats, James Connolly, and Bulmer Hobson, was not just a cultural movement. It was an attempt at something far more dangerous: a reconciliation of the three Irelands that O’Sullivan Beare had named. It tried to bring the impoverished Anglo-Irish Protestant gentry, the devastated Gaelic-speaking populations of the west, and the urban working class into a single political project that would transcend the cultural fault lines that had divided the island since the thirteenth century.
If that project had succeeded, it would have produced an Ireland in which the Old English Catholic middle class would have been one cultural formation among several — important, yes, but not the defining one. They would not have been able to claim, as they came to claim after 1922, that their particular version of Irish identity was the authentic article. They would have had to share cultural authority with Gaelic-speakers whose claim to native authenticity was older and stronger than theirs, with Protestants whose contribution to the revolutionary tradition stretched from Tone through Davis to Markievicz, and with workers whose internationalist socialism cut across all the cultural categories.
They could not allow this. And so the opposition that did the most damage to the Revival came not from Dublin Castle but from the parish priests, the parliamentary politicians, the Catholic newspapers, the temperance societies, the strike-breaking merchant employers, and the respectable Catholic middle class who together formed the social weight of Old English Catholic Ireland. They did not oppose the Revival openly — that would have been politically impossible by the 1910s — but they shaped it, contained it, redirected it, and ultimately captured it.
Partition as Strategy
The standard interpretation of partition treats it as a tragedy imposed on Ireland by Britain over the opposition of all shades of Irish nationalism. The reality is more complicated and, from the perspective of the Old English Catholic middle class, considerably less tragic.
A united Ireland of thirty-two counties would have included approximately one million Protestants, the great bulk of them concentrated in the northeast, almost all of them descendants of the seventeenth-century Plantation. It would also have included the Protestant working class of Belfast, organised into the most powerful labour movement on the island; the radical Presbyterian tradition that had produced the United Irishmen; and an industrial economy whose interests were quite different from the agricultural and commercial economy of the south. Such an Ireland would have been culturally plural in ways the Old English Catholic middle class could not control.
The twenty-six-county state that emerged from partition was, by contrast, structurally homogeneous along the cultural lines that mattered. It had a Catholic supermajority. Its urban centres were dominated by the commercial middle class. Its Gaelic-speaking populations were reduced to politically negligible remnants on the western fringe. Its surviving Anglo-Irish Protestants — perhaps five percent of the population in 1922 — were demoralised, scattered, and largely accommodated to their declining position. It was a state that could be governed as a single cultural unit.
The Catholic middle class did not need to advocate openly for partition. They needed only to accept it when it was offered, to fight a civil war against those who would not accept it, and to consolidate the truncated state along the cultural lines it had inherited. This is what they did. Cumann na nGaedheal under W. T. Cosgrave, Fine Gael’s predecessor, was the political expression of this class. Fianna Fáil under de Valera, though it would later capture much of the rural Gaelic vote through populist rhetoric, governed within the same cultural framework. The Irish Civil War of 1922–23 was not, at its deepest level, about the oath of allegiance or the boundary of partition. It was about which Ireland would be built — and the side that won was the side of the Old English Catholic middle class.
The Treaty as Counter-Revolution
Bulmer Hobson, one of the principal organisers of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and one of the architects of the 1916 Rising, lived long enough to write his memoirs and to record what he had seen. He had wanted, he wrote, “to end the British government of Ireland and get an Irish government established precisely with this object in view” — the object being the building of an Ireland whose economic, cultural, and political structures would be designed for Irish conditions rather than inherited from British ones. “Instead we had protracted and barren conflicts over verbal differences… the problems remained.”
The problems remained because the Treaty was not a revolution. It was a transfer of administrative authority from one set of officials to another, conducted within frameworks that were preserved deliberately and completely. The English common law system was retained. The English administrative apparatus was retained. The English-language commercial economy was retained. The civil service was largely the same civil service. The judiciary was largely the same judiciary. The economic relationships with Britain were retained. The currency was tied to sterling. The trade flows continued in their colonial patterns.
Edward Said, who delivered the foundational analysis of Ireland’s post-colonial condition at the Yeats Summer School in Sligo in 1986, named the mechanism:
At some stage in the antiresistance phase of nationalism there is a sort of dependence between the two sides of the contest, since after all many of the nationalist struggles were led by bourgeoisies that were partly formed and to some degree produced by the colonial power; these are the national bourgeoisies of which Fanon spoke so ominously. These bourgeoisies in effect have often replaced the colonial force with a new class-based and ultimately exploitative force; instead of liberation after decolonization one simply gets the old colonial structures replicated in new national terms.
— Edward Said, Yeats and Decolonization (Field Day Pamphlet No. 15, 1988); reprinted in Culture and Imperialism (1993)
The Treaty of 1921 is the Irish instance of the structure Said describes. The Free State that emerged was, in Said’s terms, the old colonial structures replicated in new national terms, governed by a national bourgeoisie that had been partly formed and to some degree produced by the colonial framework it nominally replaced.
What changed was the political ownership of this apparatus. It passed from the hands of the British Protestant Ascendancy and the British colonial administration into the hands of the Irish Catholic middle class — which is to say, into the hands of the very population that had spent the previous century preparing itself to inherit exactly this kind of state. The Land Acts of the late nineteenth century had transferred ownership of agricultural land to the existing tenant farmers. The Local Government Act of 1898 had transferred administration of the counties to elected councils dominated by the existing Catholic middle class. The Treaty of 1921 completed the process by transferring the central state itself.
This was not the social revolution Connolly had died for. Connolly had understood that political independence without economic restructuring would be hollow — that an Irish state operating on colonial economic logic would reproduce the colonial pattern under new management. He had said so explicitly. He had been executed in 1916 and his programme had been quietly dropped. The Free State that emerged was, in his terms, precisely the hollow independence he had warned against.
It was also not the federal, plural Ireland Hobson had argued for. Hobson had understood that genuine unity required structural recognition of difference — that Ulster Protestants, Gaeltacht communities, urban workers, and rural smallholders could not be governed by uniform diktat from Dublin. He had proposed federal arrangements that would devolve real authority to regions and traditions. He had been pushed out of the IRB by the more militarist faction around Tom Clarke and Seán Mac Diarmada, who wanted a single Rising and a single national state. He had spent the rest of his life in obscurity, watching his federal vision be replaced by what would become one of the most centralised state structures in Europe.
What Connolly and Hobson both understood, in different ways, was that the political form of post-independence Ireland was not predetermined. There were genuinely alternative possibilities. The fact that one specific form emerged — centralised, Catholic, English-speaking, commercially conservative, governed by and for the descendants of the Old English — was not historical necessity. It was a political outcome, the result of one cultural formation winning a contest that other formations had also had a real chance of winning.
The Theocracy and Its Roots
The Free State became, with remarkable speed, what has accurately been called a Catholic theocracy in all but name. Censorship was imposed in 1929. Divorce was prohibited. Contraception was banned. The 1937 Constitution gave the Catholic Church a “special position” and adopted a social philosophy explicitly modelled on papal encyclicals. The Mother and Baby homes, the Magdalene Laundries, the industrial schools — the entire apparatus of institutional cruelty toward the poor and especially toward women — was run by religious orders with state collusion and protection. By the 1950s, the entanglement of Church and State in Ireland was as complete as anywhere in Catholic Europe outside the Iberian dictatorships.
Why did this happen? The conventional explanation is that Ireland was simply a Catholic country and the Church naturally dominated its public life. This explanation misses the most important historical point. Ireland had been a Catholic country for centuries without being a theocracy. Gaelic Ireland had been Catholic but its Catholicism had been quite different — more decentralised, more locally embedded, more integrated with secular legal and social structures, less dependent on the parish-priest model of clerical control. The post-Tridentine Catholicism that came to define the Free State was a specific cultural product of post-Reformation Old English Catholic survival, brought to full institutional flower in the nineteenth century under figures like Cardinal Cullen, and made into the dominant religious culture of Catholic Ireland by the same processes that made Old English Catholic culture the dominant cultural form of independent Ireland.
In other words: the theocracy of the Free State was not the natural expression of Irish Catholicism. It was the natural expression of the particular Catholicism — Roman, hierarchical, post-Tridentine, parish-centred, morally policing, and rooted in Empire — that had been the cultural inheritance of the Old English Catholic middle class, and that this class brought with them when they inherited the state. The Church was their cultural infrastructure. They had maintained it through the penal era as the marker of their identity. When they took power, they made their cultural infrastructure into the cultural infrastructure of the state.In other words it was itself an artefact of colonialism.
The Gaelic Christian tradition — older, more decentralised, integrated with the brehon legal order and the regional saints’ cults — had been broken in the Tudor conquest and never restored. It would have produced a quite different relationship between religion and state. But it had no political vehicle in 1922. The Old English Catholic tradition did.
The Hostility List
The state that emerged from this counter-revolution was, in its first half-century, structurally hostile to almost everything that the revolutionary tradition had stood for and almost everything that places like Sligo had become.
It was hostile to Gaelic culture, despite its rhetoric. Irish was made compulsory in schools in ways designed to fail — taught through grammar drills and literary set texts rather than as a living spoken language; tested by examinations that screened working-class and rural Gaelic-speakers out of professional careers while rewarding middle-class urban students who learned it as a credential. The Gaeltacht regions were left to depopulate through emigration with minimal economic support. Brehon legal traditions were not studied, not consulted, not revived. The actual living holders of Gaelic continuity — the Traveller community whose social patterns preserved late-medieval Gaelic forms, the elderly native speakers in the Connemara and Donegal Gaeltachts, the remnants of the hereditary historian families — were patronised, romanticised, or persecuted, but never empowered.
It was hostile to Protestants. The Anglo-Irish gentry, who had produced more revolutionary leaders per capita than any other group in Ireland from Tone through Markievicz, were systematically driven out. Some left after their houses were burned in the Civil War; more left in the slow attrition of the following decades as land legislation, social marginalisation, and the Ne Temere decree on mixed marriages reduced the Protestant population of the twenty-six counties from approximately 10 percent in 1911 to under 4 percent by 1971. The Northern Catholics, the other group with a strong claim on the new state’s solidarity, were maintained as a rhetorical priority and abandoned as a practical one. The state’s irredentist claim to the six counties became, over the decades, a piece of constitutional theatre that allowed the actual abandonment of the population it nominally represented.
It was hostile to socialists. Connolly was canonised as a martyr of 1916 and his actual programme was buried. The Catholic social teaching of the bishops became the framework for state economic policy — corporatist, paternalist, suspicious of class organisation. The Irish Labour Party was kept structurally subordinate, never permitted to break through to majority support, its trade-union base systematically demobilised by clerical pressure from the 1920s through the 1950s. The Dublin Lockout of 1913 — the moment when Connolly and Larkin had built a movement that almost transformed Irish politics — was commemorated as historical heritage and never repeated as political programme. The Sligo Dock Strike of the same year — the moment when the same union, with the same tactics, had actually won against a culturally different employer class — was simply forgotten. The memory of the Sligo victory could not be allowed to survive in the official narrative, because the victory itself, properly understood, would have raised the question of why the same union with the same playbook had succeeded in one place and failed in another. The answer pointed too directly at the cultural and ideological character of the new state.
It was hostile to republicans in the original Wolfe Tone sense. The 1798 rebellion, with its Presbyterian and Catholic and Anglo-Irish leadership united around a non-sectarian republican programme, was reduced to a heritage festival. Tone’s actual writings — explicit, internationalist, anti-clerical, federalist — were not curriculum material. The anti-Treaty IRA was suppressed; the surviving republican left was marginalised; the various attempts at non-sectarian republican politics through the twentieth century never broke through. The “Republic” of 1948 was a republic in name only, retaining all the cultural and institutional features of the dominion state it had replaced.
It was hostile, above all, to cross-confessional alliances of any kind between these groups. The very thing the Gaelic Revival had been trying to build — a unity that crossed the religious and cultural fault lines — became culturally invisible after 1922. Each community was assigned its proper place in the new order: Catholics in the south as the dominant majority; Protestants in the south as a tolerated minority confined to their own institutions; Catholics in the north as a problem for someone else to solve; Protestants in the north as enemies. The categories themselves became politically constitutive in a way they had not been a generation before, because the state needed them to be.
Sligo as Test Case
Recall what Sligo had become by 1922. Three hundred years of Gaelic urban life had ended in 1603, but its consequences had shaped everything since. Sligo had no significant Old English Catholic middle class — the population that had inherited the new state nationally was almost absent locally. Its de facto middle class was Protestant — descendants of the seventeenth-century settlers, by 1922 a community of merchants, professionals, and skilled tradesmen who had over generations come to identify increasingly with the place rather than with the colonial power. Its surviving Gaelic-speaking population, devastated by the Famine, was rural and impoverished but still present. Its working class, organised through the ITGWU and proven capable of winning the kind of cross-confessional industrial victory that had eluded Dublin in 1913, had built the type of alliance the Gaelic Revival had pointed toward.
Every one of these features put Sligo on the wrong side of the new dispensation. Its Protestant middle class was the very kind of population the state could not accommodate. Its Gaelic-speaking remnant was the very kind of community the state would rhetorically claim and practically neglect. Its labour movement was the very kind of organisation the state would isolate and weaken. Its cross-confessional radical history was the very kind of memory the state would erase.
The treatment of Sligo through the revolutionary period and immediately after makes this concrete in ways that are difficult to dismiss as coincidence.
In the general election of June 1922 — the so-called “Pact election” that effectively functioned as a referendum on the Treaty — Sligo returned anti-Treaty candidates by a margin of approximately two to one. This was one of the strongest anti-Treaty results anywhere in the country. It expressed exactly what the previous analysis would predict: a population whose cultural composition and political traditions were aligned with the radical republican wing of the revolutionary movement, against the conservative settlement the Treaty represented.
The new state’s response was disproportionate violence. The Civil War in Sligo, as the historian Michael Farry has documented, was approximately three times as destructive as the War of Independence had been. The Free State army conducted a systematic campaign to break the local Republican forces, who were strong in numbers and politically representative of the majority of the county. The campaign included the killing, on Slievemore mountain near Ben Bulben in September 1922, of Brian MacNeill — the son of Eoin MacNeill, the founder of the Irish Volunteers and a serving minister in the Free State government — together with the Republican officer Seamus Devins. The killing of a Free State minister’s son by the National Army gives the measure of how completely the cultural lines of the Civil War cut across the personal and family lines of the revolutionary generation. MacNeill, like a substantial number of his comrades, had refused to accept the Treaty and was on the wrong side of his father’s politics. He was killed, with five others, in circumstances widely understood at the time as an unlawful execution rather than an action in combat. The investigations promised by the Free State government never produced results.
Through the same period, Sligo was one of only two places in independent Ireland that maintained a Republican anti-Treaty newspaper. The other was in Dublin. The Sligo paper — the Sligo Nationalist, taken over in 1920 by Robert George Bradshaw and Seamus MacGowan and renamed An Connachtach — was edited by Bradshaw, a Tipperary-born Protestant who had moved to Sligo in 1915 to work with relatives running the post office at Cloughboley in the north of the county. Bradshaw’s trajectory is worth pausing on. He had begun his Sligo years as a supporter of the British war effort, writing in the Sligo Champion in April 1916 that Ireland’s hopes depended on an Allied victory. By 1918 he had become a prominent anti-conscription organiser and active Sinn Féiner. During the War of Independence he served as the Sligo district intelligence officer for the IRA. He took the anti-Treaty side in the Civil War, was captured at Kinlough in Leitrim by the Free State army, and was interned from 1922 until 1924.
That Sligo’s Republican newspaper was edited by a Protestant from Tipperary, working alongside Catholic colleagues, in a town whose Mayor had backed the 1913 strikers, in a county that had voted two to one against the Treaty, gives the texture of the political formation the new state was determined to suppress. Bradshaw represented, in compact biographical form, everything the Old English Catholic counter-revolution could not tolerate: Protestant participation in militant republicanism, cross-confessional revolutionary alliance, regional opposition to the centralising state, the persistence of an alternative political vision that had to be eliminated before the new dispensation could be consolidated.
He was eliminated, in the limited sense that mattered. He was interned during the war and silenced afterwards. He returned to civic life eventually, serving briefly as acting town clerk of Sligo in 1933–34, but his political moment was over. The newspaper he had edited stopped publishing. The political formation he had represented was scattered. The story of his role in the Sligo revolution was not preserved in the national history and was not taught in the schools that he and his comrades had fought to make Irish. By the time successive generations of Sligo schoolchildren were learning about the revolutionary period, the Protestant editor of the town’s Republican newspaper had been written out of the story as completely as the Sligo Dock Strike had been.
This was repeated across every dimension of Sligo’s character. The Gaelic urban tradition, the Protestant middle class, the labour movement, the radicalism — each was either erased or marginalised. The Borough Council survived as an institution, but it survived as a relic, the formal expression of a town that had become, in the new state, structurally illegible. Its needs were not the needs the state was designed to meet. Its history was not the history the state was designed to celebrate. Its population was not the population the state was designed to serve.
Lissadell, 2003
There is one piece of contemporary evidence that compresses everything this article has been arguing into a single estate’s history, and it is worth examining in detail. In 2003, Lissadell House in north County Sligo came up for sale. The decision by the Irish state at that moment — and the cascade of consequences that followed over the next decade — provides a contemporary case in which the entire structural pattern this article has been describing is documented in the public record.
Lissadell is, by any reasonable accounting, the country house most centrally implicated in the foundation of the modern Irish state. It was the childhood home of Constance Gore-Booth, later Countess Markievicz — officer in the Irish Citizen Army, participant in the 1916 Rising, first woman elected to the Westminster parliament in 1918, Minister for Labour in the first Dáil Éireann, the only woman in the cabinet that declared the Republic. It was the childhood home of Eva Gore-Booth, the socialist, suffragist, and labour organiser whose Manchester work made her a foundational figure of early-twentieth-century British feminism. It was the home of Sir Josslyn Gore-Booth, the agricultural reformer and director of the Connacht Manufacturing Company, whose family business was among those affected by the 1913 Sligo Dock Strike — placing the Gore-Booth family, with characteristic Sligo complexity, on multiple sides of the revolutionary period at once. It was, repeatedly through the 1880s and 1890s, the summer residence of W. B. Yeats, who wrote about it directly in some of the most quoted lines of twentieth-century Irish poetry:
The light of evening, Lissadell, Great windows open to the south, Two girls in silk kimonos, both Beautiful, one a gazelle.
The two girls were Constance and Eva. The poem was Yeats’s elegy for them — for the sisters whose trajectory carried the Anglo-Irish gentry’s identification with Ireland to its most radical conclusion, and whom the post-independence state could not finally accommodate.
The deeper history of the estate, easily overlooked in the standard accounts, makes its symbolic weight greater still. The Lissadell lands had been granted in the early seventeenth century to Sir Paul Gore, an Elizabethan soldier, for his services to the English crown during the Nine Years War. The land was confiscated, specifically, from ecclesiastical holdings belonging to the medieval monastery of Drumcliff (founded by St Columba in the sixth century), from the Ó Conchobhair Sligigh — the Gaelic dynasty whose three-hundred-year rule over Sligo we documented in Part II — and from the Ó hAirt chiefs of the local túath. The Gore-Booth estate at Lissadell, in other words, sits directly on the confiscated patrimony of the Gaelic city. The Anglo-Irish family who would, three centuries later, produce some of the most important figures in the attempted reconciliation of the three Irelands, lived on the land that had been taken from one of those three Irelands at gunpoint at the moment when the second one was conquering it for the third.
The house itself, built between 1830 and 1835 for Sir Robert Gore-Booth, was a Greek Revival mansion designed by Francis Goodwin of London — the last of its style built in Ireland — fitted with original Williams & Gibton furniture designed specifically for the building. By the time of the 2003 sale it remained the only Irish country house to retain its original Regency-period furnishings intact. It was, in the most precise sense, a piece of irreplaceable cultural heritage.
In 2003 Sir Josslyn Gore-Booth — grand-nephew of the original Josslyn, the senior surviving member of the family — placed the estate on the market for €3 million. He did so reluctantly, citing the practical impossibility of continuing private maintenance of the house. He stated publicly that he hoped the state would acquire it. He wrote, in the Irish Independent in May 2003: “Suffice it to say I would welcome an interest on the part of the state.” The historical case for state acquisition was, in retrospect, almost embarrassing in its strength. The price was modest by any reasonable standard. The cultural significance of the house — to the foundation of the state, to the literary tradition the state nominally claimed as its own, to the revolutionary period the state commemorates annually — was beyond serious dispute. The international tourism potential of a properly developed Markievicz / Yeats heritage centre at Lissadell was obvious. The opportunity was, by any normal measure, one a self-respecting state would not refuse.
The Fianna Fáil government under Bertie Ahern refused it.
The official reason given was a cost report commissioned by Environment Minister Martin Cullen, which estimated the total cost to the state of purchasing Lissadell and refurbishing it as a major visitor attraction at approximately €28 million. The €25 million difference between the asking price and the projected total cost was attributed to refurbishment requirements. The figure was disputed at the time by Sir Josslyn himself and by independent commentators, and the methodology of the report has never been made public. The reader will recognise the pattern from the Western Rail Corridor case in Part VI: a study commissioned with a scope designed to produce a number that justifies the predetermined decision. The state declined to acquire the house. It also declined to bid for the contents of the auction that followed, during which the original Williams & Gibton furniture, family papers, paintings, and objects of irreplaceable cultural value were dispersed.
A consortium of businessmen and politicians attempted to assemble a private purchase that would have placed the house in trust for the state. They were unsuccessful. The house was eventually bought by Edward Walsh and Constance Cassidy, a pair of prominent Dublin barristers, for an undisclosed sum reported to be in the region of €4 million. The estate, three hundred and seventy-five years after being granted to Sir Paul Gore for his services to the English crown, passed into the ownership of representatives of the population that this article has been describing as the political and cultural successor formation to that colonial enterprise. The transfer was not literally a transfer back to the original dispossessing class — the Walsh-Cassidys are not the spiritual descendants of Sir Paul Gore in any direct genealogical sense. But in cultural-political terms, the transfer is exact: the symbolic seat of the Anglo-Irish revolutionary fusion tradition passed from the family that had produced Markievicz into the hands of the Dublin Old English Catholic professional class, by-passing the state that should have acquired it and the local community whose history it represented.
The Walsh-Cassidys began restoration of the house with their own resources. They also began restricting public access through the estate. Lissadell had been, for the previous century, an unofficial common space for the people of Sligo — picnics on the avenue, swimming at the beach, walking in the woods, all conducted as a matter of customary local right under the indulgence of successive Gore-Booth owners. The Walsh-Cassidys claimed, and were ultimately legally vindicated in claiming, that these uses had created no formal right of way. They closed the avenues. They restricted access to those who paid the admission fee.
Sligo County Council, under pressure from the local community and from the Lissadell Action Group that formed to contest the closures, passed a unanimous motion in December 2008 to preserve public rights of way over the four main avenues of the estate. The Walshes closed the house on 8 January 2009 and instituted legal proceedings against the council. The case ran for fifty-eight days in the High Court before Mr Justice McMahon, who ruled in June 2010 in favour of Sligo County Council on the basis that public use of the avenues had been so long-established that a right of way could be inferred from the absence of objection. The total legal costs at this stage stood at approximately €6 million.
The Walsh-Cassidys appealed to the Supreme Court. On 11 November 2013, in a 117-page judgement, the Supreme Court reversed the High Court and ruled in favour of the owners, allowing only a public right of access along the beach. The judgement was based, throughout, on English common law precedents regarding the requirements for inferring rights of way. The Irish Constitution was nowhere cited. As Vincent Browne noted in the Irish Times shortly afterwards, “the reliance in the Lissadell case on old English common law precedents inherited by the state and the lack of reference to the Constitution of Ireland in both judgements, highlights the continued reliance of the courts of the Republic of Ireland on English law and precedent, and concomitant upholding of English-style property rights.” The Republic of Ireland’s highest court, adjudicating a dispute between Dublin barristers and a Sligo county council over access to land confiscated from the medieval Gaelic kingdom of Sligo, reasoned the case entirely within the framework of seventeenth-century English property law. The structural pattern is, at this point, no longer subtle.
In April 2014 the Supreme Court ordered Sligo County Council to pay seventy-five per cent of the appellants’ costs, estimated at €5.25 million, in addition to the council’s own costs. By 2018, when a partial settlement was reached, the total legal bill was estimated at €7 million. The local authority that had attempted to preserve the public’s access to its own historic heritage — the heritage of the town whose Borough Council had been abolished five years earlier in 2013 — was financially crippled by the consequences of having attempted it. The bankrupting of the local democratic body was the price exacted for its attempt to retain something the state had refused to acquire when it could have done so for €3 million ten years earlier.
There is one more detail worth recording. In July and August 2010, while the legal battle was at its most intense, Leonard Cohen performed two concerts at Lissadell as part of his late-career tour. Cohen, who could perform anywhere in the world, chose Lissadell. He spoke onstage about the resonance of the place — Markievicz, Yeats, the foundational moment of modern Irish identity — and his audience, drawn from across Ireland and from his international following, understood why he had come. What Cohen recognised internationally — what the Israeli-born seventy-five-year-old poet-songwriter could see clearly from outside — the Irish state under Bertie Ahern, Martin Cullen, and their successors could not see, would not see, refused to see. The framework operates exactly as this article has been arguing it operates. The place that produced Markievicz, that Yeats wrote about, that Cohen came to honour, was, in the calculations of the Irish state, not worth €3 million in 2003 and not worth defending against the closure of its public spaces in 2009. It was not, in the cultural grammar of the state, recognisable as what it was.
The Lissadell case is this article’s entire argument in one estate’s history. The land confiscated from the Ó Conchobhair Sligigh; granted to Sir Paul Gore; held by the family that produced Markievicz, Eva, and Yeats’s hosts; offered to the state at the moment of its commercial sale; refused; sold to the Dublin barristers; closed against the local community; defended in court on English common law principles that predated the state itself (supposedly); with the local council bankrupted in the attempt to preserve what the state would not. Every link in the chain we have been tracing across eight hundred years is present, in compressed form, in the documented public record of the period 2003 to 2014.
It is what happens when the framework cannot see what is in front of it.
Travellers: The Starkest Evidence
What was happening to Sligo was happening, in different forms, to other populations and places that did not fit the cultural framework of the new state. The pattern is most starkly visible in the case of Travellers — the indigenous nomadic population of Ireland whose treatment by the independent Irish state represents, more clearly than any other case, what the framework required to be buried in order to maintain itself.
The Traveller community are not, as the official Irish account long maintained, a population displaced by the Famine or by other nineteenth-century dislocations. The available evidence — linguistic, genetic, cultural, and historical — points consistently to a much deeper origin, in the late-medieval and early-modern Gaelic social order. Their occupational patterns — tin-smithing, horse-dealing, seasonal labour, ritual specialisation — correspond to the roles occupied by mobile professional families in Gaelic society before the Tudor conquest. Their kinship structures, their inheritance patterns, their internal legal customs all preserve elements of the brehon order that the surrounding settled population lost centuries ago. The Travellers are not a recent ethnic formation. They are, in significant respects, the surviving carriers of pre-modern Gaelic social organisation, maintained continuously through the upheavals that destroyed the settled forms of Gaelic life. A fact now proven by scientific research and brought together by the research of TRaveller led organisations like TraVision.
The independent Irish state’s response to this population, from the 1960s onwards, was forced assimilation. The Commission on Itinerancy of 1963, the systematic destruction of traditional encampments, the construction of settled-housing programmes designed to extinguish the nomadic lifestyle, the removal of children from Traveller families and their placement in industrial schools, the active persecution of Traveller communities by local authorities supported by central government policy — all of this was carried out under a state that nominally claimed continuity with the Gaelic Irish tradition. The state did not even formally recognise Travellers as a distinct ethnic group until 2017, and even then with no official acknowledgment of what that ethnicity actually represented historically.
The question that explains this otherwise inexplicable behaviour is the question of what acknowledgment of Travellers’ actual origin would have implied for the legitimating narrative of the state. If Travellers were the descendants of the actual Gaelic Ireland the new state claimed to be the political expression of, then the settled population — and the state’s governing class in particular — was something else. Their claim to define Irish nationality was a claim made by people whose own historical formation was not the Gaelic one they were nominally celebrating. The Travellers’ visibility threatened the legitimating narrative of the entire state. They had to be either eliminated as a distinct group or made unrecognisable as descendants of what they were the descendants of. The state chose, in different periods, both. It tried to assimilate them out of existence as Travellers; it refused to recognise their history as the history it actually was.
The treatment of Travellers and the treatment of Sligo are different manifestations of the same structural process. The Travellers preserved the social patterns of Gaelic Ireland; Sligo had preserved some aspects of the urban tradition of Gaelic Ireland; both stood, in different ways, as living evidence that the state’s claim to embody Gaelic Irish continuity was an appropriation rather than an inheritance. Both had to be marginalised, suppressed, or assimilated for the appropriation to maintain itself. That is what the new state did, with Travellers by direct coercive policy, with Sligo by sustained structural neglect. The mechanisms differed; the structural function was the same.
The cultural framework that consolidated itself in the 1920s is the operating system of the Irish state, and it runs today as automatically as it ever did. Its presence is most visible in the patterns of state investment, infrastructure development, service provision, and democratic representation. These patterns can be documented, they trace the cultural fault lines that O’Sullivan Beare described in 1618 and that the Old English Catholic counter-revolution buried in the 1920s.
The story of contemporary Sligo, and of the broader region of which Sligo is the centre, is the story of these patterns playing out in real time. Every dimension of state activity that can be measured shows the same shape: investment, services, and political voice concentrated in the eastern and southern regions descended from the Old English urban tradition; underinvestment, service withdrawal, and democratic erosion in the western and northwestern regions descended from the Gaelic urban and rural traditions. The shape is so consistent across so many domains that it cannot reasonably be explained as the cumulative result of independent decisions made by neutral institutions responding to objective needs. It is a pattern. It is structural. And it has a cause.
That cause is what this article has been describing: the cultural framework of the post-1922 state, built by and for the Old English Catholic middle class, operating with an institutional blindness toward everything that does not fit its cultural template. The contemporary evidence of this blindness is so abundant that the difficulty is not in finding examples but in selecting them. We will examine the central infrastructure case — the Western Rail Corridor — and then turn to the case that most directly demonstrates the structural intent: the systematic dismantling of urban democratic representation in towns like Sligo, a process that began in 1913 and is still being prosecuted as I write these words in 2026.
The Official Designation
The European Union, in its periodic regional assessments, classifies the Northern and Western region of Ireland as a “lagging region.” This is technical language with a specific meaning: it indicates an area whose economic performance falls significantly below both the national and EU averages, attributable to long-term underinvestment in regional infrastructure and weaker economic development relative to comparable regions elsewhere. The classification is not contentious. The Irish state does not dispute it. The European Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development has confirmed it. The data are consistent across multiple measures: GDP per capita, infrastructure density, broadband penetration, transport connectivity, healthcare access, third-level education attainment, and so on.
What is contentious is the explanation. The official explanation, when one is offered at all, is in the passive voice: there has been underinvestment, services have been rationalised, demographic factors have produced unfavourable outcomes. The phrasing presents the situation as the unintended consequence of impersonal forces — geographical disadvantage, market dynamics, demographic pressure — rather than as the result of specific institutional decisions made over decades by specific bodies operating with specific cultural assumptions.
This passive-voice explanation is not satisfactory. The Northern and Western region is not an isolated, resource-poor periphery in the way that, say, the Scottish Highlands or the Italian Mezzogiorno are sometimes characterised. It is, by any objective measure, a region with substantial economic potential.
The question that the official explanation cannot answer is why this potential has been systematically not realised. The answer, as the cases that follow will demonstrate, is that the institutions of the Irish state are structured in ways that prevent the realisation of western potential, and that this is not an accident of policy but a feature of governance.
The Western Rail Corridor: A Case Study in Cultural Blindness
The Western Rail Corridor — the proposed restoration of the rail line that once ran along the Atlantic seaboard from Cork through Limerick, Galway, and Sligo to Derry — is the textbook example of what happens when a region’s needs are illegible to the state that nominally serves it. I have documented the detailed history of this case elsewhere; here I will summarise the structural pattern that case reveals.
The line itself, with its associated infrastructure, was substantially intact when the Irish state was founded. It connected the western seaboard to the national rail network and, through Sligo’s nineteenth-century intermodal port infrastructure, to the Atlantic coastal shipping system. Its restoration would require not the construction of a new corridor but the reopening of an existing one. The economic case for restoration is strong and has been documented repeatedly: it would connect three international airports, link the western seaboard to Cork’s container port at a moment when post-Brexit Ireland urgently needs alternative European-facing transport routes, integrate the campuses of Atlantic Technological University, and enable the modal shift from road freight to rail-and-coastal-shipping that EU transport policy actively encourages. EU funding is available for exactly this kind of project through the Trans-European Transport Network (Ten-T) programme.
The restoration has not happened. It has not happened despite the existing infrastructure, despite the documented economic case, despite the available funding, despite sustained advocacy by communities along the route, and despite the obvious strategic alignment with EU policy. It has not happened because, at every decision point over the past fifteen years, the Irish state has acted to prevent it from happening.
In 2011, Leo Varadkar, then Minister for Transport, personally removed the Western Rail Corridor and the broader western transport programme from Ireland’s submission to the Ten-T network — locking western Ireland out of EU transport funding streams for the foreseeable future. Subsequent studies of the rail corridor’s viability have been commissioned with scopes deliberately truncated to exclude the connections that would demonstrate its viability — examining only the 52-kilometre segment from Athenry to Claremorris, never the full corridor with its airport, port, and university connections. The consultancy that produced the most recent strategic rail review excluding Sligo from major new rail developments is the same consultancy simultaneously contracted to design a cycling greenway on the disused rail line — a direct conflict of interest that would be flagged in most jurisdictions but that has been allowed to stand here. The greenway construction itself, once completed, will make rail restoration practically irreversible: the political cost of removing a popular amenity to restore a railway would be prohibitive.
Meanwhile, the same institutional bodies that have systematically obstructed western rail pushing ahead with MetroLink — a €9–23 billion underground railway connecting Dublin city centre to Dublin Airport — with full state backing, expedited planning, and a target operational date in the early 2030s. Once MetroLink is operational, Dublin Airport’s monopoly on direct rail-airport connection will be the established national standard, and any subsequent restoration of western rail will face the further question of whether it is “needed” given the consolidation of national air traffic at Dublin.
The pattern is consistent across decades and across decision points. It is not the result of a single official’s bias or a single ministerial decision. It is the result of an institutional culture that does not consider the western seaboard a strategic priority — that does not, in any sustained way, even notice it as something requiring strategic thinking. The National Transport Authority, the body with statutory responsibility for transport policy nationally, was originally established as the Dublin Transport Authority. Its institutional DNA, its board composition, its priorities, and its operational culture are all oriented toward the Greater Dublin Area. Western transport needs are processed through Dublin institutions staffed by Dublin officials operating with Dublin-centred assumptions about what constitutes viable infrastructure.
This is not, in most cases, malicious. The officials involved are not waking up each morning determined to undermine the western seaboard. They are doing their jobs as they understand their jobs. The problem is that their jobs have been defined within a cultural framework that does not include the western seaboard as a place requiring active strategic engagement. When the western seaboard appears on the agenda at all, it appears as a regional issue to be managed rather than as a national strategic opportunity to be developed. The studies are commissioned to assess whether the region can justify investment, not to assess how investment can develop the region. The default position is non-development, and the burden of proof is on the region to demonstrate that this should change.
This is what cultural blindness looks like in administrative practice. Not bias, not discrimination, not a conspiracy. A framework that has been built around one cultural understanding of the country, that processes information through that understanding, and that quietly fails to see what falls outside it.
The Pattern Across Domains
The Western Rail Corridor case is not unusual. It is the most documented example of a pattern that repeats across every major area of state activity.
In healthcare, the pattern is service withdrawal from regional centres and concentration of specialist provision in the major Old English-descended cities. Sligo University Hospital, like other regional hospitals along the western seaboard, has seen successive removals of specialist services — cardiac surgery, complex cancer treatments, certain forms of trauma care — to “centres of excellence” in Dublin, Cork, Galway, and Limerick. Patients from the northwest now routinely travel three or four hours each way for procedures that would have been available locally a generation ago. The rationalisation is always justified on grounds of clinical concentration and economies of scale; the same logic is never applied in reverse to consolidate services in regional centres at the expense of the major cities, even where the regional centre could plausibly serve a wide catchment.
In higher education, the pattern is institutional hierarchy mapped onto cultural geography. The major Old English-descended cities have universities — UCD, TCD, UCC, UL, the University of Galway, Maynooth — with full research funding, doctoral programmes, and international standing. The western seaboard had institutes of technology, recently upgraded to technological universities, with substantially smaller research budgets, fewer postgraduate places, and weaker access to competitive funding streams. The naming distinction is not cosmetic. It maps onto resource allocation, recruitment power, and the brain drain that the institutional hierarchy itself produces. Atlantic Technological University, the institution covering the entire northwest, was constituted only in 2022 and is still in the process of integrating campuses that have no proper transport links between them — because, as we have seen, the rail infrastructure that would integrate them has been systematically prevented from being restored.
In inward investment, the pattern is concentration of IDA Ireland’s high-value foreign direct investment in the Old English-descended cities. The major multinational operations — the pharmaceutical campuses, the technology headquarters, the financial services back-offices — cluster around Dublin, Cork, Limerick, and Galway. The western seaboard receives a much smaller share, both in absolute terms and per capita, and the investment that does come is concentrated in lower-value activities. This is again justified in terms of economic rationality: existing clusters attract further investment, talent concentrations reinforce themselves, infrastructure availability dictates location decisions. All true. But the existing clusters, talent concentrations, and infrastructure availability are themselves the product of decades of state investment decisions that have followed the same cultural pattern. The “rational” outcome is the cumulative result of a non-rational distributional process.
In broadband and digital infrastructure, the pattern is the National Broadband Plan, which has been extended, delayed, and reduced in scope repeatedly, leaving the western seaboard with the worst connectivity in Western Europe well into the third decade of the century. The plan’s slowest rollout has been in precisely the rural and small-town areas where remote working could allow people to live in the region while earning incomes — that is, in precisely the areas where digital connectivity could most directly reverse the demographic drain.
In emigration and population distribution, the cumulative pattern is the most stark of all. The Greater Dublin Area now contains over forty per cent of the national population and continues to grow at a rate that has produced one of the most acute housing crises in Europe. The northwest continues to lose its young people, generation after generation, to Dublin, to Britain, to Australia and Canada and the United States. The rural population of the western seaboard, in many districts, is older than the national average and has been declining steadily for decades. This is not the result of any one policy. It is the cumulative result of every dimension of state activity we have discussed pointing in the same direction.
The Shannon Water Pipeline: Extraction Made Visible
There is one contemporary case that makes the extractive character of the relationship more visible than any other: the proposed Shannon water pipeline. The proposal is to pump water from the Shannon basin to supply the Greater Dublin Area, whose existing water sources are inadequate to support its continued growth.
The reaction to this proposal in the west has been a fury that surprises people who have not been paying attention. It is not, the western critics insist, about water-hoarding or parish-pump resistance to national infrastructure projects. It is about what the proposal exemplifies. Dublin wants western water but will not build western infrastructure. Dublin wants western resources but will not invest in western opportunity. Dublin wants to extract but never to contribute. The relationship is asymmetrical, and the asymmetry has been so consistent for so long that the Shannon pipeline appears, to people in the west, not as an isolated infrastructure project but as the next logical step in a sustained programme of regional extraction.
The colonial parallel is hard to avoid. Throughout the modern history of European empires, the relationship between metropoles and their colonies was characterised by a one-way flow: resources, products, and labour moved from periphery to centre, while infrastructure investment, political representation, and cultural recognition moved in the opposite direction only to the degree necessary to maintain the extraction. The Irish post-independence relationship between Dublin and the west has, for a century, conformed to this pattern with remarkable fidelity. The west has provided Dublin with its population — every generation forced to migrate for work, education, opportunity. It has provided rural and pastoral products. It has provided the cultural materials — Gaelic mythology, Atlantic landscapes, traditional music — that decorate the official national identity. And now it is being asked to provide the water. In return, it has received the closure of services, the prevention of infrastructure, the abolition of local democracy, and the patronising attention of state agencies that approach it as a problem to be managed rather than a region to be supported.
The 2013 Reform: A Century-Long Pattern Completed
The infrastructure failures we have just surveyed are, in one sense, easy to dismiss. They are products of complex decision processes, attributable to competing priorities, justifiable in various technical languages, and capable of being defended on any individual occasion. The structural pattern is visible only when one steps back. There is, however, one case in which the structural intent is documented in the public record, attributable to identifiable decision-makers, and impossible to defend in technical language. That case is the abolition of the Sligo Borough Council in 2013, and the broader local government reform of which it was part.
To see what was done in 2013, we have to return to 1913. The two dates are connected by a structural pattern that ran continuously through the intervening century. In the spring of 1913, as the Sligo Dock Strike unfolded, the political character of the town’s local government institutions was sharply visible. The rural Sligo County Council formally denounced James Larkin and the ITGWU as the carriers of “foul, anti-Christian doctrines.” The denunciation came in explicitly religious language, from a body whose membership was drawn predominantly from the rural districts of the county — small farmers, rural shopkeepers, Catholic professionals — a body shaped by the cultural formation we have been describing as the Old English Catholic petit-bourgeois. The same denunciation was not echoed by Sligo Borough Council, the urban authority responsible for the town itself. The Mayor of Sligo backed the strikers, hosted mass meetings of them in the Town Hall, and supported the cause publicly. The Borough Council, drawing its membership from the town’s working class, Protestant middle class, and cross-confessional radicals, was politically aligned mostly with the strike, not against it.
This 1913 split — rural Catholic conservative county versus urban radical borough — was not an accident of personnel. It was a structural feature of the town. The rural districts and the urban centre had different cultural compositions, different political traditions, and different visions of what the town and county should be. The Borough Council, as the formal institution of urban Sligo, was the political vehicle of the same cross-confessional formation that had won the Dock Strike, that would shortly produce the 1922 anti-Treaty supermajority, that maintained the Connachtach republican newspaper under a Protestant editor, that lost its young men to executions on Slievemore and internment after the Civil War. The County Council was the political vehicle of a different formation: the rural Catholic small-property class that fitted comfortably into the dominant cultural framework of the new state and that would, over the following decades, prosper under it.
For a hundred years after 1913, both institutions continued to exist, with the political distinction between them slowly eroding under the cultural pressure of the post-independence state but never entirely disappearing. The Borough Council retained, in attenuated form, the urban radical character that had distinguished it from the rural county. It was the formal expression of what Sligo town was — a place whose cultural and political traditions did not fit the dominant national framework. It was not, by the twenty-first century, a powerful institution. Decades of centralisation had stripped it of most of its functions. But it persisted, and its persistence was a kind of structural irritant.
In 2013, the Fine Gael and Labour government finally resolved the irritation. They did so under the cover of a financial scandal. Sligo County Council — not the Borough — had accumulated approximately €94 million in debt through speculative land purchases during the Celtic Tiger years. The financial mismanagement was real. The remedy was to abolish, not the County Council that had accrued the debt, but the Borough Council that had not. Phil Hogan, the Minister for the Environment responsible for the reform, observed publicly that “Sligo is certainly one of the reasons we are reforming local authorities.” It was an extraordinary statement. It identified a specific town as a reason for restructuring national local government, while justifying the restructuring on grounds that pointed at a different institution entirely. The actual operation was the elimination of urban democratic representation in a town whose urban democratic representation had, for a century, been ideologically inconvenient.
The mechanics of the abolition deserve close attention. Sligo Borough Council had been an institution with twelve elected councillors, providing urban Sligo with direct municipal representation. Under the Local Government Reform Act 2014, the Borough was abolished and replaced with a Municipal District of Sligo within the County Council, allocated six councillors. These six were placed on the reconstituted Sligo County Council alongside thirteen councillors elected from the rural districts. The urban majority of the old Borough had become an urban minority in the new combined authority. The cultural-political distinction between rural Catholic county and urban radical borough — visible in 1913, eroded but persistent through the century — was administratively erased by drowning the urban vote in the rural one.
This was gerrymandering by abolition. It was not described as such in the official rationale, which spoke of efficiency, modernisation, and the elimination of overlapping responsibilities. But the structural effect was unmistakable. The cultural formation that had backed the Dock Strike, returned anti-Treaty candidates two-to-one in 1922, edited the Connachtach under a Protestant pen, and maintained, however attenuated, an institutional voice through eight decades of cultural hostility — that formation lost its formal representation. What replaced it was a body in which the cultural majority of the surrounding agricultural districts, comfortably aligned with the dominant national framework, structurally outvoted the inheritors of the urban radical tradition.
The 2014 reform did not target Sligo alone. It abolished eighty town councils across Ireland in a single legislative action. Ireland, which had been one of the least decentralised states in Europe before the reform, became the least decentralised state in Europe after it. The European Charter of Local Self-Government, which Ireland had ratified, was systematically violated by the changes; the Council of Europe’s monitoring body has repeatedly noted Ireland’s non-compliance. The cumulative effect was the largest single reduction in democratic representation undertaken by any Western European state in the post-war era. It was carried out without referendum, without sustained public debate, and without any acknowledgment of the structural pattern it completed.
Sligo’s case was the case Hogan named. It was named because it was the case in which the structural intent was most visible: an urban radical institutional tradition, persistent for a century against the cultural framework of the dominant national formation, finally administratively eliminated under cover of a financial scandal in which it was not implicated. The official language of the reform belonged to the late-twentieth-century vocabulary of administrative rationalisation. The actual operation belonged to the longer history this article has been reconstructing — the same history that built the Pale in the thirteenth century, that conquered Gaelic Sligo in the 1590s, that consolidated Old English Catholic dominance through Catholic Emancipation, that defeated the fusion project in 1916–23, and that has, since 1922, governed places like Sligo with the structural blindness of an institutional framework that cannot see them and would prefer they did not exist.
The Process Continues: The 2025–26 Local Democracy Taskforce
The story does not stop in 2013. It continues at the moment of writing, in the spring of 2026, with a contemporary case that demonstrates the structural pattern operating in real time.
The 2020 Programme for Government, and more emphatically the 2025 Programme for Government (“Securing Ireland’s Future”), committed the state to a “Local Democracy Taskforce” intended, in the official language, to “finalise a programme for the reform and strengthening of local government.” Pressure had been building for a decade. The Council of Europe had monitored Ireland’s local government structures repeatedly and noted, in its 2023 report, the country’s serious non-compliance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The Association of Irish Local Government had published its own analyses calling for restoration of town councils. The Seanad Public Consultation Committee had reported in October 2024 on the future of local democracy. Pressure from across the political spectrum had been mounting for some kind of acknowledgment that the 2014 abolitions had gone too far.
The Taskforce was established on 4 June 2025 and held its first meeting on 26 June 2025. The membership was drawn from existing local government institutions — councillors, chief executives, audit committee chairs, departmental officials, and a former Council of Europe representative. The terms of reference set out four “pillars” — Structure, Finance, Functions, and Governance/Accountability — and a mandate to consider devolution of decision-making powers to councillors, strengthening of municipal districts, and improvement of the framework for local authority finance.
What the terms of reference did not include — and this is the central fact of the case — was the restoration of the town councils that had been abolished in 2014. An Association of Irish Local Government spokesperson explicitly confirmed, in February 2026, that “reintroduction of town councils wasn’t on the terms of reference for the Local Democracy Taskforce.” The Taskforce had been set up to reform local government while being structurally prevented from considering the central question that local government activists, the Council of Europe, and the affected populations had been raising for a decade.
The Taskforce completed its work and presented its final report to the Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage and the Minister for Local Government and Planning in early March 2026. It is not, at the time of writing, publicly available. It has not been brought to Cabinet. The Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, was asked about the report by the Tipperary TD Seamus Healy in early May 2026, in the context of Healy’s long-running campaign for the restoration of town and borough councils. Martin’s response, reported by Tipp FM, was that he had “expressed disappointment with the report” and that Healy should “not hold his breath on its contents.”
Consider what this means. The Government commissioned a Taskforce on local democracy, restricted its terms of reference to exclude the central question, received a report from the Taskforce in March 2026, and as of May 2026 was sitting on the report while the Taoiseach publicly signalled disappointment with whatever the Taskforce had nevertheless managed to recommend. The process is documented in the parliamentary record. The cultural framework that abolished town councils in 2014 is, in 2025–26, working actively to ensure they are not restored, while operating a public consultation theatre intended to suggest that consideration is being given to the question.
This is not, in 2026, the result of medieval cultural fault lines persisting unconsciously through institutional inertia. This is conscious, current, identifiable political action by a sitting government to prevent the restoration of democratic representation in towns whose representation was abolished a decade earlier and whose populations have been demanding its return ever since. The Taskforce was the structural mechanism for not addressing the issue. The report being sat on is the next stage of not addressing the issue. The Taoiseach’s preemptive disappointment with the report’s contents is the third stage of not addressing the issue.
This is what the framework looks like when its operations become visible. Most of the time the framework is invisible — its decisions are made within institutions that frame them in technical languages, its outcomes are explained in passive-voice descriptions, and the structural pattern only emerges when one stands back. In the present case, because the question has become politically prominent enough that some response was required, the framework has been forced to operate in public view. What is on view is precisely the pattern this article has been describing: a state that cannot bring itself to restore democratic representation in places like Sligo because doing so would restore institutional voice to populations whose existence the state’s framework was constructed to obscure.
Why EU Funding Cannot Fix It
There is a final point about contemporary Sligo that needs to be made explicitly, because it is the point that breaks the standard liberal response to regional underdevelopment. The standard response is that the European Union provides substantial funding for “lagging regions” and that Sligo’s underdevelopment is therefore a matter that can be corrected through the proper administration of available resources. This response misses the structural issue.
EU funding does not flow automatically. It has to be drawn down by member states. It has to be allocated to specific projects by national authorities. It has to be applied for through processes those authorities control. If the national authority is institutionally incapable of seeing what a region needs, then it cannot translate available EU money into actual development there. The Western Rail Corridor case is the perfect illustration. EU funding was available; the project was strategically aligned with EU policy; the route already existed; the documented economic case was strong. None of this mattered, because the national authority — the Department of Transport under Varadkar in 2011 — actively removed the project from the funding pathway. The EU could not unilaterally fund a project the Irish state did not submit.
The Council of Europe’s repeated criticism of Irish non-compliance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government, similarly, has produced no domestic remedy. The state, having been formally found non-compliant, has responded by establishing a Taskforce with terms of reference that exclude the central remedy. External pressure cannot overcome internal cultural blindness when the institutions responsible for translating external pressure into domestic action are themselves built within the framework that produced the original problem.
This is the structural trap. The funding that exists at EU level cannot reach the regions that need it because the national institutions are not built to channel it there. The democratic remedies recommended by European bodies cannot be implemented because the national institutions are not built to implement them. The lagging region remains lagging not because it is intrinsically unviable but because the framework that processes its claims is not built to recognise them. No amount of EU funding will fix this until the framework itself is examined and changed.
What Other Accounts Miss
A substantial body of writing now documents the dimensions of western Irish underdevelopment — the rail blockages, the hospital closures, the IDA imbalances, the broadband failures, the population drain, the local government abolitions. Some of this writing is excellent investigative journalism; some is policy analysis; some is community advocacy. What unites all of it is the documentation of symptoms.
What almost none of it does is provide the context. The symptoms are real, they are documented, they are correctly identified. But they are presented as a set of independent failures — a transport policy problem here, a healthcare rationalisation problem there, a broadband rollout failure somewhere else, a local government reform somewhere else again, a demographic crisis as the cumulative result. The implicit theory of cause is that this is a series of unfortunate decisions, each individually justifiable, that have cumulatively produced an outcome no one explicitly intended.
This theory of cause is wrong. The decisions are not independent. They follow a pattern. The pattern follows the cultural geography of the country. The cultural geography reflects, with extraordinary fidelity, the structural inheritance described by O’Sullivan Beare in 1618 and consolidated by the Old English Catholic counter-revolution of the 1920s. The reason all the writing on western neglect documents the symptoms without explaining the cause is that explaining the cause requires naming something that the official framework of the Irish state cannot easily name: that the state itself was built by and for a specific cultural formation, that it operates through cultural assumptions specific to that formation, and that places like Sligo, which do not fit those assumptions, are not just neglected by it but are, in a structural sense, invisible to it.
This article has been attempting to make that cause visible. The case for that visibility is not only descriptive. It is practical. Until the cause is named, the symptoms cannot be addressed in any sustained way. Individual battles may be won — a service restored, a road built, a council seat reinstated — but the framework that produced the symptoms will continue to produce them. The Western Rail Corridor may eventually be restored under sufficient pressure, but the next infrastructure project will go through the same process of obstruction, the next service rationalisation will follow the same pattern, the next funding cycle will produce the same misallocation, the next Local Democracy Taskforce will be set up with the central question excluded from its terms of reference. The framework reproduces itself. It will continue to reproduce itself until it is recognised for what it is.
What this would look like, and what would be required to change it, is the question that remains.
We can now state plainly what could not be stated at the beginning, because the historical work to support it had not yet been done.
The poorest regions of Ireland are not poor because they lack resources. They are not poor because of geography, demography, or the impersonal workings of market economics. They are poor because they are the regions most thoroughly devastated by colonialism — and crucially, by two colonialisms, the second of which has never been named.
The first colonialism is the one Irish historiography acknowledges: the eight centuries of English conquest, plantation, dispossession, and cultural destruction that culminated in the Tudor wars, the Cromwellian settlement, the penal era, and the famine. This colonialism is well documented. Its effects on the western and northwestern regions of Ireland are well understood. The official Irish state recognises it, commemorates it, and uses it as the foundational narrative of its own legitimacy.
The second colonialism is the one that began in 1922. It was not imposed from outside but consolidated from within. It was carried out not by a foreign power but by one of the three Irelands O’Sullivan Beare had described in 1618 — the population descended from the medieval Old English colonisers, transformed over three centuries into the urban, English-speaking, post-Tridentine Catholic middle class culture that took control of the new state at independence and rebuilt it in their own cultural image. This second colonialism has not been recognised, has not been commemorated, has not been used to explain anything. On the contrary: the official narrative of the state has been constructed precisely to make it invisible. The state has had every reason to maintain its invisibility, because the state is the political vehicle of the population that carried it out.
Sligo is one example of what the second colonialism has done. Not because Sligo is special — though it is, with its three hundred years of Gaelic urban history, its unusual demographic configuration, its central role in the fusion attempt — but because Sligo is structurally unsuited to the cultural framework of the post-independence state in almost every dimension. The town had its Gaelic urban tradition: invisible. It had its Protestant middle class: marginalised. It had its radical labour movement: suppressed. It had its cross-confessional revolutionary alliance: officially forgotten. It had its democratic institutions: progressively abolished. Each dimension of what made Sligo what it was put it on the wrong side of the new dispensation. The cumulative effect, over a century, has been the slow institutional erasure of a place whose actual history is incompatible with the state’s preferred narrative.
The contemporary symptoms — the lagging region status, the blocked railway, the closed services, the abolished Borough Council, the unrealised museum, the emigration of generation after generation of young people — are not the unrelated misfortunes of a peripheral town. They are the visible expression of a single underlying process: the structural inability of the post-independence Irish state to see, to recognise, or to serve a population whose history does not fit the cultural template the state was built to embody.
This inability is what we have been calling cultural blindness. The phrase is not metaphorical. The blindness is real, structural, and operative. It is the reason the same pattern repeats across every dimension of state activity. It is the reason no amount of EU funding can fix the problem at source. It is the reason the official explanations for western underdevelopment are always passive-voice descriptions of “underinvestment” rather than active-voice accounts of who did not invest, when, and why. The framework that processes these decisions cannot see itself, because seeing itself would require recognising that the post-independence state is not the political expression of a unified Irish nation but the political expression of one cultural formation among several.
This is the thing that has not been named, and that until it is named will continue to produce the outcomes we have documented.
Why the Diagnosis Matters
There is a standard liberal response to regional underdevelopment in Ireland that goes something like this. Yes, the western regions face real challenges. Yes, infrastructure investment has been uneven. Yes, services have been concentrated in major urban centres. The remedy is to do better: more EU funding properly applied, more strategic planning, more regional development programmes, more attention to balanced national development. Within the existing institutional framework, more enlightened decisions can be made. The problem is one of policy, and policy can be improved.
This response is not entirely wrong. Better decisions can in fact be made within the existing framework, and some of them have been made — incremental improvements in particular sectors, occasional successful regional initiatives, the gradual extension of broadband and certain services. But the response misses the structural point. The framework that produces the cumulative pattern of western underdevelopment is not a policy problem. It is a cultural problem operating through policy mechanisms. It will continue to produce the same outcomes regardless of which individuals are making policy decisions within it, because the framework itself shapes what counts as a reasonable decision in the first place.
This is why the diagnosis matters. If the diagnosis is wrong, the remedy is wrong. Treating the symptoms of western underdevelopment as a series of unfortunate policy failures, each individually correctable, allows the framework that produces them to continue operating untouched. Each individual battle may be won — a service restored, a route reopened, a funding cycle redirected — and the framework will go on producing the next wave of failures somewhere else. The lagging region remains lagging because the institutional capacity to see what it is, and therefore to serve what it needs, does not exist.
For this to change, the framework itself has to be examined, and that requires naming what it is.
What Recognition Would Require
The naming would require admitting several things that the official Irish narrative has been built to deny.
It would require admitting that there were three Irelands in the seventeenth century, and that there are still recognisably three Irelands in the twenty-first — Gaelic-descended, Anglo-Irish-Protestant-descended, and Old English Catholic-descended — though the boundaries between them have shifted and the Old English Catholic formation has become numerically and culturally dominant in ways that obscure the distinction. The cultural fault lines O’Sullivan Beare described have not disappeared. They have been buried under a symbolic Gaelic national identity that allows the dominant formation to claim continuity with what it has, in fact, replaced.
It would require admitting that independence in 1922 was not a unified national restoration but a transfer of power within a fundamentally colonial framework, from the British Protestant Ascendancy to the Old English Catholic middle class, accomplished through the defeat of the cross-confessional revolutionary tradition that had briefly threatened to produce a different outcome. The defeat of that tradition was the work of the population that succeeded the British — not the British themselves, who were withdrawing — and the state that emerged from this defeat consolidated itself around the cultural assumptions of the victorious formation.
It would require admitting that the Roman Catholic Church’s central role in twentieth-century Irish life was not the natural expression of Irish Catholicism but the specific cultural product of the Old English cultural formation that had preserved continental post-Tridentine Catholicism through the penal era and brought it to dominance through Catholic Emancipation, the devotional revolution, and the consolidation of the independent state. The other Irish Catholicism — the localised, decentralised, devotionally varied Christianity of the Gaelic countryside, fused with pre-Christian elements and weakly institutionalised — was suppressed by the same process that elevated the continental model to national official status. The Church’s contemporary loss of influence, dramatic as it has been, has not yet been accompanied by any serious recovery of the alternative religious cultures it displaced.
It would require admitting that the regions of the country that have been most thoroughly impoverished over the past century — the western and northwestern counties, the inner-city working-class districts, the Gaeltacht remnants, the Traveller communities — are not the unlucky losers of impersonal economic processes. They are the populations and places that the cultural framework of the post-independence state cannot see, cannot serve, and in many cases has actively persecuted.
These admissions would not be politically comfortable. They would disturb the foundational narrative of the state. They would raise immediate questions about the legitimacy of institutions that operate in the name of a unified Irish nation while in practice serving one cultural formation. They would require the descendants of the Old English Catholic middle class — who have ruled the country for a century without acknowledging that this is what they have done — to reckon with their own history in a way that would be uncomfortable for many of them personally and politically destabilising for the institutions they have built. The reluctance to name what this article has been describing is not, therefore, mere oversight. It is the political reluctance of a dominant cultural formation to acknowledge its own dominance.
The reluctance is understandable. It is also indefensible if the consequence is the continued impoverishment of the populations and regions the dominant formation cannot see.
The Federal Vision Returns
What would a state look like that could see all three Irelands and serve them equally? The question is not new, and the answer was substantially worked out a century ago by people who were then ignored.
Bulmer Hobson’s federal vision proposed an Ireland organised so as to devolve real authority to regions and traditions — to allow Ulster Protestants, Gaeltacht communities, urban working classes, and rural smallholders to govern themselves through structures designed for their actual conditions rather than imposed from Dublin according to uniform diktat. Hobson was pushed out of the IRB in 1916 and his vision was buried by the centralising counter-revolution. But the vision remains usable. It was never disproved; it was merely defeated. The conditions that would allow its recovery are different now, and in some respects more favourable. The cultural plurality that Hobson tried to accommodate has been damaged, but it has not been destroyed. The recognition of multiple Irish traditions, which a century ago required difficult intellectual work against prevailing assumptions, is now made considerably easier by the cumulative collapse of those assumptions.
The post-Catholic Ireland that has emerged over the past three decades — through the marriage equality referendum, the abortion referendum, the loss of the Church’s moral authority, the public reckoning with institutional abuse — has dismantled some of the institutional infrastructure of the Old English Catholic dominance without yet replacing it with anything coherent. The state remains structurally what it was, but the cultural foundations have shifted. This is the window in which the recognition of the broader historical pattern becomes politically possible, because the formation that has been ruling is no longer in a position to enforce its denial of having ruled. The institutional Catholic Church, whose collusion was essential to the Old English Catholic project’s twentieth-century consolidation, no longer has the capacity to suppress the historical conversation. The educational system, the cultural institutions, the media — all of which were once aligned with the maintenance of the official narrative — are now more permeable to alternative readings.
This does not mean recognition will come easily. The political vehicles of the Old English Catholic formation remain in place — the two major parties, the senior civil service, the dominant professional and commercial networks — and their interest in maintaining the framework that has served them is undiminished. But the framework’s invisibility is no longer assured. The question is whether the populations who have been losers under that framework — in the west, in the inner cities, in the Gaeltacht, among the Travellers, in the marginalised Protestant communities of both jurisdictions, among the working class generally — will recognise themselves as such, will recognise the common structural cause of their marginalisation, and will articulate it politically.
The Museum
To return, finally, to the symbol with which we began. The museum that Sligo has been trying to establish for over seventy years has not been built because its construction is not, in any obvious sense, possible within the cultural framework of the state. The museum would have to tell Sligo’s actual history, and Sligo’s actual history is not the history that fits the state’s narrative.
It would have to tell the story of the Gaelic city — three hundred years of urban civilisation under Gaelic governance, manuscripts produced, trade conducted, an alternative form of Irishness that the standard narrative cannot accommodate. It would have to tell the story of the Protestant settler community that became the de facto middle class, and that has been steadily diminished over the past century by processes the state does not officially acknowledge. It would have to tell the story of the radical labour tradition, the cross-confessional alliances, the dock strikes, the Sligo contribution to the revolutionary period — much of which is absent from the standard national history. It would have to tell the story of the Gaelic Revival fusion attempt and its defeat, with Sligo at its centre. It would have to tell, in short, the history this article has been telling. And no state institution has had any reason to want that history told.
If the museum is ever built — and built with proper resources, with proper scholarly authority, with proper civic recognition — it will be because something has shifted in the framework that has prevented its construction for seventy years. The construction of the museum will not be the cause of that shift; it will be its sign.
The same can be said of the railway, the hospital services, the university designation, the EU funding application, the restored Borough Council. None of these is sufficient by itself. Each is a sign of whether the framework that has produced their absence has begun to give way. The question is not whether Sligo will get its rail line and its museum and its services. The question is whether the cultural blindness that has prevented Sligo from getting these things will be examined, named, and corrected, so that the same blindness stops producing the same outcomes elsewhere and everywhere it operates.
The question, finally, is not “What is wrong with Sligo people?”
The question is: What is wrong with us, that we cannot see what Sligo is?
That question has an answer. The answer is this article. It has been the work of these pages to make the answer sayable. The work of saying it, repeatedly and publicly until something changes, remains.
References
On Old English dominance of party and property into the modern age.
I. Primary historical sources on medieval and early modern Sligo
Annals of Connacht (Annála Connacht). Compiled c. 1224–1544 by the Ó Maoilchonaire family among others. Edited by A. Martin Freeman, Annála Connacht: The Annals of Connacht (A.D. 1224–1544). Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1944. Online via CELT, University College Cork. — Used throughout Part II for the medieval dynastic history.
Annals of the Four Masters (Annála Ríoghachta Éireann). Compiled c. 1632–1636 by Mícheál Ó Cléirigh and collaborators at the Franciscan convent of Donegal. Edited by John O’Donovan, 7 vols., Dublin, 1851. — Used for the Tudor conquest period.
Annals of Ulster (Annála Uladh). Compiled at Senad Mac Manus in Fermanagh, late 15th century. Edited by William M. Hennessy and Bartholomew MacCarthy, Dublin, 1887–1901. Online via CELT. — Used for the O’Donnell-related material.
O’Sullivan Beare, Philip.Briefe relation of Ireland, and the diversity of Irish in the same. Manuscript, c. 1618. Various editions; available through CELT. — The “three types of Irish” passages quoted in Parts III, IV, V, and VII. Foundational text for the entire cultural-fault-lines argument.
Sidney, Sir Henry. Memorandum on Connacht, 1576. Quoted in Alice Stopford Green, The Making of Ireland and Its Undoing, p. 19. — The “haunted with strangers” testimony on Sligo, used in Part II.
II. Primary sources from the Gaelic Revival and revolutionary period
Hyde, Douglas. “The Necessity for De-Anglicising Ireland.” Lecture delivered at the inaugural meeting of the National Literary Society, Dublin, 25 November 1892. Reprinted in Charles Gavan Duffy, George Sigerson and Douglas Hyde, The Revival of Irish Literature. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1894. — Central text for Part IV.
Connolly, James.Labour in Irish History. Dublin: Maunsel, 1910. — Used in Parts IV, V, VII.
Connolly, James.The Reconquest of Ireland. Dublin: Liberty Hall, 1915. — Used in Part V for the argument that political independence without economic restructuring would be hollow.
Hobson, Bulmer.Ireland Yesterday and Tomorrow. Tralee: Anvil Books, 1968. — Memoirs containing the “verbal differences” passage quoted in Part V. Hobson’s federal vision and his account of being pushed out of the IRB are central to Parts IV, V, and VII.
Tone, Theobald Wolfe.Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone, Founder of the United Irish Society. Edited by his son William Theobald Wolfe Tone, Washington, 1826. — The “common name of Irishman” passage quoted in Part IV.
Davis, Thomas.Essays Literary and Historical. Edited by D. J. O’Donoghue, Dundalk, 1914. — General reference for Part IV’s discussion of cultural pluralism in the Young Ireland tradition.
Yeats, John Butler.Letters to His Son W. B. Yeats and Others, 1869–1922. Edited by Joseph Hone, London: Faber & Faber, 1944. — Source for the “socialist anarchist Home Ruler” self-description, used in Part IV. (Note: this attribution should be verified against the published correspondence — the phrase is sometimes cited as coming from his unpublished letters or his memoir Early Memories.)
III. Secondary scholarship — Sligo specific
O’Dowd, Mary.Power, Politics and Land: Early Modern Sligo, 1568–1688. Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, Queen’s University of Belfast, 1991. — The standard scholarly treatment of Sligo through the Tudor conquest and seventeenth century. Essential for Parts II and III. The book also documents the substantial Scottish settlement in Sligo, distinct from the Ulster Plantation pattern, which is relevant to the article’s argument about Sligo’s unusual demographic configuration.
Simms, Katharine. “A Lost Tribe: The Clan Murtagh O’Conors.” Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society, Vol. 53 (2001), pp. 1–22. — Primary source for the medieval dynastic history reconstructed in Part II, including the Lebor na hUidre ransom story.
O’Rorke, Rev. Terrence.The History of Sligo: Town and County. 2 vols. Dublin: James Duffy, 1889. — The classic local antiquarian history. Useful for medieval and early modern material; obviously dated in its interpretive frameworks but valuable as a compilation of sources. The author was a parish priest in the Sligo region.
Farry, Michael.Sligo 1914–1921: A Chronicle of Conflict. Trim: Killoran Press, 1994. — Used for the revolutionary period material in Part V.
Farry, Michael.The Aftermath of Revolution: Sligo 1921–23. Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2000. — Source for the claim that the Civil War was approximately three times as destructive in Sligo as the War of Independence; for the Brian MacNeill killing on Slievemore; for the 2:1 anti-Treaty result in the 1922 election. Essential for Part V.
Deignan, Patrick.Sligo Protestants, 1912–26. PhD thesis, National University of Ireland Maynooth, 2014. — Documents the Sligo Protestant community through the revolutionary period; the source for the Bradshaw material expanded in Part V. Available via the Maynooth University Repository.
IV. Secondary scholarship — general Irish history
Stopford Green, Alice.The Making of Ireland and Its Undoing, 1200–1600. London: Macmillan, 1908. (Second edition, Dublin: Maunsel, 1920.) — Stopford Green’s account of medieval Sligo, including the Sidney testimony, is the textual anchor for Part II’s account of Sligo as “an Irish city whose buildings of wood and stone were said to be splendid, whose ships traded with Spain, and carried cloth to Southampton.” Stopford Green was a Protestant nationalist historian whose work explicitly rehabilitated the Gaelic civilisation against the dominant English-colonial historiography of her time. Available open-access via the Internet Archive.
Stopford Green, Alice.Irish Nationality. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911.
Stopford Green, Alice.The Old Irish World. Dublin: M. H. Gill, 1912.
Ellis, Steven G. “Why the History of ‘the Celtic Fringe’ Remains Unwritten.” European Review of History, 10:2 (2003), pp. 221–231. — Used in Parts III and V for the argument about the marginalisation of certain historical perspectives in Irish and British historiography.
Canny, Nicholas. [Work on Edmund Spenser and the colonisation of Ireland, c. 2025 — precise title to be verified from project files.] — Cited in Part II for the ideological background to the Tudor conquest. The relevant earlier work is Canny’s “The Attempted Anglicisation of Ireland in the Seventeenth Century: An Exemplar of ‘British History’,” in Ronald G. Asch (ed.), Three Nations — A Common History? Bochum, 1993.
Antman. [Work titled along the lines of “Total War in Ireland, 1558–1603” — full citation to be verified from project files.] — Cited in Part II for the Tudor military tactics that destroyed Gaelic Sligo.
V. Hobson, anarcho-nationalism, and the federal alternative
Hay, Marnie.Bulmer Hobson and the Nationalist Movement in Twentieth-Century Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009. — The standard biographical treatment. The project file “Hay_Resurrection_of_Bulmer_Hobson_MS.pdf” may be a working paper version of this material or a related manuscript.
[Anarcho-Nationalism and Irish Freedom.] Project file. — Full bibliographic details to be verified from the source document.
Hobson, Bulmer.A Short History of the Irish Volunteers, Vol. 1. Dublin: Candle Press, 1918.
Hobson, Bulmer.Defensive Warfare: A Handbook for Irish Nationalists. Belfast: West Belfast Branch of Sinn Féin, 1909. — The early articulation of his strategic and political vision, written before the militarist faction took over the IRB.
VI. Travellers and Gaelic continuity
Helleiner, Jane.Irish Travellers: Racism and the Politics of Culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
National Library of Ireland. “Sligo Dispute.” Online exhibit drawing on contemporary Sligo Champion newspaper coverage. https://www.nli.ie/news-stories/stories/sligo-dispute — Primary documentary detail on the dispute, the employers affected (including Pollexfen and Gore-Booth’s Connacht Manufacturing Company), and the settlement terms. Central source for Part IV.
“1913 Sligo Dock Strike.” Wikipedia entry. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1913_Sligo_Dock_strike — Useful summary; should be cross-checked against the NLI material and Farry’s books.
Irish Times. “West awakens to worker rights.” 11 September 2013. https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/west-awakens-to-worker-rights-1.1522292 — Coverage of the centenary of the strike, including the parallel between Arthur Jackson’s tactics in Sligo and William Martin Murphy’s in Dublin.
An Phoblacht. “Sligo prelude to Great Lockout 1913.” June 2013. https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/23192 — Used for the settlement details and the County Council’s denunciation of Larkin’s “foul, anti-Christian doctrines.”
[The Irish Story.] “Remembering the Lockout.” August 2013. https://www.theirishstory.com/2013/08/27/remembering-the-lockout/ — Useful contextual material on the wider 1913 industrial confrontations including Sligo.
VIII. Bradshaw and the Sligo revolutionary period
“Bradshaw, Robert George.”Dictionary of Irish Biography. Royal Irish Academy. https://www.dib.ie/biography/bradshaw-robert-george-a0875 — Primary biographical source for Part V.
“Green, Alice Sophia Amelia Stopford.”Dictionary of Irish Biography. Royal Irish Academy. https://www.dib.ie/biography/green-alice-sophia-amelia-stopford-a3602 — Biographical context for Stopford Green’s intellectual project.
The Irish Story. “Book Review: Sligo. The Irish Revolution 1912–23.” 16 December 2012. https://www.theirishstory.com/2012/12/16/book-review-sligo-the-irish-revolution-1912-23/ — Useful commentary on Farry’s books, including the 2:1 anti-Treaty vote figure and the relative destructiveness of the Civil War in Sligo.
IX. The 2013 abolition and current Local Democracy Taskforce
Hogan, Phil. Statements as Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2013, on the abolition of town councils. The “Sligo is certainly one of the reasons we are reforming local authorities” quote is widely reported; specific source to be confirmed.
Local Government Reform Act 2014. Statute Book of Ireland. https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2014/act/1/enacted/en/html — The legislative vehicle for the abolition of the borough and town councils, including Sligo Borough Council.
Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.Monitoring of the application of the European Charter of Local Self-Government in Ireland. October 2023. — Source for Ireland’s documented non-compliance with the Charter.
Programme for Government 2025: Securing Ireland’s Future. Department of the Taoiseach, January 2025. https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-the-taoiseach/publications/programme-for-government-2025/ — The political commitment to establish the Local Democracy Taskforce.
Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage. “Local Democracy Taskforce established to reform and strengthen local government.” Press release, 6 June 2025. https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-housing-local-government-and-heritage/press-releases/local-democracy-taskforce-established-to-reform-and-strengthen-local-government/
Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage. “Local Democracy Taskforce.” Webpage including terms of reference and membership. https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-housing-local-government-and-heritage/publications/local-democracy-taskforce/
Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage. “Local Democracy Taskforce presents final report with recommendations for reform of local government in Ireland.” Press release, March 2026. https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-housing-local-government-and-heritage/press-releases/local-democracy-taskforce-presents-final-report-with-recommendations-for-reform-of-local-government-in-ireland/
Dáil Éireann written answers. “Local Government Reform.” 27 May 2025. https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2025-05-27/376/ — Departmental responses on the Taskforce process.
Dáil Éireann written answers. “Local Government Reform.” 20 March 2025. https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2025-03-20/section/93/
Tipp FM. “Healy calls on Taoiseach to confirm his stance on re-establishing Borough and Town Councils.” 4 May 2026. https://tippfm.com/news/healy-calls-on-taoiseach-to-confirm-his-stance-on-re-establishing-borough-and-town-councils/ — Source for the Taoiseach Micheál Martin’s “expressed disappointment with the report” comment and the “not to hold his breath” quote. Central source for the closing argument of Part VI.
Dundalk Democrat / Louth Live. “Councillors told reintroduction of Town Councils a matter for ‘higher Government’.” 17 February 2026. https://www.dundalkdemocrat.ie/news/home/2017298/councillors-told-reintroduction-of-town-councils-a-matter-for-higher-government.html — Source for the AILG spokesperson’s confirmation that town council restoration was not in the Taskforce’s terms of reference.
Connaught Telegraph. “Mayo Letters of the Week: We need solutions to a damaged democracy.” 26 April 2026. https://www.con-telegraph.ie/2026/04/26/mayo-letters-of-the-week-we-need-solutions-to-a-damaged-democracy/ — Documents the Taskforce’s submission of its report to Ministers Browne and Cummins.
Ó Riordáin, Seán. “Ireland’s taskforce on local democracy.” Administration, Vol. 73, No. 4 (December 2025), pp. 61–70. https://doi.org/10.2478/admin-2025-0026 — Scholarly analysis of the Taskforce process.
Association of Irish Local Government.Building Stronger Local Government: AILG General Election Manifesto. November 2024. — Background pressure for the Taskforce.
X. The Western Rail Corridor and contemporary infrastructure
[The author.] “Dublin’s Great Greenway Swindle.” allismotion.org. https://allismotion.org/dublins-great-greenway-swindle/ — Detailed forensic documentation of the WRC obstruction history. Referenced in Part VI.
XI. Background — genetic and prehistoric Ireland (project files)
These are not directly cited in the article but provide the broader empirical background for claims about deep continuity in Ireland’s population history:
Cassidy, Lara M., et al. “Neolithic and Bronze Age migration to Ireland and establishment of the insular Atlantic genome.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113:2 (2016), pp. 368–373.
Hofmanová, Zuzana, et al. “Early farmers from across Europe directly descended from Neolithic Aegeans.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113:25 (2016), pp. 6886–6891.
Gilbert, Edmund, et al. “Genomic insights into the population structure and demographic history of the Irish population.” Scientific Reports, 7 (2017), 17199.
Byrne, Ross P., et al. “The Irish DNA Atlas: Revealing Fine-Scale Population Structure and History within Ireland.” Scientific Reports, 8 (2018), 17199.
Keohane, F. M., et al. (2020). “Microbiome and health implications for ethnic minorities…” — Full citation to be verified from the project file.
XII. Other project files (cited or referenced)
Crampsie, Arlene. “Creating Citizens from Colonial Subjects: Reforming Local Government in Early Twentieth-Century Ireland.” [Journal and date to be verified from the project file.] — Relevant to the structural-continuity argument about how local government was reshaped in the period of independence.
A note on citation completeness
The references above are as complete as I have been able to make them given the materials available. Several references — particularly Antman’s piece on the Tudor period, the Canny essay on Spenser, the John Butler Yeats quotation, and the specific Phil Hogan source — would benefit from verification against the original project files or the user’s own notes before publication.
For a blog publication this level of citation is more than sufficient. For potential book chapter use, a final pass to confirm exact page numbers and to standardise citation format would be advisable.
The article makes some claims (particularly about the cultural composition of the 2013 Borough Council vs County Council in 1913, and about the specifics of the 2014 Local Government Reform Act’s effect on Sligo) that could be sharpened with citation of specific Borough Council records, electoral results, and council debates from the relevant periods. If access to the Sligo County Council archive is feasible, these primary documents would significantly strengthen the empirical case.
Second in a series. The first essay set out the ancient programme this work descends from — the ontology from Parmenides and Heraclitus, the method from Epicurus, and the argument that dualism is what froze the human sciences. This essay takes those foundations as given and follows the single most important consequence: that a living body is not the bounded thing we take it for, that its real edge moves, and that technology is the name for what happens when it moves outward into the world.
The first essay did the hard foundational work: one continuous being, in motion, with the dualisms dissolved because there is nowhere left for a real separation to stand. I want now to take the most familiar object there is — your own body — and show what those two axioms do to it. Because the place the whole programme turns from metaphysics into a science of human beings is here, at the boundary of the body, and it turns on noticing that the boundary is not where you think it is and does not stay still.
A body is a motion, not a thing
You think of yourself as a thing: a body, bounded by skin, that moves around inside an environment. The environment is outside, you are inside, and the skin is the line between. This is so obvious it is hard to see as a claim at all. But it is a claim, and on the view set out in the first essay it is the wrong one.
A living body is not a thing that happens to be moving. It is a motion that happens to hold a shape. Heartbeat, breath, the transport of molecules across membranes, the firing of neurons, the constant muscular work of holding posture against gravity — a body is a continuously regulated system of motion, sustained against a background of ambient motion that would otherwise dissipate it. This is not poetic licence. Stop the regulation and the shape goes: the structure that was a body becomes, within minutes, just matter subject to the ambient motion like any other, and then it disperses. What we call a body is precisely the regulation — the holding of a pattern of motion against the tendency of everything to even out. The “thing” is the verb, not the noun.
If that is what a body is, then its boundary is not the skin. The boundary is the edge of the motion the system can govern. Where the organism’s regulated motion ends and ungoverned ambient motion begins — that is the real edge of the organism, and most of the time it sits at roughly the skin, which is why we never notice that skin was never the point.
Watch the edge move
Now pick something up.
Grip a stone. For as long as you hold it, the stone’s possible motions are constrained by yours. It cannot fall, cannot roll, cannot move except as your regulated motion permits; it has entered your force-transmission system and become, for the duration, part of the governed pattern. The edge of the organism is now at the surface of the stone, not at the skin of the hand. Raise the stone and strike with it, and the governed motion now reaches through the stone into whatever you strike. Throw it, and for the duration of the flight your governed motion extends across the whole arc — you have flung the edge of yourself thirty feet downrange.
This is not a metaphor about feeling attached to your tools. It is a literal claim about where the regulated-motion system ends, and the answer is: not at the skin, and not at any fixed place. The boundary is wherever the governance currently reaches, and it moves in and out as the organism takes material under control and releases it again. The skin was just where the edge usually sits when the hands are empty.
And this is the whole definition of technology, arrived at from inside the organism rather than imposed from outside. Technology is structured motion that extends the organism’s governed boundary into external material — that brings the stone, the spear, the anvil under the same regulation that governs the heartbeat and the stride, and so reaches the edge of the self outward into the world. A stone tool, on this account, is not itself the technology. The technology is the motion; the stone is the trace it leaves and the medium through which the boundary momentarily extends. This is the reorientation the whole research programme rests on: away from the object and its type, toward the motion and its boundary.
The coupling, and why biology already has the language for it
There is an established way of talking about this in systems biology, and it is not borrowed loosely — it is the right frame, and the ontology delivers you straight to it.
An organism that brings external material under its own regulation, incorporating it into its governed dynamics, is engaged in what the systems-biology literature calls self-extending symbiosis: a system that maintains itself by recruiting parts of its environment into its own self-maintaining process. The recruited element is not metabolised, not made of the organism’s own tissue; it is coupled — brought into the regulatory loop while remaining external. The hand and the stone, while the knapping lasts, are one self-maintaining motion system with two materials in it, one of them flesh and one of them rock.
This matters because it tells you what kind of thing the organism–environment boundary is. It is not a wall and not a fixed membrane; it is the active surface where governed motion meets ambient motion and can reach across to pull some of the ambient into the governed. The boundary is where the organism does its homeostatic work — where it buffers itself against the environment’s departures from what it can tolerate. An organism with empty hands buffers itself only with its anatomy. An organism that can extend its boundary into material buffers itself with the material too, and the range of environmental departures it can survive grows accordingly. That is the seed of the entire evolutionary story the technical work tells — but the point for now is conceptual: the boundary is a place where work is done, the work is homeostatic, and extending the boundary outward is a way of doing more of it. The body’s moving edge is the organism’s primary tool for staying alive in a world that keeps changing.
The relations are the reality
Here is the part that I think is the conceptual core of the whole way of seeing, and the part I have been least willing, until now, to state without hedging. I have tended to write of technology producing “effective” changes in the organism’s world — as though the real situation were fixed and the technology only altered some experienced or measured overlay on top of it. That hedging is a mistake, and dropping it is what makes the idea land.
Start with something everyone knows in their body. Stand on a station platform as a train slides out. For a moment you cannot tell whether your train is moving or the one beside it is; the only fact available to you is the relative motion between them. This is not a quirk of perception. It is how motion is. Motion is only ever the motion of one body relative to another; there is no measurement you can make of your own motion except against something else. Classical mechanics has known this since Galileo: in an inertial frame, you measure motion only in relation to other bodies, and absent any such relation a body “may as well be at rest.” And here the programme’s first axiom finishes the thought that even Galileo left half-stated — there is no “at rest,” because all is motion. The absolute, motionless background against which things would “really” be moving or still is a fiction. It is, in the exact sense of the first essay, a what-is-not that we have wrongly granted being.
Hold onto that, because it is what licenses the strong claim. We habitually narrate a hunt from an imagined god’s-eye view: “really” the hominin stands here, the prey stands there, the spear flies between. From that imagined absolute frame, the relative-motion description looks like mere bookkeeping — a way of talking. But the absolute frame does not exist. The only frames that exist are the frames of the bodies actually in the interaction. And in those frames, the changes technology makes are not effective, not apparent, not as-if. They are the changes, full stop.
Take the cast spear. The instant it leaves the hand, the organism’s governed edge is travelling downrange at spear-velocity. Consider the moment in the frame of the prey — which is the only frame in which the prey’s life is decided. The prey had established a safe distance: thirty feet, say, judged against how fast a hominin can close on foot. The spear collapses that distance almost instantly. In the prey’s own frame, a lethal surface that should have taken seconds to arrive has crossed thirty feet in a fraction of one. The margin it had relied on is simply gone — not metaphorically, not in some analyst’s measure, but in the only frame that governs whether the prey lives. To be as safe as it was, it must now keep sixty feet, and then the next cast collapses that, and so the pressure ratchets. This is exactly the selective force that shapes prey into swervers and sprinters, and it is invisible if you insist on the god’s-eye frame and visible — calculable, real — the moment you stand where the prey stands. The distance really did collapse. There is no higher court in which it merely seemed to.
Now the cutting edge. A blade is primarily a transformation of force, and what it changes is the resistance of the material worked. With the right edge and the right motion, a hide that was too tough to part, a tendon that would not sever, parts and severs. In the user’s frame the material has become soft — and there is no other frame in which to ask whether it “really” did, because hardness is not a property a material has by itself. Hardness lives in the interaction between a material and the force brought to bear on it through a particular geometry. Change the geometry — bring an edge into the force-transmission chain — and you change the interaction, and hardness, which exists nowhere but in the interaction, changes with it. The result is not an effective softening laid over a real hardness. It is a real deformation of the environment: the flesh opens, the bone breaks, matter that would have held its shape yields and is reshaped. The organism’s structured motion has physically altered the world at its boundary.
So the three axes of the definition — force, distance, speed — are not effective modifications of the organism’s world. They are real changes in the relations between the organism and its environment, and relations are what is physically real; the absolute background in which they would be “merely apparent” is the thing that is not real. The prey really is nearer. The material really is softer. The reach really is longer. Each is true in the frame of the party it acts on, and there is no frame above those frames in which it is false. We think these changes are not “really” happening only because we are in the habit of believing in an absolute, independent reference frame — and that belief is precisely the dualist error the first essay diagnosed, smuggled back in as a picture of space.
I want to mark one boundary so the claim cannot be misread. This is classical, low-speed, Galilean relativity of motion — bodies on the surface of a planet, nothing approaching the speed of light, none of the spacetime contraction of Einstein’s relativity, with which the word “relative” is now unfortunately most associated. The effects here are not small relativistic corrections; they are large, everyday, and classical. The point is not exotic physics. The point is that ordinary motion is relative motion, that relative motion is the only motion there is, and that taking this seriously turns technology from a thing an organism has into a real reshaping of the relations that constitute the organism’s world.
The proof is in our language
There is a quiet piece of evidence that this is how human beings actually meet the world, and it is sitting in the structure of language.
We do not speak of distance, force, and speed as abstractions laid over experience. We speak of them as the substance of experience, and we use them to structure nearly everything else. A deadline approaches. A threat closes in. A solution comes within reach. A danger looms. Hardship is heavy; relief is light; we push through difficulty and move past grief; an argument gains momentum or runs out of steam. The work of Lakoff and Johnson on conceptual metaphor showed that this is not ornament — that the human mind natively builds its abstractions out of exactly these bodily experiences of relative distance, force, speed, and weight.
On the view set out here, that is not a curiosity. It is what you would predict. A creature whose entire evolutionary history was the manipulation of relative motion at its boundary — that spent three million years contracting the distances between itself and what it needed, softening the materials that resisted it, extending the reach of its governed edge — would be expected to encode that history in the deep structure of its thought and speech. The metaphors are fossil traces of the process this work describes. The reason the idea feels intuitive the moment it is stated plainly is that you are not learning something foreign; you are being shown the scaffolding you already think with, named for the first time. There is no rest. There is only motion, and how near, how fast, and how yielding the world is depends entirely on where you stand within it — which is exactly what every human language already knew.
Forward, to the stone
All of this has been the body’s moving edge described from inside, in the present, as experience and as physics. But the edge moved in the deep past too, and it left traces, and those traces are readable.
Around 2.6 million years ago there is a moment in the stone record where you can watch the boundary move. Earlier toolmakers stabilised the stone they were working on an external anvil — a separate object, on the ground, engaged only at the instant of the strike: the stabilising function sat outside the body. Later, the anvil is gone, replaced by the other hand: the stone is held continuously in the grip, oriented by the wrist, struck by a percussor in the opposite hand, and the stabilising function has moved into the body. The same mechanical job — hold the core still, deliver the blow — but reorganised from two loosely associated objects into one tightly coupled system with the material held inside the organism’s governed motion. The boundary moved inward to take up a function the world had been doing, and in doing so it committed the lineage to a path that selection would push on for the next two and a half million years.
That moment — the first time you can see the governed edge reorganise itself in the archaeological record — is where the empirical work finally touches the stone, and it is the subject of a later essay in this series. Before we get there, the next essay steps back to ask a question that the whole programme depends on: how we read any vanished motion from the trace it leaves, whether that trace is a stone, a star, or a burned scroll. The body’s edge moves; it has always moved; and once, long ago, it moved in a way that we can still read in the rock, because the motion left its mark and the mark is the only thing we ever have.
Dylan Foley is an independent researcher based in Ireland working at the intersection of physics, archaeology, and evolutionary biology, through his company Industrial Automata. The technical work these essays draw on is currently under peer review; details will follow on publication.
On conceptual metaphor and the bodily grounding of thought, see Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1980). Companion conference paper: Foley & Furey, “From Geospatial Patterns to Ancient Signals” (IEEE Irish Signals and Systems Conference 2025, DOI: 10.1109/ISSC67739.2025.11291309).
But those also who have made considerable progress in the survey of the main principles ought to bear in mind the scheme of the whole system set forth in its essentials. For we have frequent need of the general view, but not so often of the detailed exposition.
Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus
I want to start with a claim that may sound eccentric but is meant quite literally: the method behind this work is roughly 2,500 years old. For the specific task it serves — grounding a scientific framework in a domain that has not yet fully become a science — I do not think it has ever been entirely superseded.
The domain is human beings and their technology. The argument of this series is that it can support a genuinely scientific treatment — quantitative, mechanistic, and predictive in the limited sense that mature historical sciences are predictive. The obstacle, I think, has not primarily been the complexity of the subject matter, but the persistence of certain ontological assumptions inherited very early and retained for a very long time. The conceptual tools for approaching the problem differently were already present in Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, and in important respects they remain surprisingly usable. Versions of these foundations helped shape the development of physics, chemistry, and biology, but they were only unevenly extended into the study of humans and technology, often for reasons that were philosophical or theological rather than methodological.
Let me lay the foundation out in the order it actually goes, because it is a derivation, not a list. Each step forces the next.
First: there is what is, and you may not speak of what is not
Parmenides begins everything. In the fragments that survive — I am quoting throughout from John Burnet’s translation, the fragments numbered in the standard Diels–Kranz collection as DK 28 — he sets out the two roads with a clarity that is genuinely startling for the early fifth century BC:
Come now, I will tell thee… the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that It is, and that it is impossible for anything not to be, is the way of conviction, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that It is not… that, I tell thee, is a wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is not — that is impossible — nor utter it. (DK 28 B2)
A note on what I am doing with these texts, since it will otherwise be misread. I am not offering a new scholarly interpretation of Parmenides, and I am not in competition with the people who study his Greek for its own sake. That work is valuable and largely beside my point. What I am doing instead is taking him operationally: treating the text not primarily as an object of commentary but as an attempt to establish how inquiry into what-is should proceed. Parmenides was not only making claims about reality; he was also attempting to define the conditions under which inquiry itself could proceed coherently. To run that procedure and see what it produces is to use the text as the physiologos meant it to be used. Scholarly interpretation and operational use are different activities. My concern here is with the latter: whether the procedure implied by the text still produces workable results when applied to an unsolved domain.
This can sound abstract, but operationally it has a very strong consequence: it restricts what kinds of entities and separations inquiry is permitted to posit. You may reason about what is. You may not grant reality to what is not.One recurring way this occurs is through the treatment of separations — boundaries, gaps, or divisions — as though they possessed an independent ontological status of their own.
Parmenides saw this coming and named it. A little further on he diagnoses the error directly, and it is worth seeing that he identifies it at the exact moment of its birth:
Mortals have settled in their minds to speak of two forms, one of which they should have left out, and that is where they go astray from the truth. They have assigned an opposite substance to each, and marks distinct from one another. (DK 28 B8)
Read this way, the passage becomes an early critique of dualistic ontology: the treatment of opposed domains as fundamentally separate substances with distinct properties. Two forms, one of which they should have left out. The tradition that came immediately after him did precisely what he warned against: it built ontologies of two forms — being and non-being, form and matter, soul and body, the heavens and the earth, eventually the human and the natural. It assigned opposite substances and distinct marks. And it went astray from the truth, in the specific way Parmenides predicted, at the specific point he predicted it.
I take this to identify a recurrent structural error that reappears throughout later thought. Not Platonism specifically, not Aristotelianism specifically — dualism, the granting of being to a separation. On this reading, many later difficulties in developing unified sciences of motion and nature follow from repeated reintroduction of exactly these kinds of separations.
Why a separation freezes a science
Here is the part that took me a long time to see, and that I now think is the whole game.
Dualistic separation does not merely complicate explanation. In its stronger forms, it can make lawful motion difficult to formulate, because motion is always relational: a thing moves only with respect to other things within a shared system. Natural science, at root, depends on the ability to model such relations.
Motion is relational rather than absolute: a thing moves only with respect to other things and other frames within a continuous system. This is not a modern discovery; it is implicit in the unity Parmenides describes. Now watch what a real separation does. If a domain is treated as fundamentally separate in substance or principle, its relations to the surrounding system become conceptually weakened or obscured. Once that happens, lawful interaction becomes harder to formulate. A truly separate thing has nothing to move relative to. It is, necessarily, frozen.
Something like this ontological structure may also help explain why certain cosmological systems treated the Earth as fundamentally fixed and separate from the surrounding order. Once the cosmos is split dualistically — the heavens one substance, the Earth another, special and apart — the Earth cannot move, because there is nothing in the same frame for it to move against. In this reading, the problem was not purely astronomical but ontological: the separation itself constrained what kinds of motion could be conceived coherently. Get rid of the separation, put the Earth back into one continuous system with everything else, and it moves again. That is, in effect, what the Renaissance did for matter.
The broader argument of this programme is that a comparable separation continued to shape the study of humans long after matter and life had been reintegrated into continuous physical systems. Humans were frequently treated as occupying a categorically distinct domain — partially continuous with nature in some respects, but exempt from full physical continuity in others — often for theological or metaphysical reasons rather than methodological ones. And a separate humanity, exactly like a separate Earth, cannot be in motion, cannot be coupled to an environment, cannot be subjected to a mechanics. It is frozen out of physical science by the same error, four centuries after the Earth was freed from it. The human sciences did not fail to become sciences because humans are too complex or too special. They failed because dualism had defined humans out of the relational field where motion — and therefore law, and therefore science — can exist at all.
Once that separation is relaxed, humans and technology can be reintroduced into the same continuous field of motion, constraint, and interaction studied elsewhere in the natural sciences. That reintegration is the starting condition for the work that follows.
Second: all is motion
Parmenides establishes the continuity of what-is. What remains is a single continuous reality rather than a set of fundamentally separate domains.
One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that It is… now it is, all at once, a continuous one. (DK 28 B8)
But continuity alone does not yet yield a dynamic world. The second principle comes from Heraclitus: reality is not merely continuous but dynamic. Stable things are sustained patterns within ongoing motion rather than fixed substances beneath it. The one continuous being is not frozen; it is flux. What appears stable — a river, a body, a species, a tool tradition — can be understood as a relatively persistent organization of motion maintaining coherence across time. The important point is that continuity and motion are not opposites here. The continuity of the world is expressed through structured change rather than through immobility.
“All is motion,” the title of this site, is not intended as a slogan so much as a compressed statement of these two linked premises: continuity and structured change.
Heraclitus matters here in a precise way, not as a vague gesture at change. Heraclitean flux is not chaos. Motion possesses structure, recurrence, and constraint — what Heraclitus names logos. This is what lets motion be a subject of science rather than a synonym for chaos. Structured motion becomes the central object of analysis. Following that idea consistently leads, eventually, to the definition of technology developed in the later technical work.
Third: the lines we draw are ours
If reality is continuous and dynamic, then many of the boundaries we draw — between object and environment, organism and world, system and surroundings — are methodological cuts rather than absolute seams in nature. The continuity of the world does not eliminate boundaries, but it changes their status. Boundaries become analytical decisions made for the purpose of studying particular phenomena.
At first this may seem to undermine scientific analysis: if boundaries are constructed, what stabilizes the object of study? In practice, however, it is precisely what makes complex systems scientifically tractable. Science proceeds by selecting stable regions of interaction within the larger continuum. Here the relevant region is the interaction between humans, technology, and environment. The analytical cut is therefore placed at a specific interface: the boundary between an organism’s internally regulated activity and the wider field of environmental motion in which it operates.
Once the problem is framed this way, a familiar scientific vocabulary begins to emerge almost automatically. A boundary across which organisms extend regulation into external material immediately connects the problem to systems biology, ecological dynamics, niche construction, and theories of extended or distributed regulation. The ancient ontology delivers you directly to the modern boundary-systems frame. It is not bolted on afterward; it is where you land when you cut the continuum at the place your phenomenon actually occupies.
On this account, technology is not an external category added onto human life afterward. It is a mode of structured motion through which organisms extend regulation and constraint into the material environment around them.
Fourth: the present is all there is, and this is what saves inference
The next step closes the system and, for archaeology specifically, turns out to be decisive.
Parmenides then introduces a principle which, taken literally and operationally rather than allegorically, produces a remarkably rigorous foundation for archaeological inference:
Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. (DK 28 B8)
And:
there is not, and never shall be, any time other than that which is present, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable. Wherefore all these things are but the names which mortals have given, believing them to be true. (DK 28 B8)
Operationally, there is no past available to investigation. There are only present material configurations carrying traces of prior motion and interaction. Archaeology never encounters “the past” itself as an observable domain. It encounters stones, deposits, wear patterns, fractures, residues, and distributions as they exist now. “The past,” in this framework, is not a stored realm awaiting retrieval but a reconstructed account inferred from present evidence.
This is not a limitation of archaeology but the condition that makes archaeological reasoning rigorous. Once the distinction is enforced clearly, the structure of the discipline changes.
What is sensed: the present signal — the trace as it exists materially now.
What must be inferred: the structured motions and interactions capable of producing that signal.
The archaeologist does not retrieve the past as though it remained physically available somewhere behind the evidence. They reconstruct prior processes inferentially from present signals under conditions of uncertainty. Archaeology therefore becomes an inverse problem in the strict sense: reasoning backward from present traces toward the motions and processes capable of generating them. The Eleatic restriction is what keeps the inference disciplined, because it prevents reconstructed histories from being mistaken for observations. The only observation is the present trace; everything else remains inferential and must carry its uncertainty openly.
That comparable inverse-problem structures appear in astrophysical reconstruction and the search for non-human intelligence is not accidental. In each case, present signals are used to reconstruct processes that are no longer directly observable. The point is that the cleanest available foundation for it was stated by Parmenides, and that it follows from taking “only the present is” literally.
And it is thinkable precisely because of his other principle, the bridge between mind and world:
For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be. (DK 28 B3)
The reconstructed process is not unconstrained imagination. It is bounded both by the observed signal and by the lawful structure of the world capable of producing such a signal in the first place. Inference is possible because the thinkable and the real are not disconnected domains. The world is intelligible enough that present traces can constrain reconstructions of the motions that produced them. That is the epistemic foundation of the method.
Fifth: Zeno tells the formalism what it may not do
Zeno is usually treated as a producer of paradoxes to be resolved. I think it is more useful to read him as defending the continuity implied by Parmenides against attempts to reconstruct motion from discrete states. The paradoxes repeatedly target the same problem: if motion is decomposed into fully discrete positions or instants treated as fundamentally real, motion itself becomes impossible to reconstruct. The arrow that occupies a single position at a single instant is not moving; if time is merely a sum of such instants, nothing ever moves. Since motion plainly occurs, the discreteness must be the illusion and the continuity the reality. Zeno proves the master’s premise by reductio: being is continuous, not discrete.
This is not antiquarian, and it is not abstract. It is a hard constraint on how you are permitted to build the formalism, and it cuts directly at how archaeology represents its own evidence. Archaeological recording systems routinely treat layers, contexts, events, and time-slices as discrete stored units — as though the past were a stack of separate states filed away in sequence, each one a thing that happened and was set down and can now be retrieved. This is exactly the atomised ontology Zeno’s arguments were designed to destroy, and it is exactly the separate, retrievable past that Parmenides showed to be only a name.
The objection is not that we may not discretise. All science discretises; every measurement samples a continuous field, and a digital record has no choice but to partition what it stores. The error is to mistake the partition for the world — to let the sampled, layered, timestamped representation become the ontology rather than remaining a constrained operational model of a continuous present field. The moment the database schema is taken to describe how reality is structured, rather than how our sampling of it is structured, the Eleatic error has been reintroduced under a new name, and motion has been quietly frozen back out of the picture.
Taken together, the two Eleatic principles converge on a single methodological demand. Parmenides says there is no separate, stored past; Zeno says there are no fundamental discrete states for such a past to be made of. So the formalism must represent a continuous present field of traces, signals, and inferential relations — not a sequence of discretely stored, recoverable pasts. The stored record is a sampling of a continuous field, never a shelf of retrievable moments. Ontology, in other words, dictates schema — and an archaeology that builds its databases as shelves of frozen instants has, without noticing, chosen the ontology Parmenides and Zeno spent their lives refuting.
Sixth: Epicurus, and how you actually build it
The Eleatics and Heraclitus give the ontology. Epicurus gives the method — the procedure for turning that ontology into a working science from the phenomena up. His Letter to Herodotus is, read correctly, a construction manual: begin from what is evident to the senses; fix the meaning of your terms to those evident things so the words do not float free; admit nothing that contradicts the phenomena; and where the phenomena underdetermine the cause, permit several explanations rather than forcing one prematurely. This is the recipe. It is exactly the procedure I followed, consciously, to think through how a science of technology could be constructed where there was none.
And Epicurean atomism supplies the one structural idea without which none of it becomes quantitative. Atomism replaces the transformation of essences with the recombination of elements. This is the difference between a study that can only classify and a science that can count, combine, and predict. An essentialist asks what a thing fundamentally is and sorts it into a type. An atomist asks what the irreducible constituents are and how they are arranged, and can then recombine them, measure them, and predict new arrangements. Every quantitative science made this trade, and it is, in my view, the trade that is the birth of modern science — whatever one thinks of the historical route by which Epicurus’ atomism returned to circulation through Lucretius. The structural fact is what matters: recombination of elements is generative; transformation of essences is not.
This is the precise correction the work applies to archaeology. Typology is essentialism: it asks what type a tool is and sorts it. The procedural unit — the irreducible coded unit of structured motion — is the atom: it recombines, it can be counted across assemblages, it supports quantitative inference and prediction. Recoding the lithic record from types into procedural units is nothing other than the Epicurean move from essences to elements, applied to stone. The whole empirical apparatus of the work is atomism, two and a half thousand years late to a field that was kept out of its reach.
Why this is somehow new
Taken together, these steps amount to a coherent programme: Parmenides for ontology and the critique of separation; Heraclitus for structured motion; the systems boundary for organism-environment coupling; the present-only constraint for inference; Zeno for continuity; and Epicurus for operational method and atomistic reconstruction.
None of these components are modern in origin. Which raises an obvious question: if these conceptual tools were already available in antiquity, and if it built physics and chemistry and biology once it was applied to matter and life, why is applying it to humans and their technology a new research programme in 2026 rather than an obvious and long-completed one?
There are two parts to the answer, and the first is not about religion at all. It is about what a mature science is for.
Modern science succeeded largely through specialisation. Once disciplines become productive, they typically stop revisiting foundational ontological questions and instead operate within inherited conceptual frameworks.Once a field is established it stops doing ontology — it inherits its basic categories and gets on with the productive normal-science work conducted inside them. This is exactly why it is so powerful and exactly why it is helpless at the particular task of founding a new science from an ungrounded domain.But constructing a new science requires temporarily returning to earlier questions: what constitutes the object of study, what counts as a fundamental unit, where boundaries should be drawn, and what kind of motion or interaction is being modeled. That is the founder’s work, and it is a different act from the practitioner’s. Even philosophy of science, which might be expected to retain the capacity, has largely become a science about mature sciences — it studies how established fields work, not how to make one out of nothing. So the one tool required to ground a new domain is the tool the entire modern apparatus has, very reasonably, set down. In that narrow sense, some ancient foundational procedures remain unexpectedly useful for problems involving scientific grounding rather than normal disciplinary practice.
This also tells us how to read the moderns who did see it. Popper went “back to the Presocratics” and argued they founded the critical-rational tradition that science is. Rovelli wrote a whole book contending that physics descends directly from Anaximander and the Milesians and that their way of thinking simply is the scientific one. These are not merely historical observations. They reflect recognition that certain Presocratic questions remain structurally close to the foundations of scientific reasoning itself. What this programme adds is the step past recognition. If one takes the Presocratic programme operationally and applies it to a domain lacking a mature scientific structure — and if a coherent predictive and falsifiable framework emerges — then the significance of that programme is demonstrated practically rather than merely historically. We applied the method and got the kind of result the method is supposed to get. That is a stronger vindication than any reading of the texts could provide, and it is available only because we used them rather than glossed them. In that case, the Presocratics cease to appear merely as precursors to science and instead become participants in an unfinished scientific project whose implications were only partially developed.
The second part of the answer is the one I have been building toward, and I will now state it at the level of mechanism and leave the reader to draw the rest. The extension of these methods into the study of humans and technology remained unusually incomplete. The dualism Parmenides warned against was installed early, formulated with great precision — its sharpest early formulations were aimed, before Christianity, at countering the power of Epicureanism — and then welded to institutional authority and used to set humanity apart from nature. Once humans are treated as partially exempt from the same continuous relational field governing matter and life elsewhere, constructing a unified mechanics of human technological behavior becomes correspondingly difficult. Matter and life were progressively reintegrated into continuous physical and biological explanation during the development of modern science. Human technological behavior, however, remained comparatively resistant to full integration. I will not speculate about intentions; intentions are unknowable and beside the point. I only observe that of all the domains, the one kept exempt from science for non-scientific reasons was the one in which a powerful institution had the most to gain from the exemption, and that the exemption, uniquely, was never lifted. The reader may make of that what they will.
So, finally, to the matter of modern philosophy, now that the derivation has earned the remark: it is, ironically, poorly equipped to undo any of this, and the evidence is that it has been trying for decades to bring archaeology and the human sciences into science and has not managed it. It has not managed it because it inherited the very dualism it would need to discard, and because it treats the Presocratics as a charming prelude rather than as the people who actually laid down the first principles that science requires. I find that relegation genuinely strange. Parmenides established what a first principle must be, and forbade the error that froze the world, before the error had even been fully made. To file him under “early, superseded” is to mistake the foundation for a draft.
The argument of this programme is not that archaeology requires more scientific vocabulary layered onto existing theory. It is that the underlying ontology itself must change. A discipline built around classificatory essentialism, interpretive fragmentation, and unstable theoretical language cannot easily become cumulative, mechanistic, or predictive, because its foundations were not constructed for those purposes in the first place.
Much twentieth-century archaeological theory treated scientific grounding as naïve, reductionist, or even undesirable. The result was not liberation from outdated models but the gradual loss of any shared framework capable of connecting explanation, inference, evidence, and mechanism coherently across scales. In place of integration came proliferation: competing vocabularies, interpretive schools, and increasingly elaborate theoretical languages often detached from operational reconstruction.
The programme outlined here proceeds in the opposite direction. It treats archaeology not as an interpretive exception to science but as an unfinished scientific domain whose foundational reconstruction was historically interrupted before completion. The claim is therefore not modest. If the framework succeeds, even partially, then large parts of archaeological “theory” will come to appear less like the foundations of a mature science than like compensatory structures developed in the prolonged absence of one.
Let the debt be stated without hedging: this essay, and the work behind it, owes almost everything to Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, and almost nothing to the archaeological theory of the last century. And what astonishes me most is not how much they achieved but how little we needed to inherit. Their books are gone. What we have are fragments — quoted by enemies, buried under volcanic mud, recovered by the handful. Yet even these offcuts are sufficient to build a new way of seeing the world, and more than that, a new scientific way of seeing it — which is the most powerful form of understanding human beings have ever found. If fragments can do this, imagine what was lost. And imagine what is still to be found.
The Presocratics were not important because they anticipated modern conclusions. They were important because they asked, with unusual clarity, the questions required to begin a science at all. Physics and biology eventually followed those questions into matter and life. This programme is an attempt to follow them into technology and the human past with the same seriousness — and to discover whether archaeology, too, can finally become cumulative in the strong scientific sense rather than only in the archival one.
First in a series. This essay sets out the foundation underneath everything else on this site. The work — a physical theory of technology, is an attempt to make archaeology into a science in the way physics and biology are sciences — did not begin from any modern method. It began from the Presocratics and from Epicurus, and the procedure I followed is theirs, not a contemporary one. I have explained this before only in compressed, almost poetical form. Since the work now seems close to producing something real, it is time to set the background out plainly. The essays that follow take this foundation into the body, across the sciences, and finally to the stone itself.
Dylan Foley is an independent researcher based in Ireland working at the intersection of physics, archaeology, and evolutionary biology, through his company Industrial Automata. Parmenides fragments are quoted from John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (1892), Diels–Kranz numbering. The technical work these essays draw on is currently under peer review; details will follow on publication.
Companion conference paper: Foley & Furey, “From Geospatial Patterns to Ancient Signals: A Signal Based Framework for Archaeological Machine Learning” (IEEE Irish Signals and Systems Conference 2025, DOI: 10.1109/ISSC67739.2025.11291309).
Featured Image : The Snow Ghost – Scooby Doo, 1969
How a Dublin-Controlled Civil Service in cahoots with politicians Has Systematically Blocked Western Rail for Fifteen Years — And Why They Want Your Railway Tracks for Cycle Paths
“Mr. Greenway welcomed Mystery Inc. when they came to stay at his ski resort. He issued ominous warnings to guests and dressed up as the ghost to scare people away from the diamond and jewel smuggling operation he operated with Mr. Leech.”
— Scoobypedia, on the villain of “That’s Snow Ghost” (1969)
The suspicious Mr Greenway (yes thats his name!).
In the classic Scooby-Doo episode “That’s Snow Ghost,” the gang encounters a terrifying phantom haunting a ski resort. The locals are frightened. Tourism is dying. Everyone focuses on the ghost.
But the ghost isn’t real. It’s a costume worn by the resort’s manager, Mr. Greenway, to distract from his actual business: smuggling. The scary story keeps people from looking too closely at what’s really happening.
The parallels to Ireland’s Western Rail Corridor debate are, I must admit, a little on the nose.
For fifteen years, we’ve been told the railway is the ghost — an unviable fantasy, economically irrational, impossible to fund. The greenway, we’re assured, is the sensible alternative. Stop chasing spectres. Accept the cycle path. Move on.People are often threatened that they can have the greenway, or nothing.
But what if the greenway debate itself is the ghost costume? What if the endless studies, the truncated scopes, the predetermined conclusions are all designed to distract from the real operation underneath?
And why does the greenway have to be on the rail line? Surely an amenity can be built in many different places. But for years, no matter what is suggested, the lobby groups and politicians that support this greenway persist that it MUST be on the Sligo -Galway rail line. They show no interest whatsoever in placing it anywhere else. And this is how we know its a “Snow Ghost”, a chimera dreamed up and promoted to distract us from the real story. And so far, its worked.
The terrifying “Snow Ghost”. The ghost of a Tibetan Yeti? Or a distraction from a money making scheme? Sligos Greenway is also a distraction, so you dont see the real schemes behind it.
Mr. Greenway had Mr. Leech, his jewellry smuggling partner. Dublin has MetroLink, Dublin Airport, and a civil service whose institutional DNA treats the west as a resource to be extracted rather than a region to be developed.
Time to pull off the mask.
The Western Rail Corridor isn’t blocked because it “unviable” It’s blocked because Dublin killed it — deliberately, repeatedly, and with malice aforethought. This is the story of how they did it, and why.
The Cost of Neglect
Before we examine the mechanism of obstruction, let’s be clear about what’s at stake.
The West and Northwest of Ireland contain more land area than the east coast. More cities. Three international airports. The largest natural harbour in these islands. The only airport in Europe with US customs pre-clearance. A major distributed university. Nineteenth-century intermodal port infrastructure that aligns perfectly with EU coastal shipping policy.
And yet this region is bleeding out. Every year, thousands of young people leave Sligo, Mayo, Roscommon, Leitrim, and Donegal — not because they want to, but because they have to. There are no jobs. There is no infrastructure. There is no future, because Dublin has decided there shouldn’t be one.
This isn’t regional jealousy or parish-pump politics. This is a systematic policy of extraction: take the people, take the talent, take the graduates — and now, as we’ll see, take the water from the Shannon — while giving nothing back. No investment. No connectivity. No opportunity.
The population imbalance in Ireland is now grotesque. The Greater Dublin Area contains over 40% of the national population and continues to grow, while rural Ireland — particularly the northwest — continues to hollow out. Young families who might stay if they could commute to regional employment centres are forced instead into Dublin’s overheated rental market, or onto emigrant flights.
Meanwhile, Brexit has fundamentally changed Ireland’s strategic position. The old UK route dependencies are fading. Direct European connections matter more than ever. Cork’s port is becoming Ireland’s primary EU-facing gateway. The EU is prioritising cross-border connectivity and coastal shipping. Everything points toward developing the western corridor.
Instead, Dublin is converting the railway tracks to cycle paths.
This didn’t happen by accident. It happened by design.
The 2011 Intervention: Where It All Began
In 2011, something remarkable happened. Leo Varadkar, then Minister for Transport, personally intervened to remove the Western Rail Corridor (WRC) and all western transport projects from Ireland’s submission to the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (Ten-T) programme.
This wasn’t a bureaucratic oversight. It was a deliberate political act.
The Ten-T programme provides EU funding for transport infrastructure that meets specific criteria: multimodal connectivity, cross-border elements, and strategic importance. All of which the WRC fulfills. The previous Fianna Fáil government had submitted the western/Atlantic road and rail cross-border route from Cork to Derry, including the Western Rail Corridor extension.
Varadkar struck it from the list.
His own Fine Gael colleague, MEP Jim Higgins, warned him explicitly: “failure to act now might mean closing off the project to future EU funding for good.”
Varadkar proceeded anyway.
When challenged in the Dáil, Varadkar claimed that the Ten-T core network was “proposed by the European Commission and not by member states.” This was, to put it charitably, untrue. EU Transport Commissioner Violeta Bulc later confirmed in writing that the Commission’s role was to specify targets and criteria, while member states retained “substantial sovereign rights” to decide on projects.
Varadkar knew what he was doing. He did it anyway. And he lied about it afterwards.
The effect was immediate and permanent: western Ireland was locked out of EU transport funding streams. Projects must first be in the “comprehensive” network before qualifying for “core” status. Without inclusion, there is no pathway to funding. The west was written off before the decade began.
The Dublin Lock: Who Controls Transport Policy?
To understand how this obstruction continues, you need to understand who actually runs transport in Ireland.
The National Transport Authority — the body that oversees all transport policy and infrastructure — was originally constituted as the Dublin Transport Authority. That’s not a nickname. That’s what the legislation called it. The Dublin Transport Authority Act (2008) established a body whose statutory functional area covers the Greater Dublin Area: Dublin City, Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown, South Dublin, Fingal, Wicklow, Kildare, and Meath.
It gained national licensing functions later, through subsequent legislation, but its DNA remains Dublin-centric. Its board, its priorities, its institutional culture — all oriented toward the capital.
Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII), which handles rail and roads infrastructure, operates under NTA oversight. The Railway Procurement Agency, which previously managed light rail projects, was merged into TII in 2015.
The result is a governance structure where Dublin institutions control national transport policy, and national transport policy consistently prioritises Dublin.
The former Transport Minister Eamon Ryan admitted as much in a 2025 interview, recalling how “I saw infighting between CIE, Dublin Bus, the Dublin Transportation Office (now the NTA), the Department…. and meanwhile, the NRA (National Roads Authority, now TII) just ruled the roost.”
Where is the Western Transport Authority? Where is the voice for Connacht in these structures? Where is the advocacy for the Atlantic corridor that could connect Cork to Derry?
It doesn’t exist. The west has no institutional representation in transport governance. Decisions about western infrastructure are made by Dublin bodies, staffed by Dublin officials, oriented toward Dublin priorities.
And Dublin has decided the west doesn’t need rail.
The Rigged Studies: How to Kill a Railway Without Saying No
You can’t simply refuse to build a railway. You need to prove it’s not viable. And the way you prove something isn’t viable is by designing studies that cannot possibly demonstrate viability.
This is the pattern that has repeated for over a decade.
The EY Report: Commissioned to assess the economic case for reopening the Western Rail Corridor. Scope: Athenry to Claremorris only — approximately 52 kilometres. Not the full corridor to Sligo. Not the extension to Letterkenny and Derry. Not the connection to Knock Airport. Not the southern link to Cork’s container port. Just a truncated stub that serves no major destination and connects no airports.
Result: Not viable.
The JASPERS Study: Same scope. Same 52 kilometres. Same predetermined conclusion.
Both studies ignore the 2005 McCann Report, which explicitly noted that “incorporating connections to Shannon and Knock airports could significantly enhance the economic viability of the project.”
The full Western Rail Corridor — from Cork through Limerick, Galway, and Sligo to Derry — could connect three international airports:
Shannon: US customs pre-clearance, the most important airport for transatlantic traffic
Knock: Ireland’s fastest-growing airport, now handling nearly a million passengers annually
Derry: Cross-border connectivity that the EU explicitly prioritises
It could link Cork’s container port — the largest natural harbour in these islands, increasingly vital post-Brexit — to the entire western seaboard by rail.
It could connect Sligo’s existing intermodal facilities to a network, enabling the modal shift from road to rail-and-coastal-shipping that EU policy actively encourages.
It could serve Atlantic Technological University’s distributed campus, finally allowing the institution to function as an integrated university.
None of this is ever studied. Every report is scoped to examine only the 52-kilometre segment that cannot demonstrate viability. It’s like commissioning a study on whether to build a bridge, but only allowing the consultants to examine the middle span disconnected from either bank.
The parameters aren’t accidental. They’re designed to produce a predetermined conclusion.
The Conflict of Interest: ARUP’s Double Game
In 2024, ARUP was commissioned to conduct the All-Island Strategic Rail Review. Their conclusion: Sligo and the Western Rail Corridor were excluded from major new rail developments. The focus would be on “major intercity upgrades and electrification elsewhere.”
Simultaneously, ARUP was commissioned by TII to develop the Sligo Greenway — a cycling and walking path from Collooney to Bellaghy.
The proposed route? The disused railway corridor.
The same consultancy that concluded rail was not viable is being paid to design a greenway on the tracks. They have a direct financial interest in the railway remaining closed.
This is not a conspiracy theory. This is a matter of public record. ARUP is listed as the consultant for both projects. The greenway contract is funded by Transport Infrastructure Ireland.
The JASPERS studies present a similar pattern. JASPERS consulted on the Western Rail Corridor with restrictive parameters that guaranteed a negative finding — while simultaneously consulting on MetroLink, Dublin’s flagship €9-23 billion underground railway to Dublin Airport.
When the same consultants are working on competing projects, which one do you think they have an incentive to recommend?
The Timeline “Coincidence”
MetroLink is projected to be operational in the early 2030s.
The official position on the Western Rail Corridor? Nothing significant until the 2030s.
Both timelines converge on the same decade. MetroLink will be built, Dublin Airport will have its rail connection secured as the national standard, and only then — when the competitive threat has been neutralised — might western rail be “reconsidered.”
The government frames MetroLink as addressing a national embarrassment: “Ireland remains one of only a small number of countries in Europe without a metro in its biggest city or a rail connection to its main international airport.”
But which “main international airport”? They’ve pre-decided it’s Dublin. The option of connecting Knock and Shannon — creating an alternative western hub — is never examined because the studies are never scoped to examine it.
Meanwhile, Knock Airport continues to grow regardless. 2024 saw a record 818,000 passengers. 2025 is projected to exceed 945,000 — another record, representing over 5% of all air passengers in the country. A “Transformation Programme” is planned for 2026-2028 to expand capacity.
The threat Dublin fears is emerging anyway. The difference is whether it emerges with rail connectivity or without it.
The Greenway Gambit: Making Obstruction Permanent
Mr Greenway exposed!
Here’s the endgame: convert the railway corridor to a greenway, and the question of rail reopening becomes moot.
Once you’ve built a walking and cycling path on the permanent way, you’ve made a political choice that is extremely difficult to reverse. Ripping up a greenway to restore rail would face enormous opposition — even from people who support western rail in principle.
This is why the greenway push is so insistent, and why it’s being funded by the same TII that controls rail infrastructure. It’s not about providing amenities for the west. It’s about foreclosing options permanently.
The sales pitch is seductive: greenways are cheaper, quicker to build, and provide immediate recreational benefit. All true. But they also eliminate the possibility of rail, potentially forever.
And critically, greenways don’t threaten Dublin Airport’s monopoly. A cycling path from Collooney to Claremorris won’t carry business travellers to Knock. It won’t connect Shannon’s US pre-clearance facility to the northwest. It won’t create an alternative transport corridor that might reduce Dublin’s gravitational pull on the national economy.
That’s the point.
The Shannon Water Extraction: Taking Without Giving
If you needed proof that Dublin views the west purely as a resource to be extracted, consider the Shannon water pipeline.
The proposal: pump water from the Shannon basin to supply Dublin’s growing needs.
The reaction from the west: fury. Not because the west is water-hoarding, but because the ask encapsulates everything wrong with the relationship. Dublin wants western water, but won’t build western infrastructure. Dublin wants western resources, but won’t invest in western opportunity. Dublin wants to extract, but never to contribute.
This is the colonial relationship laid bare. For a century, the west has provided Dublin with its people — every generation forced to migrate for work, education, opportunity. Now the people aren’t enough. Dublin wants the water too.
The Shannon pipeline is the logical endpoint of an extractive model. The capital takes what it needs — people, talent, graduates, water — while systematically blocking any development that might allow the regions to thrive independently. The west exists, in this model, not as a place where people might live and flourish, but as a resource base for the capital’s continued growth.
Were the Shannon pipeline proposed alongside a genuine commitment to western rail, to regional investment, to balanced development — the conversation would be different. Reciprocity changes everything.
But there is no reciprocity. There is only extraction.
They want the Shannon’s water. They won’t give the Shannon region the railway that might allow it to develop. They want the west’s young people. They won’t give the west the infrastructure that might allow them to stay. They want Knock Airport to remain a regional curiosity rather than a connected hub. They want Cork’s port traffic to move by road through their tolled motorways rather than by rail along the western corridor.
The pattern is consistent. The pattern is policy. The pattern is colonial.
What Would Change Everything
Consider what the full Western Rail Corridor would actually connect:
Three international airports: Shannon (the most important airport for North American traffic, with US customs pre-clearance), Knock (Ireland’s fastest-growing airport), and Derry (providing cross-border connectivity that the EU explicitly prioritises).
Ireland’s most strategic port: Cork’s container facilities, served by the largest natural harbour in these islands. With Brexit, Cork is becoming increasingly important as Ireland’s primary EU-facing port. The old UK route dependencies are fading; direct European connections matter more than ever.
Six major cities: Tralee, Limerick, Galway, Sligo, Letterkenny, and Derry. This isn’t some rural backwater — this is a region with more area and more cities than the east coast.
A distributed university: Atlantic Technological University has formally requested rail connectivity to link its campuses stretching from Letterkenny to Galway. Students currently have no proper transport links between ATU sites. The institution that’s supposed to drive western development cannot function as an integrated university because the infrastructure doesn’t exist.
Existing intermodal infrastructure: Sligo already has a ship-to-rail link dating from the 19th century. The EU is actively encouraging smaller coastal shipping traffic to replace heavy road freight — precisely the kind of modal shift that Sligo’s port could facilitate, if it were connected to a functioning rail network.
Cross-border integration: The extension to Derry isn’t just symbolically important for all-island connectivity — it’s precisely the kind of cross-border transport project that EU funding programmes prioritise. The Ten-T criteria that Varadkar used to exclude the west actually favour projects like this.
The Western Rail Corridor isn’t a regional amenity. It’s a strategic national asset that would reorient Ireland’s transport infrastructure toward Europe at exactly the moment when Brexit demands such reorientation.
For the first time, the west would have a transport spine. Shannon’s transatlantic connections would be accessible from the northwest by rail. Cork’s growing port traffic could move by rail rather than clogging roads. Regional towns along the corridor would become viable locations for commuter housing and distributed employment.
The population drain might finally reverse.
But this is precisely what Dublin’s institutional structures are designed to prevent. An empowered west is a threat to Dublin’s primacy. A connected west is competition for Dublin’s airport monopoly. A thriving west means Dublin cannot take western resources for granted.
So the studies remain rigged. The timelines remain aligned to protect MetroLink’s first-mover advantage. The greenways advance on the railway tracks. And another generation leaves the west because there’s nothing to stay for.
The Evidence, Summarised
Year
Event
Effect
2005
McCann Report recommends Shannon and Knock airport connections
Ignored in all subsequent studies
2010
WRC Phase 1 opens (Limerick-Galway via Ennis)
Corridor partially operational
2011
Varadkar removes WRC from Ten-T submission
EU funding blocked permanently
2015
RPA merged into TII under NTA
Rail procurement absorbed into Dublin-controlled structure
Various
EY, JASPERS studies with Claremorris-only scope
Reports engineered to show non-viability
2024
ARUP Strategic Rail Review excludes Sligo
Official policy confirms no WRC extension
2024
ARUP simultaneously contracted for Sligo Greenway
Same consultancy: rail not viable, build greenway on tracks
2024-25
Knock Airport breaks passenger records
Threat to Dublin growing regardless
2025
MetroLink approved, operational target early 2030s
Dublin Airport rail secured before western alternative possible
What the truncated studies never examine:
Asset
Strategic Value
Status
Shannon Airport
Only US pre-clearance in Europe
Not connected to northern corridor
Knock Airport
945,000 passengers, fastest-growing
No rail connection studied
Derry connection
EU cross-border priority
Excluded from all scopes
Cork container port
Largest natural harbour, post-Brexit gateway
Southern link ignored
Sligo intermodal port
19th-century ship-to-rail infrastructure
Disconnected from network
ATU distributed campus
Letterkenny to Galway
No student transport links
EU coastal shipping policy
Modal shift from road freight
Sligo facilities unused
Conclusion: It’s Policy, Not Accident
The Western Rail Corridor hasn’t failed, and it isnt “unviable”. Quite the opposite. It’s been prevented from succeeding because it has enormous potential to change Irelands economy forever.
The pattern is too consistent to be coincidence: the deliberate removal from EU funding, the Dublin-controlled governance, the rigged study parameters, the consultant conflicts of interest, the synchronised timelines, the greenway gambit.
This is policy. It has been policy for at least fifteen years, and decades before that. And unless it’s named, challenged, and reversed, it will remain policy — while the west continues to empty out and Dublin continues to extract what it needs.
The swindle isn’t just the greenway, which is just a distraction. The swindle is the entire apparatus that makes the greenway seem like the only option.
It’s time to call it what it is.
The author welcomes corrections, additional evidence, and contrary arguments. The documents cited in this article are matters of public record, obtainable through Freedom of Information requests and official publications. Names, dates, and quotations can be verified.
In 2014, NASA published “Archaeology, Anthropology, and Interstellar Communication,” edited by Douglas Vakoch. The initiative called for archaeologists to contribute their expertise in understanding past cultures to help SETI researchers design communication strategies for extraterrestrial contact. It was a reasonable request—archaeologists spend careers interpreting artifacts from societies separated from us by time, so why shouldn’t they help interpret signals from civilizations separated by space?
The response from archaeology was near silence.
Not vigorous debate. Not counter-proposals or methodological critiques. Just quiet non-engagement from a discipline that was apparently being offered relevance to one of humanity’s most compelling scientific questions.
This silence is more revealing than any rejection would have been. It’s diagnostic evidence of something fundamental: archaeology couldn’t recognize a scientific question about information preservation and recovery across deep time as directly concerning their own discipline.
What SETI Actually Asked
Strip away the SETI framing, and Vakoch’s core question was purely archaeological. What do we know about how information degrades, transforms, and remains recoverable across vast temporal distances? What encoding strategies survive better than others? What makes signals interpretable despite massive context loss?
These are archaeology’s central problems. Every excavation addresses them. Every artifact interpretation depends on understanding what information survives and what’s lost. Every chronological reconstruction requires accounting for temporal uncertainty and signal degradation.
Yet archaeologists didn’t recognize the question as theirs.
The Paradigm Gap Is Real
This wasn’t a case of archaeologists making a reasoned decision that SETI was outside their purview. It was an inability to see the connection at all. And this failure reveals something fundamental about how archaeology operates theoretically. Its foundation is not scientific.
As Lambros Malafouris described the field’s theoretical problems: “This territory is familiar, as when the hand grasps a stone and makes it a tool, yet it remains terra incognita, since—despite a long genealogy of analytic efforts—just what this grasping implies for the human condition remains elusive, and refuses to be read in the narrative fashion that hermeneutics have promised.”
Archaeology has no mathematical formalisation of its core concepts. Technology, the primary evidence in archaeological records, remains theoretically undefined. Cultural transmission, the process archaeology claims to study, cannot be modeled with scientific rigor because, as Sperber and Claidière demonstrate, “cultural causality is promiscuous”—it cannot be neatly divided into replication mechanisms and environmental factors the way biological inheritance can.
The field operates in what amounts to a pre-scientific paradigm. Not pre-scientific in the sense of being primitive or unsophisticated—archaeological work is often brilliant and insightful—but pre-scientific in lacking the fundamental formalisation that would make it compatible with physics-based frameworks.
this matters because …
When Vakoch framed his question in signal science terms—information preservation, encoding strategies, pattern detection across temporal distances—archaeology had no theoretical apparatus to engage with it. The discipline’s conceptual vocabulary operates in interpretive and hermeneutic modes that simply don’t connect to physics-compatible frameworks.
This isn’t a failure of individual archaeologists. It’s a structural limitation of the paradigm itself. You cannot expect researchers trained in cultural interpretation and meaning-making to suddenly switch to signal processing and information theory when they have no conceptual bridge between these frameworks.
But the consequences are significant. Archaeology is the only discipline with direct access to information about how patterns survive and remain recoverable across deep time. It’s the only field that routinely works with degraded signals from past events separated from us by thousands or millions of years. This makes archaeology potentially central to SETI’s actual challenge—detecting signals from extinct civilizations across vast temporal and spatial distances.
Yet archaeology couldn’t engage with this opportunity because it lacks the theoretical foundation to do so.
Historical Context: Decades of Crisis
This isn’t a new problem. Archaeology has been in theoretical crisis for decades. The failure of processual archaeology’s attempts at scientization in the 1960s-70s led to post-processual retreat into pure interpretation. Cultural evolution remains unmodelable, if theres such a term.
So, despite decades of attempts, as documented extensively by researchers like Richerson and Boyd, precisely because cultural phenomena cannot be formalised using biological inheritance models. The field has produced sophisticated phenomenological descriptions and rich interpretive narratives.
But it has failed to achieve what Thomas Kuhn would recognize as normal science—a paradigm with mathematical formalisation, falsifiable predictions, and theories compatible with physics.
My own work spans both archaeology and computational science, holding degrees in both fields. From that position, the paradigm gap is starkly visible. Archaeology operates with concepts that have no physics-compatible definitions. Technology, culture, cognition, social structure—these remain what philosophers call “folk psychological” categories rather than scientifically formalised entities.
The Targeted Fix
In this series I’ve argued that archaeology and SETI are fundamentally the same discipline—signal science across spacetime. But making that unification practically meaningful requires solving the problem the Vakoch silence exposed: archaeology needs reformulation in physics-compatible terms.
This is exactly what our IEEE paper attempts. By treating archaeological data as degraded signals from past motion events, by representing temporal relationships as geometric manifolds, by applying signal processing methods to pattern recovery—we create a framework where archaeological concepts become mathematically defined and therefore physics-compatible.
Technology becomes “controlled motion of material creating quantifiable environmental transformation.” Cultural transmission becomes “propagation of motion patterns through observation and replication.” Archaeological sites become “persistent signals of past motion events detectable through spatial-temporal pattern recognition.”
These aren’t just semantic relabeling. They’re reformulations that make archaeological phenomena expressible in the same mathematical language used throughout physics and engineering. This creates the conceptual bridge that was missing in 2014.
If the reformulation works, archaeologists should be able to engage with questions about temporal transmission protocols, information preservation across deep time, and signal detection in degraded data—without feeling like they’re abandoning their discipline for some alien framework.
They should recognize these as core archaeological questions, now expressible in scientific terms. The Vakoch call shouldn’t produce silence. It should produce vigorous technical discussion about encoding strategies, redundancy requirements, and pattern preservation across geological timescales.
We’re not there yet. This is early-stage paradigm work. But the IEEE paper demonstrates proof-of-concept with real archaeological data—150,000+ sites, 6,000 year temporal span, statistically significant pattern recovery from noisy legacy records.
Conclusion
The 2014 silence wasn’t archaeology’s failure. It was evidence that archaeology needs fundamental reformulation to function as science. The discipline has existed for over a century producing valuable insights while operating in a theoretical framework incompatible with the rest of science.
This work attempts a targeted fix: reformulating archaeological concepts to be physics-compatible while preserving what makes archaeology distinctly valuable—its focus on information recovery across deep time. Whether this particular formulation succeeds, others can judge. But the Vakoch silence proves the attempt is necessary.
In the next post, I’ll walk through the technical implementation—showing how the signal processing framework actually works with real archaeological data, what it reveals that traditional methods miss, and what it suggests about designing transmissions for future recovery.
Four billion years of planetary history, the complete evolutionary record of life on Earth, from single-celled organisms to technological civilization. The geological transformations of a living world. The extinctions, the radiations, the slow accumulation of atmospheric oxygen. The emergence of language, art, and science.
All of it will vanish without a trace, like tears in rain.
Not through some cosmic catastrophe—though that’s inevitable too—but simply through the passage of time. Erosion, tectonic recycling, stellar evolution. Given enough time, even mountains disappear. The question isn’t whether Earth’s history will be lost. The question is whether anyone will have recorded it before it’s gone.
There’s no cosmological reason why preservation is necessary or, some might argue, even desirable. Opinions may reasonably differ on whether it should be a priority at all. But for archaeology and SETI (Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence) as actual research programs consuming real resources, the question must be asked explicitly: what is the ultimate objective? The answer determines everything else—methodology, funding priorities, measures of success.
The Foundational Questions
Why is archaeology pursued at all? To what end do we construct the record? For whom do we do it, and how much resources should society invest in it?
The same questions apply to SETI: to what end do we search for technosignatures (signals from technically advanced civilisations)? For whom do we conduct this search, and how should we allocate resources between detection methods, target selection, and interpretation frameworks?
These aren’t abstract philosophical questions—they’re practical ones that determine research priorities. Currently, both fields operate with implicit objectives that may not withstand scrutiny. Archaeology typically justifies itself through “cultural heritage” and historical understanding—valuable goals, but relatively weak when competing for funding against immediate social needs.
SETI traditionally frames itself as searching for contemporary communication from active civilizations—an exciting prospect, but one that becomes increasingly implausible when you account for the temporal overlap problem I discussed in my previous post.
A Logical Foundation
We can establish a more rigorous objective by starting with what we know for certain: one technological civilization exists that can understand space and time—us. We exist, we’re capable of encoding information, and we can conceive of entities separated from us by vast distances in spacetime.
From this single data point, we can reason that other such civilizations may exist in the future. They could be our own descendants after societal transformation or extinction and re-emergence. They could be entirely different lineages evolving on Earth after we’re gone. They could be civilizations arising elsewhere in the galaxy on timescales long after our extinction. We don’t know which scenario is likely, or if any will occur. But we know it’s possible, because we exist as proof of concept.
This creates a concrete objective that unifies both archaeology and SETI: if we are the first, the only, or simply the present technological civilization in our temporal window, then even if SETI finds no signals now, we can dramatically increase the probability that a future SETI project will find a record—ours.
This isn’t metaphysics. This is practical planning.
The Dual Research Program
Understanding preservation as the shared objective of archaeology and SETI creates a productive research program with two complementary branches.
First, archaeology’s meta-objective becomes clearer: we’re not just reconstructing the past for present cultural understanding. We’re establishing what kinds of information structures survive degradation across time, what encoding strategies remain interpretable despite transformation, and what patterns remain detectable despite noise. Every successful archaeological recovery is a proof-of-concept for preservation. Every failed interpretation reveals encoding strategies that don’t work across deep time.
Second, SETI should be designing temporal transmission protocols as a practical project. This serves a dual purpose: it enables us to create transmissions for future detection, and it informs what we should look for in the present. If we’re designing durable, interpretable information structures to survive millions of years, we’re simultaneously developing detection methods for finding similar structures left by others.
The two research directions inform each other. Archaeological signal processing—like the framework we published in the recent ISSC Conference Proceedings using Ireland’s archaeological data—demonstrates what kinds of patterns survive degradation and remain detectable.
These same patterns become design principles for creating future-detectable structures. Conversely, thinking about what we would create for long-term detection informs what we should be searching for in both archaeological records and astronomical observations.
Why This Matters Practically
This reframing doesn’t require accepting that preservation is cosmically important or morally necessary. It simply recognizes that if we’re already doing archaeology and SETI, we should have clear objectives that maximize the value of the resources invested.
The preservation framework provides that clarity. It gives archaeology a concrete goal beyond heritage conservation: develop and test encoding strategies that survive geological timescales. It gives SETI a concrete goal beyond listening for messages we’ll likely never receive: design transmission protocols and detection methods for signals across deep time.
And it creates a shared research agenda that leverages both fields’ expertise. Archaeologists understand how information degrades, what remains recoverable and how to reconstruct it, SETI researchers understand signal detection and pattern recognition in noise. Combined, they could develop systematic approaches to encoding Earth’s history in ways that maximize probability of future recovery.
This is the preservation imperative, and we may be living in the only window where it’s possible to act on it.
The Window Is Closing
In my previous post, I argued that archaeology and SETI are fundamentally the same discipline—signal science. If that’s true, then both fields share a common challenge: signals degrade over time, and windows of opportunity are brief.
Consider what we know about Earth’s technological window. Modern industrial civilization has existed for perhaps 200 years. Our capacity to encode and transmit information at scale—using digital systems, materials science, and signal processing—has existed for perhaps 50 years at a meaningful level. The archaeological record we’re trying to preserve spans 6,000 years of recorded history, hundreds of thousands of years of human evolution, millions of years of mammalian radiation, and billions of years of geological and biological transformation.
We’re attempting to capture and encode four billion years of history using technology that has existed for half a century. And we’re doing it while the record itself is actively being destroyed by development, climate change, erosion, and simply the passage of time.
This creates genuine urgency. We have advanced enough technology to attempt preservation—AI systems, signal processing frameworks, materials science capable of creating durable substrates. We still have an archaeological record that’s reasonably intact and interpretable. We have sufficient resources and stable enough societies to fund large-scale research programs. But these conditions are fragile.
Climate change threatens both the physical record and our capacity to study it. Mass extinction erodes the paleontological data. Urban development destroys archaeological sites faster than we can excavate them. And societal collapse—whether through climate catastrophe, nuclear war, or pandemic—could eliminate our technological capacity entirely.
If we’re in a unique window, we need to act as if it might close.
Who Receives the Transmission?
The elegant aspect of the preservation framework is that we don’t need to know who will receive the signal or when. We simply need to maximize the probability that it survives and remains interpretable across the longest possible timescales. But it’s worth considering the possible audiences, because each scenario reveals different technical requirements.
Future earthlings after civilizational collapse represent the nearest-term scenario, perhaps 100 to 10,000 years out. If our current technological civilization collapses—whether through climate change, resource depletion, nuclear war, or pandemic—survivors would need to rebuild. Having durable archives of our accumulated knowledge could prevent restarting from scratch. This scenario requires robust local storage, perhaps geological encoding or orbital repositories that survive atmospheric reentry. It’s the most tractable scenario because the audience shares our biology, our planet, and much of our context.
Distant Earth descendants operating on timescales of millions to hundreds of millions of years represent a more challenging scenario. These could be future intelligent species that evolve after we’re gone, or our own descendants so transformed by time and evolution that they’re effectively alien to us. This scenario requires extremely durable encoding—crystalline matrices, genetic insertions, or orbital megastructures that survive stellar evolution. The challenge here is interpretability: how do you create messages that remain meaningful after language, culture, and possibly even sensory modalities have completely changed?
Alien archaeologists discovering Earth after the Sun has expanded and sterilized the planet represent the deepest time scenario—billions of years. This is SETI in its purest form, but from the transmitting side. Here, the encoding must survive not just time but planetary destruction. Space-based archives, artificial structures in stable orbits, or even engineered patterns in solar system architecture become relevant. The interpretability challenge is maximal: you’re communicating with entities that share no evolutionary history, no common sensory experience, possibly no comparable physics if they evolved in radically different environments.
Our own SETI searches discovering similar preservation attempts by other civilizations could operate on any timescale, but likely fall in the range of 10,000 years to 10 million years—brief enough that technological signatures remain detectable, long enough that temporal overlap is unlikely. This scenario is particularly interesting because understanding what we would leave behind informs what we should look for when searching. If every technological civilization faces the same preservation imperative, then SETI should be searching for archives, not conversations.
Are We the Transmission?
There’s a fifth scenario worth considering, one that inverts the entire preservation framework: what if life on Earth is itself an example of temporal transmission from a previous technological civilization?
This isn’t recycled panspermia speculation. It’s a testable archaeological question. If we’re serious about temporal transmission protocols and preservation across deep time, we should apply the same investigative framework to our own origins. Archaeological SETI shouldn’t just look outward and forward—it should look inward and backward.
The timeline is suggestive. Life appears on Earth extraordinarily quickly after conditions stabilize following the Late Heavy Bombardment—perhaps within 100 million years, possibly much faster. This rapidity has always seemed remarkable. Chemical evolution from non-living to living systems is supposed to be slow, requiring vast numbers of random molecular combinations before self-replicating systems emerge. Yet it happened here almost immediately in geological terms.
The standard explanation invokes probability—given Earth’s size and the number of chemical reactions occurring, even improbable events become likely. But there’s an alternative hypothesis worth investigating: life’s rapid emergence might indicate technological origin rather than purely naturalistic chemical evolution.
If a previous technological civilization wanted to transmit information across the deepest possible timescales—spanning the death and rebirth of solar systems, surviving galactic-scale catastrophes—what would be the most durable encoding substrate? Crystalline matrices degrade. Orbital structures eventually decay. Even neutron star engravings face erosion across billions of years.
But self-replicating molecular systems that actively maintain and propagate their own information? Systems that evolve error-correction mechanisms, adapt to changing environments, and spread across planetary surfaces? That’s genuinely durable encoding. Life itself becomes the transmission medium.
Starting the Archaeological Trail: Solar Siblings
If we’re investigating this hypothesis methodologically, we should start from what we know—proper archaeological practice. Our Sun formed 4.6 billion years ago in a molecular cloud alongside hundreds or thousands of sibling stars. These solar siblings scattered across the galaxy over billions of years, but many remain identifiable through their chemical signatures and orbital trajectories.
This makes them the logical starting point for archaeological SETI. If life has technological origins involving panspermia or deliberate seeding, solar sibling systems are the most likely candidates for sharing that origin. They formed from the same material, at the same time, in the same region. If our system was seeded, theirs likely were too. If life emerged naturally here, similar conditions might have produced it there as well.
Current solar sibling searches have identified candidates like HD 162826, a star roughly 110 light-years away that almost certainly formed with our Sun. More will be identified as Gaia mission data improves stellar kinematics. These aren’t random SETI targets—they’re archaeologically motivated searches working from known relationships outward.
This is exactly how archaeology operates: start from documented connections, trace them through time, look for shared origins. Solar sibling searches become archaeological investigation across both space and time, following the trail from our Sun’s birth cloud to wherever those siblings migrated.
Investigating Technological Signatures
This hypothesis generates testable predictions. If life has technological origins, we should find evidence of engineering in its fundamental architecture. Not the kind of complexity that arises from natural selection—that’s expected regardless of origin—but signatures of deliberate design, optimization beyond what blind evolutionary processes would produce, or information encoding strategies that serve no survival function but might preserve transmittable data.
We already know some puzzling features of life’s molecular machinery. The genetic code’s error-correction properties are remarkably sophisticated. The specific amino acids used by all Earth life represent a small subset of chemically possible options, chosen with apparent optimization for certain properties. The universal use of left-handed amino acids and right-handed sugars lacks obvious naturalistic explanation.
None of this proves technological origin. But it establishes that investigating life’s origins through an archaeological SETI lens—looking for technological signatures rather than assuming purely naturalistic processes—is methodologically sound. We have one confirmed example of life. We can study its architecture in detail. We know it emerged rapidly after planetary conditions stabilized. We can identify and search our Sun’s sibling systems for related signals. These are exactly the conditions where archaeological investigation should operate.
This creates a productive symmetry in the temporal transmission framework. We’re simultaneously designing preservation strategies for future recovery while investigating whether our own existence represents successful recovery of a previous civilization’s preservation attempt. Both directions use the same methodology: signal processing applied across deep time, pattern recognition in noisy data, distinguishing technological signatures from natural processes, working from known relationships outward.
And both reinforce archaeology’s central role. Whether we’re encoding information for future discovery or decoding information from past transmission, we’re doing archaeology—recovering signals across temporal distances using physics-compatible methods.
The Funding Implication
Recognizing archaeology as informing preservation as well as reconstruction transforms its justification from cultural heritage to existential responsibility. Current archaeological funding operates on the logic of “understanding our past has educational and cultural value.”, which is true, but relatively weak when competing for limited resources.
The preservation framework makes a stronger argument: we are potentially in Earth’s unique window to encode and transmit four billion years of planetary history. If we fail to do this, that information vanishes permanently, regardless of who might have been able to use it. This reframes archaeology from “nice to know our heritage” to “species-level imperative to preserve the only known record of life’s evolution in the universe.”
This is comparable to climate science or asteroid detection—fields justified by their role in preventing existential catastrophe. If archaeological preservation is the only way to ensure Earth’s history survives beyond our technological window, then it deserves similar priority and funding.
The practical implications are significant. Every archaeological excavation becomes part of a larger dataset encoding planetary history. Every paleontological dig contributes to the evolutionary record. Every geological survey maps deep-time transformations. The question shifts from “what happened at this specific site?” to “how do we encode this information for maximum recoverability across geological timescales?”
Practical Implementation
We have the technical frameworks to begin systematic preservation now. Our IEEE paper (Foley & Furey, 2025) demonstrates one approach: treating archaeological data as degraded signals and applying signal processing methods to extract patterns despite noise, gaps, and temporal uncertainty. Working with Ireland’s Record of Monuments and Places—over 150,000 archaeological sites spanning 6,000 years—we showed that we can recover territorial boundaries, administrative centers, and invasion patterns with statistical significance, even from noisy legacy data.
But this is just the beginning. The same signal processing frameworks that extract patterns from archaeological data can inform how we encode information for future extraction. If we know what kinds of patterns survive degradation, we can deliberately create those patterns at larger scales. If we understand how temporal relationships transform into spatial geometries, we can design encoding strategies that remain interpretable despite transformation, degradation and deformation.
The research questions that emerge are concrete and testable. What materials survive millions of years in various planetary environments? How do you design redundancy levels that ensure reconstruction despite 99.9 percent data loss? What geometric and statistical patterns remain obviously artificial despite transformation over geological timescales? These are engineering problems with testable solutions.
And we have a laboratory to test them: Earth’s archaeological record. Everything we successfully recover from the past tells us something about what will be recoverable from our present.
The Responsibility
We don’t know if anyone will ever receive the transmission. We don’t know if Earth descendants, alien archaeologists, or post-collapse survivors will ever decode what we leave behind. We can’t even be certain that preservation is physically possible across the timescales involved.
But the alternative is accepting that four billion years of planetary history simply vanishes, and no one ever knows it happened. If we’re right about technological windows being brief and rare—if temporal overlap really is unlikely—then preservation becomes the only realistic goal for both archaeology and SETI.
This creates a clear imperative: use the window we have to encode as much as possible, as durably as possible, using every tool available. The archaeological sciences should receive funding commensurate with this responsibility. The theoretical frameworks should be developed urgently. The encoding strategies should be designed and tested systematically.
We might be the only civilization in billions of years of galactic history that has both the record and the capability to preserve it. That’s not just an opportunity. It’s an obligation.
If we succeed, Earth’s story survives. If we fail, it’s lost forever.
Dylan Foley
Next in This Series
This post establishes why temporal transmission protocols matter—the practical foundation for both archaeology and SETI. In the next post, I’ll examine why the 2014 call for archaeologists to contribute to SETI failed to gain traction, and how the signal processing framework bridges the paradigm gap that kept these disciplines separated.
Later in the series, I’ll walk through the technical implementation described in our recently published IEEE paper, showing how treating archaeological data as degraded signals enables pattern recovery across large timescales—and what this tells us about designing transmissions for future detection.
Related Publication: Foley, D. Furey E. (2025). “From Geospatial Patterns to Ancient Signals: A Signal Based Framework for Archaeological Machine Learning.” 2025 Irish Signals and Systems Conference (ISSC). IEEE https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11291309/metrics#metrics
Sometimes the fog of collective delusion clears and reveal the true nature of these human constructions we take so seriously. The pandemic of 2020 was one of these moments.
We are told that the COVID-19 pandemic ended sometime in 2022 or 2023, marked by the lifting of mask mandates and the resumption of “normal” life. This narrative is fundamentally mistaken, we are not beyond the pandemic—we are still within it, experiencing not its acute phase but its chronic psychological and political aftermath. More precisely, we are witnessing a massive societal reaction formation: an attempt to deny the pandemic’s reality by systematically dismantling every structure and acknowledgment that might confirm its existence.
This reaction is not random. It follows predictable psychological patterns rooted in conservative-authoritarian psychology, particularly among those driven by fears of uncertainty, loss of control, and contamination—both literal and metaphorical.
The pandemic performed an act of revelation: it demonstrated with brutal clarity that society is only as strong as its philosophical foundation, that monetary systems can be unraveled by a virus, that the seeming certainties of daily life rest on extraordinarily fragile foundations. For people oriented toward order, hierarchy, and certainty—what George Lakoff terms the “Strict Father” worldview—this revelation was not merely frightening, but intolerable.
Why the West Is Uniquely Vulnerable
Before examining what the pandemic revealed, we must understand why its revelation proved so catastrophic for Western consciousness specifically.
The answer lies in a fundamental belief structure pervading Western thought: dualism—the conceptual splitting of reality into binary opposites – fundamentally separate categories of human/nature, mind/body, culture/biology, spiritual/material. The core concept is that of a material and non-material existence underlying everything we observe. It can be contrasted by a monistic belief system, in which all things are in one category, for example all things are material.
The belief is referred to as an ontology – the science of enquiring what is it that exists, or can or cannot exist. An ontology underpins all our other knowledge by providing fundamnetal categories into which we sort the world. They most often are not consciously held beliefs, but underly our knowledge of the world. Hence theyare pervasive, affecting all og human knowledge in any given society. Whether we believe the universe contains only one interconnected whole, or is split into two disconnected types of being colours everything we think about. The west chose dualism.
This dualistic belief is deeply embedded in Western religious and philosophical traditions, and creates a specific vulnerability. The classic example of western thought derived from dualism is the splitting of mankind from nature. We see this in economics and in current climate debates, where there is a great difficulty in persuading large sections of the population that human action can influence the planets climate. We see the concepts in social sciences and economics where human business and monetary systems are not rooted in ecological knowledge, they are human specific, and therefore separate to nature/ Natural systems are treated as optional to engage with. This serves the extraction of natural resources and the ever increasing maximisation of profits very well, but every so often, Nature decides to remind us of its presence.
When a natural disaster strikes, when nature suddenly cannot be kept separate from the human world, when biology overwhelms culture, this entire psychological construction of reality threatens to collapse.
Dualism: The Deep Structure of Western Thought
Dualistic thinking characterises Western consciousness at levels so fundamental they operate largely unconsciously. In religious thought, this manifests as the split between spirit and matter—the immaterial soul separate from mortal flesh—and the distinction between Heaven and Earth, where the divine realm exists apart from the natural world.
Good and Evil are positioned as cosmic forces in eternal opposition, leading to binary binary concepts of Salvation versus Damnation. Crucially for our purposes, humanity is conceived as created in God’s image, separate from and dominant over nature itself.
Philosophical dualism mirrors these religious structures. The Cartesian mind-body split puts res cogitans (thinking substance) as fundamentally different from res extensa (extended substance). Reason is set against passion for example, with the rational mind expected to control the irrational body and emotions.
Culture is distinguished from Nature, with human civilisation understood as transcending natural determinism. The perceiving Subject is fundamentally separated from the perceived Object—the self as something apart from the world it observes.
In economic thought, dualism becomes particularly consequential. The Economy is conceived as separate from the Environment, with economic activity understood as distinct from natural systems. This separation enables the concept of “externalities”—environmental costs that are literally external to economic calculation. This allows the cost of industrial capitalism to be ignored by dumping waste and pollution into nature, where it basically ceases to exist from the point of view of economic calculation.
Growth is positioned against natural limits, with human economic expansion imagined as separate from natural constraints and therefore infinite.
This dualistic paradigm provides enormous psychological advantages for those operating within it. It enables an elite to mobilise lanour and act as if the economy is separate from natural determination, allowing populations to imagine themselves as exempt from biological constraints. It allows the systematic ignoring of natural limits, since “externalities” can be externalised indefinitely. So we dump material into the ocean and presume it will never return.
In its roots in ancient religious philosophies, it may have provided certain useful outcomes to help societies to survive. Societies with extremely limited understanding of the planet and systems of life in which they were embedded. It provides psychological escape from biological vulnerability through the promise that the soul transcends the body. It justifies hierarchy by suggesting that those more “spiritual” or “rational” have authority over those more “natural” or “material.”
And critically, it enables capitalism as currently practiced, treating nature as a resource separate from the human economy rather than as an integrated system.
The entire Western project of modernity rests on this dualistic foundation: the progressive separation of humanity from nature.
The Pandemic’s Assault
COVID-19 didn’t merely present a biological threat—it threatened, by demonstrating that nature and humanity are not, and never were, separate it threatened the core beliefs of very large sections of human populations.
As a natural pathogen shut down human civilisation with ruthless efficiency, suddenly nature overwhelmed the economy, as microscopic viral replication rendered economic “laws” and financial engineering irrelevant.
Material reality suddenly trumped abstraction, no amount of capital manipulation could remove physical vulnerability. The “external” became internal as environmental factors—air quality, ventilation, population density—suddenly determined who would live and who would die. Peoples minds, considered outside nature, were now affected by physical infection that produced psychological trauma, “brain fog,” and lasting cognitive impairment.
For any person whose consciousness was structured by dualism, this wasn’t just frightening—it was potentially devastating to their entire understanding of reality. The fundamental categories structuring society revealed themselves as illusory constructs with no basis in truth. For a person or group in this position there was only two responses, accept the collapse of their world view, or deny it was even happening.
Why Asia Proved More Resilient
This helps explain why Asian societies, while sharing human psychology’s universal features, demonstrated greater resilience to pandemic social disruption. Many Asian philosophical and religious systems operate from fundamentally monistic or non-dualistic ontologies that never separated humans from nature.
For example Buddhism teaches interdependent co-arising—pratītyasamutpāda—recognizing no fundamental separation between self and world, mind and body, humanity and nature.
Taoism emphasizes the unity of opposites, with the natural way (Dao) encompassing all phenomena without fundamental divisions.
Confucianism offers a relational ontology where individuals are defined by their relationships within natural and social orders rather than as separate autonomous subjects.
Vedantic Hinduism teaches non-dualism (Advaita), viewing apparent separations as illusory (Maya), with underlying reality unified in Brahman. The term Advaita (अद्वैत) literally means “not-two”, forming a very close analogy with the concepts we are discussing here. .
Adi Shankara, the most prominent exponent of Advaita Vedānta tradition. “I am other than name, form and action. My nature is ever free! I am Self, the supreme unconditioned Brahman. I am pure Awareness, always non-dual.” Adi Shankara, Upadesasahasri 11.7 Wikipedia
These philosophies never suggested humanity could or should transcend biological reality. Natural disasters, epidemics, and human vulnerability were integrated into worldviews.
When the pandemic struck, Asian populations could respond pragmatically to biological threat without experiencing the collapse of their mental model of the world. Masks, social distancing, and collective action didn’t threaten core worldviews because those worldviews never promised escape from nature in the first place.
The Western Exception: The Apeiron and Science
Importantly, Western thought isn’t uniformly dualistic. Significant monistic traditions exist, though they’ve been consistently marginalised in the political sphere. Or have been subject to attack for the reasons we are discussing.
Monism was in the philosophy of the west from the start. Inspired by the Ancient Egyptian cosmology the Greek Milesian School of Thales and Anaximander posited a single fundamental substance—whether water, air, or the boundless apeiron—underlying apparent diversity.
Everything is generated from apeiron and there its destruction happens. Infinite worlds are generated and they are destructed there again. And he says (Anaximander) why this is apeiron. Because only then genesis and decay will never stop.
— Aetius I 3,3<Ps.Plutarch; DK 12 A14.>
Early Greek natural philosophers—the Pre-Socratic Physiologoi like Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles—developed sophisticated monistic ontologies.
Parmenides conceived of reality as unified, unchanging Being, with apparent divisions as illusory. Heraclitus saw unity through constant change and transformation, recognizing opposites as interdependent rather than fundamentally separate.
We can speak and think only of what exists. And what exists is uncreated and imperishable for it is whole and unchanging and complete. It was not or nor shall be different since it is now, all at once, one and continuous.
–Parmenides Fragment 6 – 5th Century BC
These thinkers established monistic foundations for natural science itself, understanding nature through observation and reason rather than supernatural explanation, and recognizing underlying unity beneath surface diversity.
Modern science emerged from these monistic foundations, not dualistic ones. But it did so only recently in the 17th century with the rediscovery of these ancient Greek texts in transmitted form, such as the poem of LucretiusDe Rerum Natura.
Scientific method requires humanity as part of nature subject to natural laws, knowledge gained through empirical observation of material reality, recognition of causal connections across apparent boundaries, and unity of explanation across domains. To put it simply, the west spent almost a thousand years with an incorrect foundational concept and so pursued the transmutation of one thing into another, alchemy. But the breakthrough of understanding of matter did not happen until the atomic theory of the Greek philosophers was recovered.
The greatest scientific advances occur when dualistic boundaries collapse: Darwin showing humanity continuous with nature, neuroscience revealing mind as brain process, ecology demonstrating organism-environment unity, systems biology showing no clear individual-environment boundary. Even these sciences suffer from issues defining the boundaries.
Yet Western religious and philosophical traditions repeatedly reasserted dualism against these monistic insights.
Plato, misunderstanding either on purpose or by accident the entire corpus of Greek thought up to his life, positioned perfect Forms as separate from the imperfect material world. Recreating a dualistic philosophy in an instant, which was to be enormously influential on subsequent religions and cults. Platonic dualism and Christian theology reinscribed soul-body division, the saved-damned binary, and the supernatural-natural split.
in the 17th century Descartes Cartesian philosophy reinscribed mind-body dualism at modernity’s very foundation. While science was to cling to the ancient Greek concepts of the atom, and to revolutionaise our understanding of the universe, in the political and power sphere, the medieval religios dualism held sway, and so the curriculum was split, into humanities and sciences, as humans, being spiritual beings differebt from animals and made in the image of God, were to be in a category apart from nature. And so it is even now.
And so, as industrial capitalism developed it treated nature as an exploitable resource separate from human economy. This reassertion served power structures: dualism justifies hierarchy (spiritual rulers over material workers), exploitation, as nature is a separate resource, and authority, priestly or rational classes mediating between realms.
The Pandemic as Broken Dualism
But in the late December of 2019 and the early months of 2020, nature proved iself not to be separate to humans after all. The true believer sin the market and the reality of finance were left reeling a s the “externality” of the environment invaded economic reality with devastating force.
Now we can begin to understand the pandemic’s devastating psychological impact on Western populations.
When no amount of willpower, prayer, or positive thinking could prevent infection. Hierarchy proved non-protective as elites initially caught COVID like everyone else, regardless of wealth or status.The spiritual-material boundary dissolved as churches became superspreader sites and faith failed to immunize believers.
Individual autonomy proved illusory when survival required collective action and acknowledgment of biological interdependence.
This collapse was most catastrophic for those whose worldviews most depend on dualistic philosphies: religious conservatives for whom spiritual-material dualism is fundamental to theology; free-market fundamentalists whose ideology requires economy-nature separation to ignore natural limits; individualists who require the self-world boundary to remain absolute; and authoritarians whose hierarchical structures are justified by dualistic claims of superiority—the rational over the emotional, the civilised over the natural.
But much of human populations acted in counter-intuitive ways, often against their own interest, and also often actually died because of this behaviour.
people doubled down in a process known to psychology as reaction formation. when the anxiety produced by approaching the thought of the nature divide being dissolved – the anxiety is severe enough to be suppressed and instead the person engages in ritualistic denial of the reality of the pandemic. The rituals may involve refusing to wear masks. We may think of rising anxiety at any thought that threatens the dualistic underpinnings of a persons reality, and lessening anxiety at anything that seems to reinforce the boundary. Lets see how this plays out.
Reaction Formation as Restoration Project
When a very deeply believed model is under threat, it causes massive cognitive dissonance. Whats happenming in the world and whats possible in the persons model of the world do not match. This causes real anxiety, and in many an impossible to resolve dilemma.
Because dualism’s collapse threatens their entire psychological and social construction of reality. They did the only rational thing in the circumstance.
They denied it was happening.
Every element of the denial makes sense as an attempt to restore the certainty of the world before an invisible nature invaded and threatened to collapse. Operating mostly below conscious awareness, people moved to excape the anxiety caused, not be fear of the disease, but by the fear of the dissolution of certainty.
Confronted by Covid-19, instead of accepting it, the first goal of many became to to deny nature’s power. So began the essentially ritual acts to make nature return to its proper place, tto subordinate it to the higher spiritual plane of human existence.
For example, minimising a viral threat reassures the mind that nature cannot overwhelm the human world. Rejecting masks and distancing implies nature cannot dictate human behavior. Refusing vaccines asserts that nature cannot enter the sovereign body. The overarching aim is to restore nature as a separate, controllable “externality”—safely distant from human affairs. And with each magical deinal of its power they would feel some relief from the exisstential anxiety, even when this behaviour meant it was more likely they would be harmed or die from the virus.
An entire mass movement then sprung up to reassert the spiritual-material boundary. Attacks on medical science reject material explanations in favor of spiritual or moral ones. Promoting faith healing reasserts spiritual primacy over biological reality.
Blaming deaths on moral failure rather than biological infection reframes the pandemic in spiritual rather than material terms. In each case the goal is to restore soul-body dualism and reinstate spiritual authority over scientific expertise.
Others strove to restore the individual-collective boundary. Resisting public health mandates reasserts individuality separated from nature against the reality of biological connection.
Framing collective action as tyranny denies the reality of interdependence. Emphasising personal choice while ignoring biological connection aims to restore the individual as ontological foundation, despite the pandemic’s clear demonstration that we are fundamentally interconnected biological beings.
To reinforce human-nature separation large parts of the population ignored environmental factors externalises air quality and ventilation as somehow separate from human health. ie – if we weer to act on air quality it would be to admit that the pandemic was real and that nature and humanity are one system and that we must act and organise society and knowledge systems according
Resisting building upgrades denies that material conditions determine outcomes.
Each seemingly irrational behaviour, even ones that hastened peoples demise, by causing them to catch and sometimes be overwhelmed by the virus, is logical if we see it as a reaction to the implications of the virus on human society and its structure.
Promoting “return to normal” attempts to restore pre-pandemic dualism as if the revelation never occurred. The goal is to re-externalise nature, positioning it once again as separate from the human world rather than integrated with it.
The threat to the current social hierarchy, which also must be protected at all costs.
The fifth goal reestablishes hierarchy as naturally ordained. Electing authoritarian leaders attempts to restore protective fathers who can master nature through strength.
Attacking expertise reasserts political over scientific authority, restoring traditional hierarchies.
Blaming vulnerable populations for their suffering restores hierarchical order by suggesting natural superiority.
The goal here is to restore dualistic justification for social stratification—positioning dominance as reflecting spiritual or rational superiority rather than mere power.
This isn’t merely psychological defense—it’s a concerted attempt to reinforce the philosophical underpinnings of western societies.. The pandemic broke reality’s fundamental structure (as experienced through dualistic consciousness), and so every denial, every resistance and every attack on science serves the project of reassembling that structure.
We can see the link between the virus and how it could threaten immediately to overturn societies accepted norms, something that would have meant that the old social orders would indeed be replaced, and the current dominant religiously based belief systems that have maintained dominance in the west would be overwhelmed.
Ancient Parallels: Politics or Priesthoods?
We can gain a glimpse here into ancient responses to natural disasters and their role in the creation of priesthoods, kings. The propitiation of gods represents early humanity’s solution to dualism’s failures. Ancient societies experiencing catastrophe—floods, earthquakes, plagues, famines—faced the same ontological crisis: nature overwhelming human world, demonstrating the dualistic boundary’s porosity.
The solution was ritual restoration through specialized social technologies. Priests emerged as specialists in managing the nature-supernatural boundary. Kings claimed divine authority that bridged spiritual and material realms. Sacrifice ritually fed nature or gods to restore separation and appease threatening forces. Propitiation involved bargaining with supernatural powers to keep nature at bay. Scapegoating purged the “contamination” that had breached protective boundaries. These weren’t merely superstitions—they were ontological technologies for restoring dualistic order after natural disasters revealed its fragility.
The contemporary parallel follows the same functional pattern, though in modern forms. Political strongmen serve as divine-right kings promising protection from nature’s threats. Evangelical leaders function as priests managing the spiritual-material boundary through faith rather than reason. Scapegoating China, the WHO, and medical “elites” purges contamination that breached the human sphere. Ritual resistance through anti-mask and anti-vaccine stances provides symbolic restoration of individual autonomy. Propitiation through denial bargains with reality to restore dualism—if we simply refuse to acknowledge nature’s power, perhaps it will retreat to its proper separate sphere. The form has changed but the function is identical: restore the broken ontological boundary at any cost.
C.P. Snow, Karl Popper, and the Two Cultures
C.P. Snow’s famous “Two Cultures” lecture (1959) identified this dualism’s persistence in modern intellectual life—the split between scientific and humanistic cultures, between material and spiritual/aesthetic domains. Snow saw this split as dangerous, preventing society from addressing technological challenges.
But Snow didn’t fully grasp that this “two cultures” division reflects deeper ontological dualism. It’s not merely that scientists and humanists don’t communicate—it’s that dualistic ontology creates incompatible frameworks:
Science requires monism: Unified explanation across domains, material causation, empirical verification
Humanistic dualism requires separation: Free will separate from determinism, values separate from facts, meaning separate from mechanism
Karl Popper’s Contribution:
Popper’s philosophy of science implicitly recognized this tension. His falsificationism requires:
Hypotheses subject to empirical refutation (material reality independent of desire)
Open criticism and testing (no privileged authority or revealed truth)
Provisional knowledge (no final separation from uncertainty)
This is fundamentally incompatible with dualistic thinking that reserves sacred domains immune from material investigation.
Now we understand why attacks on science are so central to the reaction formation. Science represents monistic ontology in its fundamental methods and assumptions. It positions humanity as part of nature, subject to natural laws rather than exempt from them. It generates knowledge through material investigation rather than revealed truth. It builds uncertainty and revision into its method, refusing the comfort of absolute certainty. No domain remains exempt from empirical inquiry—including consciousness, spirituality, and human nature itself. Scientific disciplines demonstrate interdisciplinary unity, recognizing no fundamental boundaries between fields of investigation.
For dualistic consciousness, science poses an existential threat. It systematically collapses the boundaries dualism requires. Natural selection connects humans to nature, eliminating the human-animal divide. Neuroscience studies consciousness materially, dissolving the mind-body split. Ecology demonstrates organism-environment unity, showing individuals as porous and contextual. Systems biology reveals no clear boundary between individual and environment. Each scientific advance further undermines dualistic ontology.
Therefore, restoring dualism requires attacking science itself. This explains phenomena that otherwise seem irrational: rejecting climate science maintains economy-nature separation by denying that economic activity affects environmental systems.
Denying evolution maintains human-nature separation by insisting humans are fundamentally different from other life forms.
Resisting pandemic science maintains body-spirit and individual-collective separations by refusing to acknowledge biological vulnerability and interdependence.
Attacking medical expertise maintains hierarchy of faith over empirical knowledge, reasserting spiritual authority over material investigation. Each attack serves the project of ontological restoration, protecting dualism against scientific monism’s corrosive effects.
The Path Forward: Embracing Monistic Ontology
Understanding dualism as the root vulnerability suggests a solution—though one most resistant to hearing it would reject. Monistic ontology requires recognizing humanity as continuous with nature rather than separate from it, accepting biological vulnerability as inherent rather than transcendable through will or faith, acknowledging interdependence as reality rather than collectivist ideology, integrating economy and ecology rather than externalizing nature as mere resource, building with nature rather than against it through pandemic-resistant architecture, and accepting uncertainty as fundamental to existence rather than something to be overcome through control or denial.
This proves extraordinarily difficult because it requires abandoning not just psychological comfort but entire civilisational foundations. Capitalism as currently practiced requires treating nature as an externality that can be exploited without consequence. Abrahamic religious frameworks depend on spirit-matter dualism for their core theological claims. Liberal individualism requires the atomistic self as its foundation, denying the reality of biological and social interdependence. Hierarchical authority structures require dualistic justifications—positioning some as naturally superior through greater rationality or spirituality. The modern progress narrative requires the fantasy of transcending nature through technological mastery. Abandoning dualism means reconstructing civilisation from foundations upward.
Yet this is precisely what modern science demands. Contemporary ecology, systems biology, neuroscience, epidemiology, and climate science all converge on monistic insights that cannot be reconciled with dualistic ontology. Organisms and environments co-constitute each other rather than existing as separate entities. Individual boundaries are porous and contextual rather than absolute and fixed.
Mind and body are inseparable aspects of unified biological systems. Human and natural systems are integrated rather than separate spheres. Health is systemic and relational rather than individual and isolated. Each scientific advance makes dualism less tenable, revealing it as an obstacle to understanding rather than a reflection of reality.
The Extreme Dangers of Religious Ontology in Public Policy
When dualistic religious ontology shapes policy during pandemics, the consequences prove systematically catastrophic. Biological reality gets denied in favor of spiritual explanations for material processes. Effective responses get rejected because collective action threatens dualistic individualism and hierarchical authority. Scientific expertise gets suppressed as it threatens religious authority’s claims to truth. Vulnerable populations get blamed through moral rather than biological explanations for their suffering. Long-term planning becomes impossible when restoration fantasy replaces adaptation to changing reality.
The result is not merely bad policy—it’s systematically selecting for civilisational failure. Societies embracing monistic ontology can adapt to biological reality by acknowledging human integration with natural systems. Societies clinging to dualism cannot adapt without first breaking the dualism—leaving them the choice of breaking the dualism or breaking against reality itself. And this is where we are right now.
The West’s Dilemma
Western civilisation faces a fundamental choice that’s almost certainly too difficult to make consciously:
Option One: Maintain Dualism
Continue denying nature’s integration with human world
Keep externalizing environmental costs
Preserve hierarchical authority structures
Result: Eventual catastrophic collapse when reality overwhelms denial
Option Two: Abandon Dualism
Accept monistic ontology and its implications
Rebuild institutions on realistic foundations
Result: Requires abandoning core civilisational structures—capitalism, individualism, traditional religion as currently practiced
The first option is psychologically easier but materially catastrophic. The second is materially necessary but psychologically impossible for most.
This is why the pandemic’s psychological aftermath is so dangerous specifically in the West: the civilisation most structurally dependent on dualistic ontology faces the most fundamental threat from its collapse.
The Pandemic’s Revelation: Society as Constructed Reality
Money, Authority, and the Illusion of Solidity
The pandemic stripped away the veneer of permanence from modern social systems with shocking speed. Within weeks of COVID-19’s emergence, mechanisms that seemed immutable revealed themselves as contingent constructions. Monetary systems traditionally presented as natural laws of economics were suddenly suspended—governments printed money at unprecedented scales, implemented rent moratoriums, and provided direct cash payments to citizens through actions previously declared impossible.
Work structures that management insisted required physical presence in offices evaporated overnight, exposing decades of organisational dogma as mere preference rather than necessity. Property rights, typically treated as sacrosanct, became negotiable when eviction moratoriums challenged the fundamental relationship between ownership and control. Educational hierarchies collapsed as prestigious universities scrambled to deliver online instruction indistinguishable from community colleges, undermining carefully constructed status differentials.
This wasn’t a temporary suspension of normal rules—it was a revelation that the “normal rules” were always social constructions maintained through collective agreement and power structures, not natural or inevitable orders. A microscopic pathogen had demonstrated that human social organisation is artificial, contingent, and vulnerable after all.
The Fragility of the Constructed Order
For individuals whose psychological architecture depends on perceiving the world as ordered, hierarchical, and stable—characteristics that decades of research link to conservative ideology—this revelation was catastrophic. Research consistently shows that political conservatism correlates with intolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity, need for cognitive closure and order, threat sensitivity and anxiety about chaos, and preference for familiar social structures over novel arrangements. The pandemic didn’t merely present a biological threat—it performed a metaphysical assault on worldviews premised on stability, predictability, and the permanence of social hierarchies.
When conservatives witnessed governments creating money “out of thin air” to prevent economic collapse, when they watched traditional gender and work roles dissolve as parents juggled childcare and remote work, when they observed that the emperor of modern capitalism truly had no clothes, the cognitive dissonance was profound and intolerable.
Conservative Psychology and the Pandemic Response
The Strict Father Model and Pathogen Threat
George Lakoff’s “Strict Father” model provides crucial insight into conservative pandemic response. This model conceptualises conservative morality through the metaphor of a traditional patriarchal family where the father figure represents absolute moral authority, providing protection and enforcing discipline. Obedience to hierarchy becomes paramount for maintaining social order. Self-discipline and self-reliance emerge as primary virtues that must be cultivated through strict upbringing. The world is viewed as inherently dangerous, requiring strong authority to maintain order against chaos and evil. Weakness invites chaos and breakdown, therefore strength—including moral strength—must be constantly demonstrated to prevent social dissolution.
When applied to the pandemic through the “Nation-as-Family” metaphor, this model creates profound tensions. The virus represented a threat that couldn’t be disciplined into submission, that didn’t respect hierarchy, that made everyone equally vulnerable regardless of moral fortitude or obedience to authority.
Research on the “behavioral immune system” (Schaller, 2006; Schaller & Park, 2011) suggests that pathogen threats typically make people more socially conservative, promoting conformity and traditional values as disease-avoidance strategies. Yet COVID-19 produced a paradoxical response: American conservatives became less likely to perceive the virus as threatening, less anxious about infection, and less compliant with protective measures (Calvillo et al., 2020; Kerr et al., 2021).
The Politicisation of Uncertainty
This paradox resolves when we understand that acknowledging the virus’s threat meant acknowledging the failure of the strict father model to protect. Research from 2020 showed:
Political conservatism predicted lower perception of COVID-19 threat despite conservatives’ typical threat sensitivity (Tyson, 2020)
Self-uncertainty among conservatives predicted polarized threat perceptions rather than unified response (uncertainty-identity theory)
Conservative politicians and media systematically minimized viral threat to maintain authority credibility
The choice was stark: admit that reality had overwhelmed the protective capacity of strong leadership and traditional structures, or deny the reality that created this unbearable cognitive dissonance. Many conservatives chose denial.
Fear of Contamination: Literal and Metaphorical
Conservative psychology has long been associated with heightened disgust sensitivity and fear of contamination (Inbar et al., 2012; Terrizzi et al., 2010). This manifests not just in concerns about physical pathogens but in metaphorical contamination—fears of cultural mixing, immigration, and social change “polluting” traditional society.
The pandemic created a peculiar inversion: the literal contamination threat (COVID-19) was minimised, while metaphorical contamination fears intensified. Mask mandates and vaccines—protective measures against literal contamination—were framed as metaphorical contamination: government overreach “infecting” individual liberty, medical authority “contaminating” bodily autonomy, and social distancing “polluting” traditional community bonds.
This inversion makes psychological sense within the strict father framework: accepting medical authority over the paterfamilias’s judgment represented a greater threat to the hierarchical order than the virus itself. The driving force being that to embrace remedies to the virus, would be to admit the reality of the pandemic, and thereby threaten the psychological model of society as outside nature. Ao the pandemic was denied by refusing to respond rationally to it. If theres no response, then it doesnt exist. Truly magical thinking. But perfectly in line with our thesis of denial to uphold a dualistic world view and avoid the profound anxiety that challenging that would cause.
Authoritarian Family Structures and State Authority
From Family to Nation: The Transfer of Authority
Lakoff argues persuasively that conservative political ideology extends the strict father family model to governance through the “Nation-as-Family” metaphor. Just as the father provides protection and enforces discipline within the family, strong leadership should protect citizens and enforce social order. The pandemic, however, created an impossible bind for this model:
Medical experts (not political authority figures) possessed the relevant knowledge
Collective action (not individual strength) offered the best protection
Interdependence (not self-reliance) proved necessary for survival
Hierarchy failed to control an indifferent pathogen
For authoritarian personalities who transfer the strict father model from family to state, this failure was intolerable. Research on Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) by Bob Altemeyer shows that high RWAs exhibit:
Submission to established authorities they perceive as legitimate
Aggression toward those who violate established norms
Conventionalism: rigid adherence to traditional social norms
The pandemic violated all three dimensions. Medical authorities recommended unprecedented social changes; the virus forced violations of traditional norms (gatherings, face-covering, physical distance); and established political authorities (particularly in countries like the United States) were revealed as inadequate to the biological challenge.
The Authoritarian Response: Reasserting Control
When external reality threatens the authoritarian worldview, the typical response is not adaptation but intensified commitment to authoritarian solutions. The pandemic triggered precisely this dynamic through a predictable sequence. First comes denial of threat legitimacy—if the virus isn’t genuinely dangerous, then no authority failure occurred and no adaptation is required. Next arrives blame displacement, attacking medical experts, public health officials, and “liberal” pandemic responses rather than acknowledging systemic vulnerability. Then follows symbolic reassertion of control through resisting masks, vaccines, and restrictions as demonstrations of autonomy and strength rather than capitulation to biological reality. Finally comes the search for strong leaders who promise to restore the pre-pandemic order rather than adapt to new realities, leaders who will make the threatening complexity disappear through force of will.
This explains the seemingly paradoxical finding that intolerance of uncertainty—typically associated with conservative ideology—didn’t directly predict pandemic compliance. Instead, political partisanship mediated the relationship: conservatives dealt with pandemic uncertainty not through precautionary measures but through allegiance to political authorities who denied the uncertainty’s legitimacy.
The Ongoing Reaction: “Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle”
The Systematic Denial Project
We are currently experiencing a coordinated, if not always conscious, campaign to deny the pandemic’s reality by eliminating every trace of its impact and every structure that acknowledges its ongoing presence. This manifests across multiple domains simultaneously.
Medical infrastructure faces systematic dismantlement. There is widespread resistance to upgraded building codes requiring improved ventilation, refusal to retrofit public spaces with air filtration systems, opposition to architectural paradigms that account for airborne pathogen transmission, dismantling of pandemic surveillance and early warning systems, defunding of public health agencies and positions, and sustained attacks on medical expertise as inherently suspicious.
Scientific authority undergoes coordinated erosion. Vaccine hesitancy and denial persist despite overwhelming efficacy evidence. Conspiracy theories proliferate about medical establishment motives. Public health measures get reframed as authoritarian control rather than disease mitigation. Epidemiological modeling and evidence face dismissal as politically motivated. Growing distrust in medical institutions reflects a broader pattern—trust in science among conservatives has declined steadily from 1974 to 2010. This erosion has an ontological dimension: science represents monistic ontology that collapses dualistic boundaries, making it an existential threat to worldviews dependent on nature-culture separation.
Memory undergoes active suppression. Pandemic memorials and acknowledgments disappear rapidly from public spaces. Social pressure builds against discussing ongoing COVID impacts. Pandemic deaths get reframed as “inevitable” or “acceptable losses” rather than preventable tragedies. Long COVID and chronic health impacts face systematic minimisation. Return-to-office mandates deny lessons about remote work viability, erasing institutional knowledge gained during the acute phase.
Political reaction accelerates these trends. Elections increasingly favor explicitly anti-public-health officials. Legislative restrictions limit future public health emergency powers. Book bans target pandemic-related educational materials. In some jurisdictions, attacks on medical freedom of speech constrain what health professionals can publicly recommend.
This isn’t merely partisan politics—it’s a psychological project to restore the pre-pandemic ontology where social systems seemed permanent, hierarchies appeared natural, and authority figures could guarantee safety through strength and discipline.
The Architectural Denial
Perhaps most concerning is the refusal to acknowledge that the current disease waves are enabled by a global urban environment connected through air travel that creates optimal conditions for pathogen adaptation. Without systemic changes to this environment—improved air filtration, better ventilation standards, architectural designs that account for airborne transmission—pathogens will continue to adapt to this conducive environment.
The waves will continue. They will likely intensify. Yet the same psychologies that drove pandemic denial now prevent the infrastructural changes that might mitigate future outbreaks. To upgrade building codes or retrofit structures would be to admit that the pandemic revealed genuine vulnerabilities requiring ongoing attention—an admission that threatens the fantasy of restored stability.
Historical Parallels: The 1918 Spanish Flu
The Aftermath of Mass Death
The 1918-1919 influenza pandemic killed approximately 50-100 million people worldwide—more than World War I. Its psychological and social effects offer instructive parallels to our current moment. Recent research reveals that social trust erosion proved permanent and transgenerational. Experiencing the pandemic likely had lasting consequences for social trust that persisted across generations. Americans whose ancestors experienced the 1918 flu in their countries of origin display lower levels of social trust even a century later. The mechanism was clear: the “textbook case of utter failure of health care institutions both in containing the spread of an epidemic and in providing effective care” created a climate of general mistrust. Survivors reported that authorities’ incompetence during the crisis permanently altered their beliefs about institutional reliability—beliefs they passed to descendants.
Remarkably, the Spanish Flu quickly disappeared from public discourse after 1920. Historian Alfred Crosby noted this collective amnesia in his seminal 1976 work, later reissued as America’s Forgotten Pandemic. The pandemic was ignored by periodicals and textbooks for decades. This silence wasn’t accidental—it reflected a societal need to forget a catastrophe that revealed governmental inadequacy and social vulnerability. We’re witnessing a similar dynamic today, though on a compressed timeline. The speed at which COVID-19 has been relegated to “history” despite its ongoing presence mirrors the rapid forgetting after 1918.
The Spanish Flu’s mental health impacts were severe and lasting. Asylum hospitalisations for mental disorders attributed to influenza increased by an average factor of 7.2 in the six years following the pandemic. Survivors reported depression, mental distraction, sleep disturbances, and difficulty coping with work. Influenza death rates significantly correlated with increased suicide rates during 1918-1920. A marked rise in neurological diseases followed, suggesting long-term biological impacts on mental health. The “massive and sudden loss of life plunged many into a chronic state of helplessness and anxiousness.” Thirty-one thousand children in New York City alone lost one or both parents in November 1918. This scale of loss created trauma that permeated society.
Paradoxically, the Spanish Flu also catalyzed positive changes. Workers’ protests following the pandemic led to fundamental changes in social policy. The origins of developmental and welfare states emerged from the combination of pandemic and war. Women’s agency increased as they joined the workforce in greater numbers—from 18% in 1900 to 21% in 1920 in the United States. The 19th Amendment granting women’s suffrage passed in 1920. Yet these progressive changes occurred alongside social upheaval and violence, abandonment of the sick and dying, breakdown of funeral rites and community bonds, and a climate of suspicion and distrust that characterised the period “and long after.”
Key Differences from Today
Two critical differences distinguish COVID-19’s context from 1918. First, the media environment differs fundamentally. The 1918 pandemic occurred during wartime censorship, limiting information flow. Today’s pandemic unfolded in an environment of instant global communication, social media, and unprecedented information access—yet this has paradoxically enabled more effective disinformation campaigns rather than more informed responses. Second, institutional trust levels were inverted. The Spanish Flu struck populations with relatively high institutional trust that subsequently eroded. COVID-19 struck populations—particularly in the United States—where institutional trust was already deeply compromised, accelerating existing political polarisation rather than creating new divisions.
Historical Parallels: The Black Death (1348)
The Ultimate Pandemic
The Black Death of 1348-1350 killed between one-third and one-half of Europe’s population—perhaps 25-50 million people. Its psychological impact offers insights into how societies respond to existential biological threats:
1. Breakdown of Social Bonds
The plague created such terror that fundamental human relationships dissolved:
People abandoned friends and family, fled cities, shut themselves off from the world
Funeral rites became perfunctory or stopped entirely
The sick and dying were abandoned by doctors and family members
Bodies littered streets for days, with no one willing to collect them
Social fabric tore apart as fear overcame communal bonds
This breakdown wasn’t mere selfishness—it was psychological collapse in the face of incomprehensible horror. As one chronicler noted, “the blow struck the world with immense terror.”
2. Crisis of Authority and Meaning
The Black Death shattered existing frameworks of understanding:
Religious authority failed: Prayer didn’t prevent sickness and death. Mass death among clergy undermined the Church’s moral authority. People turned to mysticism and extremism, seeking alternative explanations.
Medical authority failed: Physicians proved helpless. Their reliance on ancient texts and traditional remedies offered no protection. This failure planted seeds for eventual scientific revolution.
Social hierarchy collapsed: The plague killed nobles and peasants alike initially, though the wealthy eventually learned to isolate themselves. The traditional belief that social position reflected moral worth was exposed as fiction.
Worldview disintegration: People “knew—or thought they knew—how the world worked.” The plague destroyed this certainty, forcing a “complete reevaluation of the existing paradigm of received knowledge.”
3. The Search for Scapegoats
Unable to comprehend the disaster, populations sought human agents to blame:
Jews were massacred across Europe under the conspiracy theory that they had poisoned wells. Thousands were burned alive in at least two hundred towns.
Foreigners, beggars, and lepers faced systematic persecution as suspected plague carriers.
Women and marginalized groups were targeted as witches or moral pollutants causing divine punishment.
This pattern—seeking human enemies when confronted with biological threat—mirrors contemporary conspiracy theories about COVID-19 origins, bioweapons, and deliberate infection campaigns.
4. Psychological Transformation
The Black Death produced lasting psychological changes:
Preoccupation with death: Art turned dark, featuring widespread imagery of “danse macabre” (dance of death) showing death as a skeleton choosing victims randomly.
“Live for the moment” mentality: The uncertainty of survival created a mood of “Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow you may die.”
Reduced faith in traditional institutions: Both religious and secular authority permanently lost credibility.
Peasant revolts: Survivors, recognizing their increased value in a labor-scarce economy, challenged aristocratic power (the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 in England, for example).
The Systemic Response Failure
Critically, the Black Death persisted because medieval society lacked the conceptual framework and institutional capacity to address systemic vulnerability:
No germ theory meant no understanding of transmission mechanisms
No public health infrastructure meant no coordinated response
Religious explanations (divine punishment) prevented rational mitigation
Urban design (dense populations, poor sanitation) created ideal conditions for plague bacteria
The plague recurred for centuries because societies couldn’t acknowledge and address the environmental and infrastructural factors enabling its spread.
We face a parallel situation. COVID-19 revealed that our globally connected urban environment creates optimal conditions for pandemic disease. Yet the same psychological resistances that prevented medieval societies from addressing urban design now prevent us from acknowledging that air travel, inadequate ventilation, and crowded spaces create conducive environments for pathogen adaptation and transmission.
The Vulnerable West: Democracy’s Weakness Against Psychological Reaction
The Authoritarian Advantage
Western democracies face unique vulnerabilities during this ongoing pandemic reaction:
1. Exploitation by Authoritarian Leaders
The psychological need for “strong fathers” who promise to restore pre-pandemic order makes populations vulnerable to authoritarian appeals. We observe:
Electoral success of explicitly anti-public-health candidates
Cult-of-personality politics around leaders who deny pandemic impacts
Symbolic strength displays (anti-mask, anti-vaccine stances) valued over competent governance
Attacks on expertise framed as populist resistance to “elites”
Research on the Trump phenomenon showed how appeals to strict father authority resonated with voters facing uncertainty. During pandemic conditions, this dynamic intensified.
2. Opportunistic Billionaire Capitalism
The pandemic created unprecedented wealth transfer to billionaires while working populations suffered. This inequality has been leveraged to:
Fund anti-public-health political movements (e.g., Koch network backing mask/vaccine opposition)
Resist workplace safety improvements that might reduce profits
Lobby against building code upgrades requiring better ventilation
Promote “return to normal” narratives that prioritize economic activity over health
The strict father model’s emphasis on self-reliance and resistance to “handouts” provides ideological cover for policies that benefit wealthy elites while harming working populations.
3. Feudal Powers Capitalising on Turmoil
Authoritarian states and reactionary movements have exploited pandemic-induced chaos to:
Undermine democratic institutions through disinformation campaigns
Promote anti-science narratives that weaken Western technological advantage
Encourage political polarization that paralyzes effective governance
Model authoritarian “efficiency” in pandemic response (despite questionable actual effectiveness)
Russia and China, in particular, have actively promoted anti-vaccine disinformation in Western countries while mandating vaccination in their own populations—a strategic undermining of adversary capabilities.
4. The Democratic Disadvantage
Democracies’ fundamental strengths—transparency, freedom of expression, responsive governance—become weaknesses during crises that trigger authoritarian psychology:
Transparent reporting of deaths and failures undermines confidence
Freedom of expression enables disinformation campaigns
Responsive governance to diverse constituencies creates policy incoherence
Respect for individual liberty prevents effective coordination
This isn’t an argument for authoritarianism—authoritarian regimes’ pandemic failures were often worse despite information control. Rather, it highlights that democracies face particular vulnerabilities when significant portions of their populations experience psychological needs for authoritarian “strong fathers” who promise simple solutions to complex threats.
The Downward Spiral
The combination of these factors creates a self-reinforcing cycle:
Pandemic reveals systemic vulnerability
Vulnerability triggers authoritarian psychology in portion of population
Authoritarian psychology resists structural changes that might address vulnerability
Unaddressed vulnerability enables continued disease spread
Continued spread creates more uncertainty and fear
More uncertainty and fear strengthen authoritarian appeals
Authoritarian movements gain power, further preventing adaptive response
This cycle, if unbroken, leads toward either:
Gradual democratic degradation as authoritarian movements incrementally erode democratic institutions, or
Catastrophic collapse when accumulated vulnerabilities enable a crisis that overwhelms weakened systems
The Infrastructural Imperative We’re Ignoring
The Conducive Environment
The contemporary pandemic pattern emerges from specific material conditions:
1. Global Urban Network
Densely populated cities provide large susceptible populations
International air travel connects these populations within hours
Shared air systems in buildings facilitate transmission
Return-to-office mandates concentrate people in inadequate spaces
Global distribution enabling variants to spread before immunity develops
3. The Adaptation Race
Human adaptive responses (vaccines, treatments) must compete with viral evolution in an environment optimized for the virus. This is analogous to running a race while giving your opponent a head start and favorable terrain.
The Interventions Not Happening
Addressing this conducive environment would require:
1. Architectural Revolution
Universal air filtration (HEPA or equivalent) in public buildings
UV-C germicidal irradiation in HVAC systems
Ventilation standards updated for airborne pathogen transmission
Global coordination constrains national sovereignty
3. They Require Collective Action
The interventions needed are fundamentally incompatible with strict father ideology’s emphasis on:
Individual responsibility over collective response
Self-reliance over interdependence
Minimal government over coordinated governance
Free-market solutions over regulated change
4. They Cost Money Now for Future Benefit
Strict father morality emphasizes:
Present discipline over future investment
Earned rewards over preventive spending
Punishment of weakness over systemic change
Personal responsibility for vulnerability
Investing in infrastructure to prevent future pandemics requires precisely the opposite orientation.
The Misdirection of Capital: Techno-Utopianism as Pandemic Escapism
Elon Musk and the New Futurism
In the midst of this psychological crisis, we witness a peculiar phenomenon: vast sums of capital flowing toward fantastical technological “solutions” rather than practical infrastructural improvements. Elon Musk’s pivot toward humanoid robots—the promise that artificial workers will solve all problems and render pandemic vulnerabilities irrelevant—represents the apotheosis of techno-utopian escapism.
This bears striking parallels to the futurism of the 1920s and 1930s. Following the trauma of World War I and the Spanish Flu pandemic, that era saw:
Investment in spectacular projects rather than public health infrastructure
Charismatic industrialists as visionary heroes (Henry Ford, Thomas Edison)
Faith that technology would transcend human vulnerability and social problems
Then, as now, this futurism served a psychological function: it promised escape from uncomfortable realities rather than adaptation to them. The 1920s-30s futurism collapsed into the Great Depression and World War II—crises that revealed the inadequacy of technological fantasies disconnected from material and social infrastructure.
The Humanoid Robot Fantasy: Emotionally Driven, Infrastructurally Impossible
Musk’s humanoid robot project exemplifies emotionally driven techno-utopianism rather than realistic technological development:
1. The Missing Foundation
Humanoid robots operating at scale would require:
Automated maintenance systems capable of servicing millions of robots
Robust data infrastructure far exceeding current capacity
Open systems and standardized protocols enabling interoperability
Reliable power grids and charging infrastructure
Supply chains for parts, repairs, and upgrades
Regulatory frameworks and safety systems
Educational institutions training maintenance workers
Economic systems adapted to mass automation
None of these foundational layers are receiving the investment flowing toward the robot fantasy itself. This is analogous to promoting flying cars while roads remain full of potholes—the spectacular vision disconnected from mundane prerequisites.
2. The Ecosystem Requirement
Humanoid robots represent an apex technology requiring a complete supporting ecosystem:
The current data infrastructure is already “creaking”—inadequate for present demands, much less for billions of autonomous robots requiring constant connectivity and updates. Without this ecosystem, humanoid robots are non-functional props, technological cargo cults worshipping imaginary capabilities.
3. The Impractical Reality
We can demonstrate the impracticality through basic analysis:
Energy requirements: Humanoid robots require enormous power. Where will this come from when current grids struggle with existing demands?
Maintenance burden: Mechanical systems fail. Who maintains robots when we can’t maintain existing infrastructure?
Data transmission: Real-time robotic operation requires massive bandwidth. Current infrastructure can’t support this at scale.
Part manufacturing: Complex robots need precision components. Supply chain fragility was exposed by pandemic disruptions—how would robot supply chains fare?
Skill requirements: Operating and maintaining robots requires technical expertise. Our educational systems aren’t producing these workers.
The humanoid robot fantasy reveals itself as emotionally rather than rationally motivated: a desire for magical solutions that make pandemic-revealed vulnerabilities disappear, without the hard work of addressing actual systemic problems.
Capital Flowing to Father Figures, Not Infrastructure
The pattern is clear: vast sums flow toward charismatic “father figures” who promise technological salvation—Musk, Bezos, Zuckerberg—while practical infrastructure investments languish:
Funded Fantasy Projects:
Humanoid robots ($billions)
Mars colonization ($billions)
Neural interfaces ($billions)
Cryptocurrency systems ($billions)
Virtual reality “metaverses” ($billions)
Unfunded Practical Needs:
Building ventilation upgrades ($inadequate)
Public health surveillance systems ($defunded)
Water infrastructure ($crumbling)
Electrical grid modernization ($insufficient)
Public transportation ($neglected)
Pandemic-resistant architecture ($non-existent)
This misallocation isn’t accidental—it’s psychologically motivated. The fantasy projects promise:
Escape from biological vulnerability: If we colonize Mars or upload to machines, pandemics become irrelevant
Technological transcendence: Solutions that don’t require acknowledging present failures
Strong father figures: Charismatic leaders who promise to solve everything
Restoration of control: Technology as means to dominate nature rather than adapt to it
Individual salvation: Personal technological enhancement rather than collective infrastructure
These are precisely the promises that strict father psychology craves: strength, control, transcendence, and individual rather than collective solutions.
The Contrast: What Real Investment Would Look Like
Compare the humanoid robot fantasy with realistic technological applications addressing actual pandemic vulnerabilities:
Building Automation and Safety:
Automated HVAC systems with pathogen-detecting sensors and responsive filtration
UV-C disinfection robots for large spaces (already proven technology)
Air quality monitoring networks with public dashboards
Ventilation optimization AI using occupancy sensors and predictive modeling
Touchless interfaces for elevators, doors, and building systems
These technologies exist. They’re practical. They’re affordable at scale. They would actually reduce pandemic transmission. Yet they receive a fraction of investment compared to humanoid robot fantasies.
Infrastructure Automation:
Automated water quality monitoring preventing contamination
Self-healing electrical grids with distributed generation and storage
Predictive maintenance systems for bridges, roads, and tunnels
Automated waste management improving sanitation
Public health data integration enabling early outbreak detection
Again—proven technologies, practical applications, genuine benefits. Yet they lack the emotional appeal of humanoid servants, so capital flows elsewhere.
Open Systems and Interoperability:
The humanoid robot vision, if it were serious rather than fantasy, would prioritize:
Open-source robotic operating systems enabling diverse manufacturers
The 1920s futurism collapsed not because the visions were impossible in principle, but because they were disconnected from material reality. Flying cars are technically feasible—but not while roads crumble. Robot servants are possible—but not without the maintenance ecosystem to support them.
Today’s techno-utopianism suffers the same disconnect. Humanoid robots are theoretically achievable—but not while data infrastructure creaks, electrical grids fail, and we refuse to invest in the foundational layers that would make them possible. We may build them, but they will rapidly end up on the scrap heap as soon as something like a pandemic collapses precarious corporate monopoly supply chains.
The Authoritarian Bargain
This misdirection of capital represents a bargain between populations seeking strong fathers and billionaires seeking power:
What Populations Get:
Comforting fantasies of technological salvation
Charismatic leaders promising simple solutions
Spectacles distracting from present failures
Permission to deny uncomfortable realities
What Billionaires Get:
Concentration of wealth and power
Freedom from regulation and accountability
Public subsidy of private projects
Status as visionary heroes rather than extractive oligarchs
This bargain is catastrophically bad for humanity’s long-term survival, but it satisfies immediate psychological needs for those who can’t tolerate pandemic-revealed truths.
Conclusion: Charting a Path Forward
Still Inside, Still Falling—But Not Without Agency
We remain inside the pandemic—not its acute phase but its chronic political and psychological crisis. The original pathogen revealed uncomfortable truths: that society is constructed rather than natural, that hierarchies can’t protect against indifferent biology, that interdependence is not weakness but reality. Most fundamentally, it collapsed the dualistic ontology structuring Western consciousness—the illusory separation of humanity from nature, culture from biology, spirit from matter.
For psychologies oriented toward authority, hierarchy, and certainty—and shaped by dualistic religious and philosophical traditions—these truths are unbearable. The current reaction—denying the virus’s significance, dismantling public health infrastructure, attacking medical expertise, electing authoritarian leaders, investing in escapist technological fantasies—represents an attempt to restore the pre-pandemic dualistic ontology by eliminating all evidence that it was ever disrupted.
This ontological restoration project ensures we will face worse pandemics in the future. By refusing to acknowledge that our globally connected urban environment creates optimal conditions for pathogen evolution, by resisting the architectural and infrastructural changes that might mitigate transmission, by dismantling the scientific and public health capacity to respond effectively, by directing capital toward fantasies rather than practical solutions, and most fundamentally by clinging to dualistic ontology that requires denying humanity’s integration with nature, we are actively constructing the conditions for catastrophe.
The Historical Pattern and Its Breaking
The historical parallels are stark. After the Black Death, Europe took 150 years to recover demographically and experienced social upheavals (peasant revolts, religious reformation, breakdown of feudalism) that transformed civilisation. After the Spanish Flu, social trust eroded for generations, mental health impacts persisted for years, and the pandemic was rapidly forgotten—only to recur in new forms.
Yet history also shows that societies can adapt, though usually only after catastrophic failures force acknowledgment of reality:
The Black Death ultimately broke feudalism and enabled new social forms
The Spanish Flu contributed to welfare state development and women’s enfranchisement
The 1930s-40s crises eventually produced public health infrastructure and social safety nets
The question is whether we must wait for catastrophe to force adaptation, or whether we can choose reality over comforting fantasy.
What Realistic Forward Movement Requires
A genuine path forward demands rejecting both the denial that claims the pandemic is over and the escapism that promises technological transcendence without foundation:
1. Acknowledging Material Reality
The pandemic revealed systemic vulnerabilities that remain unaddressed
Social systems are constructed and can be reconstructed
Hierarchy and authority cannot protect against biological threats
Collective action and infrastructure investment are necessary
Most fundamentally: Humanity is not separate from nature; dualistic ontology is illusory and dangerous. We must embrace monistic ontology recognizing our integration with biological and ecological systems.
2. Redirecting Capital Flows
Away from:
Escapist technological fantasies
Concentration in authoritarian figures
Proprietary closed systems
Spectacular projects with no foundation
Toward:
Building ventilation and air quality systems
Open-source automation and monitoring
Distributed and resilient infrastructure
Public health surveillance and response capacity
Educational systems for maintenance and operation
Democratic control of technological development
3. Building the Maintenance Ecosystem
Before advanced automation becomes realistic, we need:
Automated systems for maintaining infrastructure (water, power, data, transport)
Open standards and interoperable protocols
Distributed manufacturing and repair networks
Technical education at scale
Regulatory frameworks for emerging technologies
Economic models supporting transition
This is unglamorous work. It lacks the emotional appeal of humanoid servants or Mars colonies. But it’s the actual foundation for any advanced technological future—and it would address present pandemic vulnerabilities.
4. Confronting Psychological Resistance
The hardest challenge is psychological:
Populations seeking strong fathers must learn to tolerate uncertainty
Strict father psychology must acknowledge limits of authority and strength
Individualist ideologies must accept interdependence as reality
Escapist fantasies must yield to engagement with present problems
Uncomfortable truths must be faced rather than denied
This may be impossible at scale. Psychological patterns established in childhood and reinforced across lifetimes rarely change voluntarily. Entire populations may be incapable of the adaptation required.
Two Paths, Two Futures
We face a bifurcation:
Path One: Continued Denial and Escapism
Capital flows to fantasies and authoritarian figures
Infrastructure continues deteriorating
Pandemic waves continue and intensify
Authoritarian movements gain power
Eventual catastrophic collapse or degradation into permanent crisis
Path Two: Reality-Based Adaptation
Acknowledge pandemic-revealed vulnerabilities
Invest in practical infrastructure and open systems
Develop collective capacity for coordinated response
Create political and economic systems resistant to authoritarian capture
The choice seems clear. Yet the psychological barriers to Path Two may be insurmountable for many. Those who need strong fathers and comforting certainties will continue seeking them, regardless of consequences.
What Must Break
For genuine adaptation to occur, something must break:
Either, the dualistic ontology breaks: Recognition that humanity/nature separation is illusory, requiring wholesale reconstruction of philosophical, religious, economic, and political systems
or
The denial breaks and reality becomes impossible to ignore, forcing acknowledgment of monistic ontology
the systems break, then continued failure creates collapse that enables rebuilding on monistic foundations
and the psychology breaks: Enabling enough people to achieve the difficult work of embracing interdependence and uncertainty
The first option would be preferable but requires abandoning core Western belief structures—it would be a transformation as profound as the shift from medieval to modern worldview. The second and third are increasingly probable as climate change and future pandemics compound. The fourth may be happening among some populations but seems unlikely at scale sufficient to prevent catastrophe.
The deeper truth: Until Western consciousness confronts its dependence on dualistic ontology and the impossibility of maintaining that dualism in the face of ecological and epidemiological reality, all other reforms remain superficial. You cannot build pandemic-resilient civilization on foundations that require denying biological integration. You cannot address climate change while maintaining economy/nature separation. You cannot create sustainable systems while clinging to human/natural dualism.
The Bottom Line
We are not beyond the pandemic. We are not recovering from the pandemic. We are failing to respond—and ensuring worse ones to come.
The waves will continue. The pathogens will adapt. The infrastructure will remain inadequate. Capital will flow to escapist fantasies and authoritarian figures. And populations seeking psychological comfort through “strong fathers” and technological transcendence will become increasingly vulnerable to precisely the disasters those authorities promise to prevent.
The ontological dimension makes this particularly acute for the West: Clinging to dualistic ontology that requires separation from nature, Western civilization systematically selects against adaptation to biological and ecological reality. Each denial, each attack on science, each refusal to acknowledge interdependence serves the project of maintaining an illusory ontology—even as maintaining that illusion guarantees catastrophic failure.
The genie cannot be forced back into the bottle. Reality cannot be restored through denial. Humanoid robots will not save us while buildings lack adequate ventilation. Mars colonies will not rescue humanity from pandemic vulnerability on Earth. And dualistic ontology cannot be maintained in a world where nature demonstrably overwhelms the “separate” human sphere.
But the attempt will continue, with each denial deepening the vulnerability it seeks to escape, with each misdirected billion making practical solutions less achievable, with each reassertion of dualism making monistic adaptation more psychologically impossible, until something breaks: either the ontology, the denial, the systems, or the psychology maintaining them.
The tragedy is that we know what practical responses would look like. The technology exists. The knowledge exists. The philosophical foundations exist in both ancient Greek monism and Asian non-dualistic traditions. What lacks is the capacity to abandon dualistic ontology—to choose boring infrastructure over exciting fantasy, to tolerate uncomfortable truths over comforting illusions, to invest in collective resilience over individual transcendence, to accept humanity’s fundamental integration with nature rather than cling to illusory separation.
History suggests this capacity typically emerges only after catastrophe. The Black Death broke feudalism. The World Wars broke empires. Perhaps the cascading crises of climate change and pandemic waves will break dualism.
We can hope this breaking comes before complete collapse. But dualistic consciousness, precisely because it’s unconscious and pervasive through Western education, politics, religion, and thought, may prove more resistant to reality than the civilisations built upon it.
The pandemic isn’t over. It’s just beginning to transform us—revealing the fundamental ontological structure that makes Western civilisation uniquely vulnerable to biological reality. Whether that revelation produces adaptation or collapse remains to be seen.
References
Aassve, A., Alfani, G., Gandolfi, F., & Le Moglie, M. (2020). Epidemics and trust: The case of the Spanish Flu. Health Economics.
Calvillo, D. P., Ross, B. J., Garcia, R. J., Smelter, T. J., & Rutchick, A. M. (2020). Political ideology predicts perceptions of the threat of COVID-19. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1119.
Gauchat, G. (2012). Politicization of science in the public sphere: A study of public trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010. American Sociological Review, 77(2), 167-187.
Hibbing, J. R., Smith, K. B., & Alford, J. R. (2014). Predisposed: Liberals, conservatives, and the biology of political differences. Routledge.
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Iyer, R., & Haidt, J. (2012). Disgust sensitivity, political conservatism, and voting. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(5), 537-544.
Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. Motivation and Emotion, 36(1), 55-64.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339-375.
Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. A., & Gosling, S. D. (2008). Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality, and political psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(2), 126-136.
Kerr, J. R., Panagopoulos, C., & van der Linden, S. (2021). Political polarization on COVID-19 pandemic response in the United States. Personality and Individual Differences, 179, 110892.
Lakoff, G. (1996). Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think. University of Chicago Press.
Mamelund, S. E. (2003). Effects of the Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918-19 on later outbreak of mental disorders in Norway, 1926–1929. Epidemiology, 14(S26).
Schaller, M. (2006). Parasites, behavioral defenses, and the social psychological mechanisms through which cultures are evoked. Psychological Inquiry, 17(2), 96-101.
Schaller, M., & Park, J. H. (2011). The behavioral immune system (and why it matters). Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(2), 99-103.
Terrizzi, J. A., Shook, N. J., & McDaniel, M. A. (2013). The behavioral immune system and social conservatism: A meta-analysis. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34(2), 99-108.
Tyson, A. (2020). Republicans, Democrats move even further apart in coronavirus concerns. Pew Research Center.
Van Prooijen, J. W., & Douglas, K. M. (2017). Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations. Memory Studies, 10(3), 323-333.
Van Prooijen, J. W., & Douglas, K. M. (2018). Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(7), 897-908.